ABBOTT LABORATORIES et al.,
S249895
Supreme Court of California
June 25, 2020
Fourth Appellate District, Division One, D072577; Orange County Superior Court, 30-201600879117-CU-BT-CXC
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuellar, Kruger and Fujisaki* concurred. Justice Kruger filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justice Corrigan concurred.
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, assigned
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT
S249895
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
The Orange County District Attorney (District Attorney) brought this action against several pharmaceutical companies, alleging that the companies had intentionally delayed the sale of a generic version of a popular pharmaceutical drug to maximize their profits at the expense of consumers throughout California. The companies moved to strike references to “California” in the complaint, arguing that the District Attorney has no jurisdiction to enforce California‘s consumer protection laws outside the geographic boundaries of Orange County. After the trial court denied the motion to strike, the companies obtained an order from the Court of Appeal directing the trial court to grant the motion.
The People, as real party in interest and represented by the District Attorney, have asked this court to determine whether the District Attorney‘s authority to enforce California‘s consumer protection laws under the auspices of the unfair competition law (UCL) (
I.
The District Attorney initiated this action by filing a complaint in the name of the People of the State of California against Abbott Laboratories, AbbVie Inc., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.; Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc; Duramed Pharmaceuticals Inc.; and Duramed Pharmaceutical Sales Corp. (collectively, Abbott). The complaint alleged that Abbott violated the UCL by entering into agreements to delay the market debut of generic versions of Niaspan, a prescription drug used to treat high cholesterol. As a result, the District Attorney alleges, users of Niaspan, their insurers, public health care providers, and other government entities paid substantially higher prices for Niaspan than they would have if the generic version had been available without improper delay. The District Attorney sought an injunction prohibiting Abbott from further violating the UCL and an order for restitution and civil penalties, including treble penalties for violations that injured senior citizens or disabled persons. (
Abbott, in turn, filed a motion to strike “claims for restitution and civil penalties to the extent that those are not limited to Orange County.” Noting that the District Attorney‘s complaint makes no specific claim to penalties or restitution extending beyond the bounds of the county, Abbott asked the trial court to strike 16 references to “California” from the complaint on the ground that a district attorney‘s enforcement authority under the UCL is limited to the geographic boundaries of his or her county. According to Abbott, the motion was intended to “focus” the case, discovery, and scope of any potential settlement.
The trial court denied the motion to strike, finding “premature” Abbott‘s concerns about the scope of discovery and financial exposure as well as any enforcement concerns that might arise if the Attorney General were excluded from a negotiated statewide settlement. The court explained: “If there‘s a settlement, I can guarantee you the Attorney General . . . is going to know about [it]. So, we will deal with that if and when. . . . There are going to be more players in any kind of settlement unless there‘s a carve-out.” The court did not refer specifically to the geographic scope of the District Attorney‘s authority during the hearing or in its minute order.
Abbott sought review by means of a writ petition. A divided Court of Appeal overruled the District Attorney‘s demurrer and granted relief to
The Court of Appeal observed that “though district attorneys have plenary authority to pursue actions in the criminal arena in the State‘s name [citation], their ‘authority is territorially limited’ to the confines of their county.” (Abbott, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th 1, 19, quoting Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 361 (Pitts).) By contrast, “with respect to civil actions, a district attorney has no plenary power.” (Abbott, at p. 19.) “Rather, it is settled that a ‘district attorney has no authority to prosecute civil actions absent specific legislative authorization.’ ” (Id. at p. 20, quoting People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 753 (Humberto S.).) As to whether the UCL grants such authority, the court looked to People v. Hy-Lond Enterprises, Inc. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 734 (Hy-Lond), which held that a district attorney has no authority to limit the powers of the Attorney General or other public agencies under the guise of UCL enforcement. (Hy-Lond, at pp. 752–753.) The Court of Appeal here explained it had “no difficulty applying Hy-Lond‘s principles to bar a district attorney‘s unilateral effort to seek restitution and civil penalties for UCL violations occurring outside his or her own county jurisdiction.” (Abbott, at p. 25.)
Writing in dissent, Justice Dato explained that Abbott had failed to “offer anything approaching an ‘extraordinary reason’ to justify this court‘s decision to intervene at the pleading stage” in order to address “a motion to strike that does not challenge the plaintiff‘s ability to plead a valid claim, but merely seeks to edit the language of the complaint in a manner that better suits the defendants’ tactical purposes.” (Abbott, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 34 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.).) Even if Abbott had met this threshold showing, Justice Dato continued, “the majority opinion reaches the wrong result.” (Id. at p. 37 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.).) According to Justice Dato, it is the court, not the plaintiff, that awards restitution, and “there is nothing inherently problematic about the court awarding restitution to statewide victims of defendants’ unlawful business practice.” (Ibid.) “[E]ven absent a request by the District Attorney the court is empowered by section 17203 to award restitution ‘to any person’ adversely affected by the defendants’ unlawful conduct. . . . This includes, potentially, residents of counties other than Orange.” (Ibid., quoting
We granted the District Attorney‘s petition for review, which was limited to the Court of Appeal‘s decision to grant writ relief. The District Attorney did not seek review of the portion of the Court of Appeal‘s opinion overruling the demurrer. Accordingly, we express no view on the service requirements of section 17209, as all papers filed in this court have been properly served upon the Attorney General. (See
II.
We review the trial court‘s denial of the motion to strike for abuse of discretion. (Cal-Western Business Services, Inc. v. Corning Capital Group (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 304, 309.) To the extent the decision rested upon a legal determination as to the scope of the District Attorney‘s authority, it is a question of law subject to de novo review. (Ibid.; see Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 345.)
A.
The UCL prohibits unfair competition, defined as “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” (
To that end, the Legislature has created a scheme of overlapping enforcement authority. Section 17204 provides that actions for relief under the UCL may be prosecuted “by the Attorney General or a district attorney or by a county counsel authorized by agreement with the district attorney in actions involving violation of a county ordinance, or by a city attorney of a city having a population in excess of 750,000, or by a city attorney in a city and county or, with the consent of the district attorney, by a city prosecutor in a city having a full-time city prosecutor in the name of the people of the State of California upon their own complaint or upon the complaint of a board, officer, person, corporation, or association, or by a person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.”
The UCL grants broad equitable authority to courts to remedy violations. Section 17203 provides in relevant part: “Any person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition may be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction. The court may make such orders or judgments, including the appointment of a receiver, as may be necessary to prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice which constitutes unfair competition, as defined in this chapter, or as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition.” Such remedies are “cumulative . . . to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state.” (
While the UCL provides for both public and private enforcement, authorized public prosecutors have an additional tool to enforce the state‘s consumer protection laws: civil penalties. “Any person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition shall be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for each violation, which shall be assessed and recovered in a civil action brought in the name of the people of the State of California by the Attorney General, by any district attorney, by any county counsel authorized by agreement with the district attorney in actions involving violation of a county ordinance, by any city attorney of a city having a population in excess of 750,000, by any city attorney of any city and county, or, with the consent of the district attorney, by a city prosecutor in any city having a full-time city prosecutor, in any court of competent jurisdiction.” (
B.
Abbott argues that this case is controlled by our statement in Safer v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 230, 236 (Safer) that “the Legislature has manifested its concern that the district attorney exercise the power of his office only in such civil litigation as that lawmaking body has, after careful consideration, found essential.” According to Abbott, the UCL contains no legislative finding that statewide enforcement by district attorneys is “essential” to the purpose of the UCL.
The proceedings at issue in Safer arose when a farmworkers’ union set up picket lines around the fields of several Ventura County strawberry growers. (Safer, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 233.) The growers filed suit to obtain injunctive relief against the union and its members, and the trial court issued a temporary restraining order limiting the spacing and number of pickets. The next day, the Ventura County Sheriff arrested a number of participants in ongoing picketing activities, charging three with willful disobedience of a lawful court order, a misdemeanor offense. Then, when the defendants appeared for jury trial, the district attorney dismissed the misdemeanor charges and instead served them with orders to show cause in contempt proceedings initiated under
We held that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it permitted the district attorney to prosecute a contempt proceeding arising from private civil litigation “in which the district attorney could rest his
Although Safer specifically concerned “a disturbing instance” of intervention by a public prosecutor in private civil litigation (Safer, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 242), Abbott notes that we have cited Safer for the general proposition that “a district attorney has no authority to prosecute civil actions absent specific legislative authorization.” (Humberto S., supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 753 & fn. 12 [citing cases]; see Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. County of Stanislaus (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1143, 1155–1156 [citing Safer to explain that if a specific provision of the Cartwright Act authorizing the district attorney to bring antitrust actions on behalf of the county or its subdivisions did not exist, the district attorney would be unable to do so].)
Even assuming Safer established a general requirement that a district attorney may not pursue civil litigation without specific legislative authorization, that requirement is satisfied with regard to a district attorney‘s authority to bring a UCL action. As we explained in People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626, a case concerning a district attorney‘s authority to prosecute violations of the Mobilehome Parks Act (
As to this question, Abbott concedes that the District Attorney may seek and obtain statewide injunctive relief upon a sufficient showing before
There is thus no dispute as to the District Attorney‘s general authority to bring UCL claims or his specific authority to pursue statewide injunctive relief. The issue here, more precisely, is whether a civil enforcement action initiated by a district attorney under the UCL may seek civil penalties for violations occurring outside of the district attorney‘s county as well as restitution on behalf of Californians who do not reside in the county. To answer that question, we return to the text and purpose of the UCL.
C.
” ’ “[O]ur fundamental task is ‘to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ ” ’ [Citation.] As always, we start with the language of the statute, ‘giv[ing] the words their usual and ordinary meaning [citation], while construing them in light of the statute as a whole and the statute‘s purpose.’ ” (Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 135.) As the parties and amici curiae observe, the text of the UCL does not explicitly address the geographic scope of a district attorney‘s authority to seek civil penalties and restitution. But the statute does contain several clues that bear on the question presented.
First, in addition to contemplating statewide injunctions (
The purpose of the quoted language of section 17206 was to codify the standard set forth in People v. Superior Court (Olson) (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 181, 198, for determining the number of violations and corresponding civil penalties resulting from the publication or broadcast of a media advertisement. (See Stats. 1992, ch. 430, § 4, pp. 1707–1708; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1586 (1991–1992 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 4, 1992, pp. 1–2.) Although the legislative history does not include any specific consideration of the question before us, it is notable that the Olson case was brought by the Orange County District Attorney seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties for false advertisements that ran in multiple counties and that targeted homeowners in Orange County and Riverside County. (Olson, at p. 185 & fn. 2.). Neither Olson nor the legislative history of the 1992 amendment to the UCL raised any concern about the geographic scope of relief sought in an enforcement action by a district attorney.
Second, section 17206, subdivision (c) provides in part: “If the action is brought by the Attorney General, one-half of the penalty collected shall be paid to the treasurer of the county in which the judgment was entered, and one-half to the General Fund.” (See also
Third, in making injunctions prohibiting unfair competition widely enforceable throughout the state, section 17207, subdivision (b) distinguishes between “any county in which the violation occurs” and “any county . . . where the injunction was issued.” In other words, the county “where the injunction was issued” is not necessarily the county “in which the violation [of the injunction] occurs,” and civil penalties to punish violation of an injunction may be obtained through a civil action filed in either type of
A straightforward reading of the UCL‘s broad language is consistent with the statute‘s purpose and history. As the parties note, there is no specific indication in the voluminous legislative record of the UCL that the Legislature intended to grant statewide enforcement authority to district attorneys or to withhold such authority from them. But what the record does reveal is a clear trajectory toward greater and overlapping public enforcement at all levels of government.
The scope of public UCL enforcement has expanded in the decades since the statute‘s enactment in 1933. (See Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 116, 129–130.) Although the statute originally provided only for injunctive relief, the Legislature granted to the Attorney General and district attorneys the authority to obtain civil penalties for violations of the UCL in 1972. (Compare Stats. 1963, ch. 1606, § 1, p. 3184 with Stats. 1972, ch. 1084, § 2, p. 2021.) In 1974, the same authority to seek injunctive relief and civil penalties was extended to city attorneys of jurisdictions with a population in excess of 750,000, despite objections that “prosecution of unfair competition cases should be a county-wide function, rather than broken up into cities,” because “harmful competition will arise between the two entities.” (Sen. Republican Caucus, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1725 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 24, 1974, p. 2; see Stats. 1974, ch. 746, § 1, pp. 1654–1655.) The law was amended in 1988 to grant standing to the San Jose City Attorney (Stats. 1988, ch. 790, § 1, pp. 2557–2558), in 1991 to grant standing to all county counsel (Stats. 1991, ch. 1195, § 1, p. 5799), and in 1992 to grant standing to all city attorneys with the consent of their respective district attorneys (Stats. 1992, ch. 430, § 4, p. 1707; see generally Fellmeth, California‘s Unfair Competition Act: Conundrums and Confusions (Jan. 1995) published as part of Recommendation on Unfair Competition Litigation (Nov. 1996) 26 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. 227, 234 & fn. 24). These amendments
The sole exception to this trajectory of expanding UCL enforcement was the 2004 enactment of Proposition 64, which revised the UCL‘s standing provisions for private individuals by providing that “a private person has standing to sue only if he or she ‘has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of such unfair competition.’ ” (Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn‘s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 227, quoting
In sum, the text of the UCL grants broad civil enforcement authority to district attorneys, and this broad grant of authority is consistent with the statute‘s purpose and history. We see no indication that in an enforcement action brought by a district attorney, the Legislature intended to limit civil penalties or restitution to the geographic boundaries of the district attorney‘s county.
III.
Abbott contends that we must read a geographic limitation into the District Attorney‘s UCL enforcement authority in order to give effect to the “hierarchical structure of the prosecutorial function within California‘s executive branch” as set forth in the California Constitution.
Article V, section 13 of the state Constitution provides: “Subject to the powers and duties of the Governor, the Attorney General shall be the chief law officer of the State. It shall be the duty of the Attorney General to see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced. The Attorney General shall have direct supervision over every district attorney and sheriff and over such other law enforcement officers as may be designated by law, in all matters pertaining to the duties of their respective offices, and may require any of said officers to make reports concerning the investigation, detection,
This provision mentions “the powers of a district attorney” but does not define those powers except by reference to “the investigation, detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions.” (
In reading the language of the constitutional provisions concerning the role of the Attorney General and district attorneys, we find nothing in those provisions that constrains the Legislature‘s prerogative to structure UCL enforcement so that a district attorney has authority to seek civil penalties and restitution for violations outside of his or her county. The UCL does not undermine the Attorney General‘s constitutional role as California‘s chief law enforcement officer. In particular, the public enforcement authority that the UCL grants to district attorneys does not constrain the Attorney General‘s prerogative to intervene or take control of a civil enforcement action that, in the Attorney General‘s view, does not adequately serve the public interest. (See
supervision over the district attorneys, and [w]hen he deems it advisable or necessary in
The Attorney General, as amicus curiae, does not join Abbott’s constitutional arguments but offers three practical concerns in support of Abbott’s position. First, the Attorney General suggests that the District Attorney’s position would present “conflicts of interest” between local prosecutors’ responsibility to statewide victims, to whom they are not politically accountable, and their own incentives to secure a greater share of available remedies for local constituencies. “The result,” according to the Attorney General, “could be a degradation of UCL enforcement, as local prosecutors compete to be the first to settle a case and secure penalties for local use.” Second, “granting statewide enforcement authority to local prosecutors would endanger California’s ability to credibly lead the way in matters of national or international prominence” by compromising the Attorney General’s primary role in consumer enforcement. Third, the Attorney General contends, the “widely recognized geographic limitations on district and city attorneys’ UCL authority have formed the basis for decades of interoffice cooperation” between state and local prosecutors, and this cooperation, which is crucial to the intensive investigations and litigation necessary to pursue UCL claims, would be jeopardized by a rule allowing any district attorney to pursue statewide remedies. The CDAA, as amicus curiae, echoes these concerns, adding that an “assertion of statewide jurisdiction and preemptive authority . . . should come . . . only after a careful analysis by the State Legislature to resolve competing policy objectives.” (See Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 578.)
These concerns are not without force, and we do not take them lightly. But two caveats are in order. First, the Attorney General’s “conflict of interest” concern appears directed solely at civil penalties rather than restitution, as restitution is paid to victims, not the county, and thus does not create the same “race to file” incentive. Second, all of these concerns are presented in the abstract. In support of his argument, the Attorney General offers a single example of a district attorney unilaterally pursuing statewide relief in parallel with a coalition of state and local prosecutors. As the Attorney General recounts, the District Attorney of Trinity County, represented by contingency fee counsel, sued Volkswagen shortly after the discovery of the worldwide
In any event, we note that concerns similar to those raised by amici curiae have been conveyed to the Legislature at various junctures when it considered proposals to expand local enforcement (ante, at pp. 15-16), and the Legislature nevertheless chose to create a decentralized enforcement model in which a district attorney has authority to obtain statewide relief. Although arguments in favor of a more centralized model are not without merit, the Legislature reasonably could have believed that an overlapping scheme of decentralized enforcement has several potential advantages.
First, “for a defendant in a state the size of California, a law enforcement action alleging a statewide unlawful business practice and seeking monetary relief creates, at least potentially, a substantial economic exposure. To the extent law enforcement can be Balkanized and monetary relief limited to local jurisdictions—especially early in the litigation—a defendant’s ‘management’ of the exposure is greatly facilitated.” (Abbott, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 32 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.).)
Second, although it is possible that a district attorney will pursue a settlement that undervalues the true scope of statewide claims, it is also possible that the alternative would be no enforcement or penalty at all for violations outside of the district attorney’s county. Indeed, the limited enforcement resources of the Attorney General have been a significant factor in the Legislature’s repeated expansion of public enforcement authority under the UCL. Although concerns about conflicts of interest or duplicative enforcement have been expressed each time the Legislature expanded the scope of UCL enforcement, neither the legislative record nor the briefing before us points to any concrete or widespread problems. “Pursuing litigation against corporate defendants is expensive, and the Legislature was doubtless aware that both financial and political considerations may sometimes discourage a public prosecutor from undertaking such a case. Consistent with the UCL’s broad remedial purposes and the perceived need for vigorous enforcement, there is nothing unconstitutional about the Legislature’s decision to permit and encourage multiple public prosecutors with overlapping lines of authority on the theory that more enforcement in this context is better than less.” (Abbott, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 35 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.).)
Third, as to the Attorney General’s leadership role and the value of interjurisdictional cooperation, the Attorney General retains authority to intervene or take over the case (
The Court of Appeal relied on Hy-Lond, supra, 93 Cal.App.3d 734, in which the Attorney General moved to set aside a stipulated judgment between the Napa County District Attorney and a nursing home operator with facilities in 12 counties. (Id. at pp. 739-742.) The stipulation provided for general injunctive relief and payment of civil penalties (id. at pp. 741-742, 748-749) and designated the Napa County District Attorney as ” ‘the exclusive governmental agency that may enforce the provision of this injunction’ ” (id. at p. 741, fn. 1). It purported to absolve the company of past wrongdoings and immunize it from future unfair competition lawsuits brought by anyone acting on behalf of the state for alleged violations of any acts covered by the injunction. It also purported to bar the state or any of its administrative agencies from taking action to suspend or revoke the company’s license based on the alleged acts referred to in the complaint. (Id. at pp. 741, fn. 2, 749.)
Hy-Lond held that the Attorney General had standing to intervene and move to vacate the judgment. Unlike Abbott, the defendants in Hy-Lond argued that the district attorney must be able to act on behalf of the state in a civil enforcement action because “parties dealing with the state must be able to negotiate with confidence with the agent authorized to bring the suit, and without the fear that another agency or other state entity might overturn any agreement reached.” (Hy-Lond, supra, 93 Cal.App.3d at p. 752.) While acknowledging this concern in the abstract, the court in Hy-Lond reasoned that the parties were on notice that the district attorney had no right “to surrender the powers of the Attorney General and his fellow district attorneys to commence, when appropriate, actions in other counties under the provisions of law.” (Id. at p. 753.) Moreover, the settlement in Hy-Lond ran afoul of the general rule that “an injunction cannot be granted to prevent the execution of a public statute by officers of the law for a public benefit.” (Ibid.) Finding these principles dispositive, the court noted but did not examine the further argument that a contrary rule would result in an intolerable conflict of interest by “put[ting] the initiating district attorney in the position of bargaining for the recovery of civil penalties that would flow into his county’s coffers, at the expense of surrendering the rights and duties of the state to control the respondent’s activities generally through the powers of the Attorney General” and other local and state enforcement agencies. (Ibid.; see id. at p. 754 [“the powers of the district attorney are limited by the recognition of a possible conflict of interest” and corresponding rules of professional conduct].)
Hy-Lond is inapposite because it concerned a negotiated settlement that specifically sought to limit future enforcement authority of the Attorney General and other officials. The parties in this case have not reached any settlement; there is no judgment that purports to bind other public prosecutors or limit their enforcement authority; and the role of the Attorney General has not been compromised or usurped. Further, the trial court said that “if [defendants] reach a settlement with the district attorney, unlike the trial court in Hy-Lond — and if the [Attorney General] comes in and says I want to be heard about this, you bet I’m going to let them be heard on this.” This is not a case where a trial court appears poised to approve a settlement without affording the Attorney General an opportunity to participate.
Ultimately, the pros and cons of centralization or decentralization in the enforcement of California’s consumer protection laws is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide. We acknowledge amici curiae’s concern about democratic accountability, but it is undisputed that the Legislature has authorized local prosecutors to seek a statewide injunction under the UCL.
The Court of Appeal, having reached the contrary result, suggested that a district attorney could seek civil penalties beyond the boundaries of his or her county if the Attorney General were to provide written consent to the litigation. But just as the UCL imposes no geographical limits on a district attorney’s enforcement authority, it contains no provision requiring the district attorney to obtain the Attorney General’s consent to enforce the statute. The Court of Appeal cited statutes dealing with intercounty cooperation between district attorneys’ and city attorneys’ offices, but those statutes do not mention the Attorney General. Simply put, the UCL does not require a district attorney to obtain the Attorney General’s consent, written or otherwise, before pursuing an enforcement action under the statute.
Finally, we note that the complaint in this case specifically alleges that at least some of the violations occurred in Orange County and that venue is therefore proper in the Orange County Superior Court. We have no occasion to address whether a district attorney could bring a UCL claim for conduct occurring entirely outside the bounds of his or her county. (Cf.
We reverse the judgement of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
LIU, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CHIN, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
KRUGER, J.
FUJISAKI, J.*
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT
S249895
Supreme Court of California
June 25, 2020
Kruger, J.
Concurring Opinion by Justice Kruger
I agree with the majority opinion that district attorneys exercising their authority to enforce the unfair competition law (UCL) (
As the majority opinion explains, the text and history of the UCL indicate that when the Legislature empowered district attorneys to sue “in the name of the people of the State of California” (
The majority correctly notes that the UCL’s system of overlapping public enforcement authority generally has not—to this point—given rise to such difficulties. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20.) But as a consequence of our decision today—which has dispelled the cloud of uncertainty that had previously hung over statewide enforcement actions brought by district attorneys—we may well see an increase in attempts to bring such actions, and an increased risk that the Attorney General’s and California District Attorneys Association’s worries will be realized.
The UCL lacks a comparable notification provision for trial proceedings. It does contain one for appellate matters: On appeal, the parties must serve the Attorney General with copies of their briefs and petitions. (
The Legislature may wish to fill this gap by requiring that district attorneys and other public prosecutors serve the Attorney General with a copy of any UCL complaint whose prayer for relief seeks monetary relief for violations occurring beyond the borders of their respective jurisdictions. Such a requirement—which would parallel the existing statutory requirement to serve the Attorney General with copies of each appellate brief or petition—would go a significant way toward addressing the legitimate concerns the Attorney General and other district attorneys have expressed about the powers we recognize today, and toward facilitating coordination and collaboration between different enforcing authorities in the future.
KRUGER, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.