*1
damages
remedy
damages
is liable in
at law in
As to whether Paul
because
Watkins,
speedy,
complete.
plain,
adequate,
court concluded
and
district
genuine
that
there remained unresolved
Rutherford,
Here,
inas
Suchan v.
fact;
issue material
court therefore
supra,
seriously
contended
cannot
“[i]t
summary-
for
the Watkins’ motion
remedy
that the
via
at law
judgment against
and
mo-
Paul
the latter’s
complete
adequate,
speedy,
plain,
summary judgment against
tion for
303,
in this
P.2d at 443.
case.” Id.
former.
plain
that the
The evidence fails
show
respective briefs, appellants (the
In their
any par
need
tiffs
the land
respondent
Watkins)
both
ticular,
purpose,
is one of the
unique
which
deny-
tend
court
that
district
erred in
per
granting specific
main reasons for
summary
ing each of their
motions
formance;
plaintiffs’
contrary,
However,
judgment against
the other.
ob
they
that
seek to
evidence
shows
summary judg-
denial of these
motions
they
resell it
only
tain the land
so that
properly
ment is not
us
consid-
before
circumstances,
profit.
these
Under
appeal
eration.
notice of
indicates
bring
performance
specific
would
only
granting summary
the order
plaintiffs
greater
would
no
relief
than
judgment in favor
Richardsons has
profit.
lost
in the amount of their
appealed.
possess
Therefore,
if the
even
Watkins
regard
refusal,
granting
to the
right
order
of first
an enforceable
summary judgment,
well settled in
fide
if the Richardsons were not bona
even
notice,
Idaho that this Court must construe the ev
purchasers for
this
value without
presented
idence
proper
specific
to the district court liber
performance,
not a
case for
ally in
party
favor of
opposing
the or
properly
and that relief was
denied.
der and accord him the benefit
infer
of all
Judgment
respond-
Costs
affirmed.
ences
might reasonably
which
be drawn.
ents.
Straley v.
Corp.,
Idaho Nuclear
94 Idaho
917,
Rawlings
500 P.2d
v.
SHEPARD, McQUADE,
and Mc
Layne
496,
Pump
& Bowler
93 Idaho
FADDEN,
SCOGGIN,
JJ.,
District
The Watkins contend that the district concluding
court erred in have an
adequate remedy at law in ascertainable issue, this rely On both sides
upon Rutherford, v. Suchan (1966), P.2d 783 Court stated that: BUICK, ABBIE URIGUEN OLDSMOBILE basic, underlying “The equity rule is that INC., corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, will not aggrieved intervene where the party plain, has a speedy, adequate, and UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE complete remedy However, at law. COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent. involving case of contracts the sale No. 11226. land, or lease of courts assume Supreme Court of Idaho. aggrieved party an ad- does not have July equate remedy at law and is entitled
specific performance.” case,
In that the Court went on to decide present- under the circumstances there
ed real property vendor did not have right specific performance obtain *2 Beeks, Kramer, Plankey, M. Beeks, Falls, appellant. Twin &
Smith Rock, Moffatt, Thomas, R. B. Barrett Boise, respondent. Blanton, & SHEPARD, Justice.
This case results an insurance com- pany’s coverage denial of brought The insured seeking attorneys recovery action fees pro- company’s a result incurred as spective punitive damage denial of Summary judgment claim. was entered company. favor of the reverse. question presented The first herein is obligated, an is whether policy, under a blanket automobile provide coverage punitive damage arising claims out acci- of an automobile dent; whether, conversely, public policy precludes coverage. The Idaho company’s pro- second issue is whether spective pu- denial of damage nitive breach claim was insurance contract entitled the sured retain his counsel and there- after fees. recover George Green, May On 1970 one Jr. driving was an automobile Abbie owned Oldsmobile, Uriguen Uriguen was Inc. Joe passenger in the The automobile car. in an in which was involved accident two persons severely injured. were brought injured suits Those Green, Uriguen, doing business as &J Joe Sales, Uriguen U Auto and Abbie Oldsmo- bile, alleging operating Inc. that Green was negligent, “in heedless automobile under the influ- reckless manner while liquor”; ence Green intoxicating per- driving was the automobile with Uriguen Corporation; mission of the Abbie Uriguen Corporation had “full that the knowledge the defendant fact George driving Green, Jr. liquor intoxicating at the time influence permission said auto- given he drive mobile.” acci- relatioiiship to this Uriguen’s Joe least, is obscure, he since say dent we will County, is to inform Cassia “This alleged to be a resident of client, your defend diligently operating an sales tinue automobile punitive damages are but, City Burley the event in Cassia business in the necessary Mr. awarded, Oldsmobile, will County, while Abbie his own pay those corporation Inc., alleged with its to be a *3 paid by be Jails, they will not pocket since principal place of business Twin carrier. alleged liability insurance Uriguen is to be an Idaho. not Joe only passen- of owner automobile but every way possi- attempted in have “We ger; however, alleged it is that the auto- elim- ability to of our to the best ble and being pur- mobile was used for “business case element from this inate poses” Uriguen. point at this damages, Joe but Uri- If doing Mr. note so. We that law unsuccessful two suits injured persons employ you at his guen arose out of desires to substantial in- jury this connection to them to defend case expense because the record reveals items, you are punitive damage that $39,500. suits law were settled with the for you assist ambiguous record to do so and we will regard- somewhat invited ing possible.” every way punitive amount the claim for damages actions; asserted in those it is ei- Later, for Fire wrote counsel U. S. $50,000 ther $150,000. or Corporation: Uriguen counsel for Uriguen Corporation tendered the de- telephone conversation to our “Pursuant pf fense suits two to its liability insur- herewith today, you enclosed will find carrier, ance defendant-respondent U. S. August 6th copy of a letter dated Fire Insurance Inc. U. S. Fire’s attor- today 'from received which we have ney wrote Corporation that while plaintiff in above matter. for counsel U. provide S. Fire would a full defense to the offer of settlement of “You will note the two law suits it would not any cover damages $100,000 special general and punitive awards of damages. The letter $50,000 are punitive We states: forwarding com- copy to “This letter is written you to inform pany. plaintiffs in the event the are successful thoughts on best you any “If how in recovering punitive damages against point, this to case from we conduct the Abbie Buick, Inc., Oldsmobile happy you discuss with would be to corporation, damages such will not mutually convenient time.” paid be by your liability insurance car- still, Later counsel for S. Fire U. wrote rier the reason against pub- that it is Uriguen Corporation: counsel for lic for an insured to obtain cover- age type for this damage. You are appear plaintiffs “It are mak- would urged employ counsel therefore ing attempt nego- it more difficult to
your choice and at your own expense to tiate in this Enclosed settlement case. protect your interests with respect copies herewith are to Amend Motion plaintiffs’ claim damages in Complaint Hear- Amended Notice each (Emphasis case.” supplied) plaintiffs ing, all of are which indicates attempting obtain an Order from Uriguen thereafter legal retained its own prayer Court to increase the guard counsel to regarding interests $50,000.00 $150,000.00. punitive damage Correspondence claims. exchanged between you representing Abbie Uri- U. S. “Since Fire and Uriguen Inc., Corporation. Buick, guen A motion individual- Oldsmobile to dismiss and strike allegations case, ly, thought you in this should be we complaint relating immediately of this Motion advised wrote; denied. Counsel for it, U. Fire S. but intend to resist Amend. We Coverage bodily repeatedly and Mr. advised C. or
we have
client,
Coverage
property damage
D.
insurance
Uriguen our
Uriguen,
carrier
Mr.
applies,
caused
any
pay
award
arising
cannot
an occurrence and
out of
plaintiff
such
ages
maintenance,
obtains
use,
in the event
ownership,
includ-
award,
leads us
since our research
ing loading
unloading,
an
auto-
”
by in-
payment
that such
the conclusion
mobile
.
.
.
pub-
companies
surance
would
policy provision
note
is iden-
policy.”
lic
policy provisions in
tical with
cases which
we will discuss herein. This case focuses
both suits in Novem-
U.
Fire settled
S.
prospective
on U. S. Fire’s
denial of
spe-
ber of 1971. That settlement did
punitive damage
of a
award. We
any allocation between
cifically set forth
Uriguen’s
consider first
assertion that the
merely re-
punitive damages but
actual or
*4
adopting
trial
in
court erred
U.
Fire’s
S.
from all
all defendants “of and
leased
that
forbids insur-
contention
claims, demands,
of ac-
actions or causes
punitive
damage
ance
awards.
tion,
costs,
judgments,
and un-
both known
undersigned
question
impression
or
in
This
of first
known which
of,
any
only
in
dealing
or
There are
cases
hereafter have on account
Idaho.
few
way growing
instant action
[*]
[*]
[*]
fy
Corporation
seeking
of a certain accident with this
to recover
then
brought
its attor-
and the courts have
punitive damages.
garding public
policy
in other
on
sharply
insuring
jurisdictions
divided re-
against
Fire vi-
neys
theory
on the
that U. S.
fees
Idaho follows the
view
prospectively
olated I.C.
41-1839 when
§
public purpose
that
behind
any liability
any
award
punish
is both
to deter.
damages.1 The
might
made for
Stolworthy,
Cox v.
496 P.2d
summary judgment
district
entered
court
Clark,
;
Dodge,
682 (1972) Boise
Inc. v.
92
that I.C.
grounds
S. Fire on the
U.
Jolley
Idaho
(1969);
“The will Supp.) it is stated: insured all sums which the insured shall “In a recent case the court concluded obligated pay legally become as applicable state law an award that under ages because of attorney justly un- thereto the amount due Allowance of entitled I.C. 41-1839. contract, Any policy, (1) certificate or in der such fees suits insurers. — brought any issuing any policy, in action thereafter certificate or shall insurer any insurance, surety, guaranty court or insurer contract of recovery indemnity terms of the under the state for kind or nature whatso pay contract, policy, period such ever, thir certificate which shall fail for adjudge ty days proof (30) the court shall amount as has been further after of loss attorney’s provided policy, ac- fees cer reasonable furnished as in such person contract, pay tion. tificate or
505
ment,
Damages and Their Possi-
punitive damages against an insurer
Punitive
Application
Accident
is submitted
ble
Automobile
improper.
would be
It
policy, Litigation,
(1960);
46
1036
public
Va.L.Rev.
this extension of
rule of
Liability
Note,
Insurance and
intentionally
Automobile
originally limited to acts
caused,
Temple L.Q. 459
Damages,
the cit- Punitive
is unsound. The facts of
Gonsoulin,
Is
award of
ed case
that defendant’s conduct
an
indicate
D.J.
present
Damages
an
not
He had
Punitive
Covered Under
wilful.
no
plaintiff.
Comprehensive Liability
injure
act
tent
Had his
Automobile
wilful,
Policy?,
433 (1968).
that he intended
Southwestern
sense
L.J.
plaintiff,
the insurer would
urges adoption
philoso
S. Fire
U.
completely
of liabili-
have been
absolved
phy expressed by Judge
in North
Wisdom
ty.
It
strangely
seems
inconsistent
McNulty, western Nat. Cas. Co. v.
F.
insurer,
breath,
an
in one
liabil-
admit
Corpora
1962). Uriguen
2d
(5th
Cir.
ity
compensatory damages,
then
tion,
hand, urges
adopt
us
the other
deny liability
part
for that
of an
expressed by
the view
the Tennessee court
award claimed attributable to reckless or
Lazenby
v. Universal Underwriters Ins.
Appleman’s argu-
wanton conduct. Mr.
1 (1964).
Tenn.
383 S.W.2d
apply
equal
ments
force to
Judge
McNulty,
In
Wisdom stated:
event
court should
“
appears
.
.
It
to us
.
there
aid
an insurer which fails to exclude
especially
strong
rea-
punitive damages.
*5
Surely
allowing socially
sons for not
irresponsi-
there
nothing
insuring
in the
clause
escape
ble automobile drivers to
the ele-
that would forewarn an insured that
punishment
personal
of
punitive
ment
such was to
party.”
be the intent of the
damages when
guilty
are
of reckless
Likewise in 15
2d,
on
Couch
Insurance
§
slaughter or maiming
highway.
on the
(1966),
56.27
it is stated:
say, society imposes
It is no
to
answer
criminal
wrongdoers;
sanctions to deter
“Recovery under
liability pol-
automobile
enough
offender,
that it is
when
civil
punitive
icies for
exemplary
or
damages
insurance,
through
pays
he is ad-
what
awarded
the insured
gener-
judged to
A
owe.
criminal
ally
conviction
been sustained at least
in the ab-
payment
and
may
to the
fine
state
injuries
sence
intentionally
inflicted
society
be atonement
by
for the offender.
the insured. On this basis
has
But it
not have a sufficient effect
been held that damages recovered by the
on the conduct of others to make
injured
the
party against the insured which
public policy
in favor of
part
are
compensatory
part pu-
and
* * *
ages useful and effective.
We
nitive are
imposed
liabilities
by the law
sympathetic
are
with the innocent victim
for damages within
meaning
the
here; perhaps there
thing
is no such
liability policy,
automobile
whether
money damages making him
But
whole.
were awarded on the basis
receiving noncompensato-
interest
gross
negligence and not of intention-
ry damages
compared
is small
with the
injuries.”
al
public
lessening
interest in
the toll of in-
See
Am.Jur.2d,
also: 7
Automobile In-
jury
highways;
and death on the
196,p.
surance
§
thing
there is such a
aas
state
However,
contrary
the
rule has also
punish
by
wrong-
making
deter
the
support
found
from the commentators.
pay.”
doer
ring on the
public purpose
that the
in
the
view
prohibition of
skeptical
what
punitive damages
punish
behind
is both
liability for
surance
Lazenby
court stated:
ex
to deter.
accomplish the results
damages will
*
**
If
by
majority.
pected
accept
knowledge,
as common
“We
by such stat
penalties provided
criminal
injuries
highways
fact
on our
death and
seri
wrongdoers, I
utes fail
deter
very
problem and
and streets
serious
closing
market
ously doubt that
great
is a
concern.
matter
so. As
will do
insurance
accept,
further
as common knowl-
We
fact,
my
judgment
it is
matter
drivers,
edge,
irresponsible
socially
who
F.
opposite result will follow.”
operation of motor
their action and
2d at 444.
vehicles,
be liable for
could
great part
prob-
McNulty.
two facets of
point
We, however,
agree
able to
lem.
are not
attempting to
First,
court was
the federal
market,
closing
predict
of Florida
damages,
payment
time had not been
Virginia
which at
necessarily ac-
such drivers who would
state courts.
announced
deterring
complish
result of
them
Secondly:
State, in
wrongful
This
their
conduct.
the suit oc-
giving rise to
“The accident
regard
proper operation of motor
to the
Smith, a drunken
curred
Florida.
vehicles,
many
crim-
great
has a
detailed
driver, traveling
eighty
an hour
miles
sanctions,
apparently
inal
faster, weaving
from side to side
highways
slaughter on our
deterred this
pass
the automobile
the road tried
say
closing of
and streets. Then
McNulty
plaintiff
was driv-
Edward
market,
payment of
in the
ing.
attempt
it was
He made
where
punitive damages,
to deter
would act
impossible
pass
completely lost
he
opinion
guilty
in our
drivers would
smashed
control of his car.
car
Smith’s
speculation.
tain some element
*6
McNulty’s
into the
of
car. Without
rear
aid,
language in
the
“Second. The
the
stopping to
fled
render
Smith'
bar,
is similar
policy in
at
which
the case
scene of the accident. He was arrested
policies, has
liability
many types of
to
highway
twelve miles down the
when
courts,
by
as a mat-
most
been construed
gas.”
car ran
F.2d at 433.
out of
307
language
interpretation
the
of
ter
of
of
theory
support
McNulty
In
See:
compensatory and
policy, to cover both
Tenery, 96
Universal
Indem. Ins. Co. v.
most courts
damages. Since
10,
(1934);
Colo.
Crull v.
776
language in
so construed this
Gleb,
(Mo.App.1964); Nich-
507
wrong
849,
injury.
Daniel,
which caused the
What
Ark.
440 S.W.2d
246
Co. v.
injured party?
Implicit
;
&
about
Hartford Accident
(1969)
582
Price v.
485,
in-
Co.,
P.2d 522
the entire field
tort
108 Ariz.
Indem.
concept
furnishing
surance law is the
(1972).
protection
in-
some
who are
those
pro
point
policy
We
jured.
policy
Public
involved here
as be
herein make no distinction
visions
greater
society
extent.
will
do
What
punitive damages. Puni
tween actual and
daily
injured
with the thousands
are
who
specifically excluded
damages are
and to some
whom
pro
policy
language.
Under
are
at
awarded.” 307 F.2d
policy
promises
vision
turn
now to a consideration of
pay
all
behalf
the insured
sums
any
whether U. S. Fire’s refusal to cover
obligated
legally
insured shall.be
punitive damages
award of
constituted
pay
as
caused
the use of
breach of
contract.
any automobile.
The law clear
Idaho
question
same
Motor
was treated
Boise
policies
that insurance
are to be construed
Co.,
Mercury
Car Co.
Paul
v. St.
Indem.
liberally
recovery.
most
in favor of
438,
(1941).
Idaho
Uriguen potential liability faced $150,000 punitive damages arising for out If, opinion as the seems to' indi- very person- causing an accident serious cate, punitive damages is the function of injuries. already al We have here- decided deter,” punish “to and to I would dif- coverage that the insurance afforded for ficulty pub- concurring with the view punitive damages. The insurance carrier policy preclude recovery lic does not suggested Uriguen employ its own against liability insurance counsel to defend its interest in- which the punitive damages against the in- awarded surance wrongfully carrier refused to cov- However, sured. most recent Court’s policy. er impractical It is both decision, discussing pu- purposes illogical to look back in as did the time damages, nitive states that feel that “we judge say trial McNulty that since the the courts in these cases should be civil necessity case was settled there was no primarily by purpose motivated of deter- employing counsel. rence the defendant and others [of engaging in similar conduct the future] In the instant case U. Fire S. purpose punishment. In obligation breached its contractual words, exemplary other the assessment of “ * * * prompted by should be the court’s defend suit jury’s assure, desire to to the extent seeking damages against insured possible monetary imposition via the of a sured on bodily account of penalty, that similar conduct does not oc- property damage.” se, Punishment, per cur in the future. when it notified that it would not Jolley should be left criminal law.” cover award of damages. Co., 702, 708-709, Puregro v. 94 Idaho Such refusal constituted breach of the (1972). addition, P.2d our lat- insurance attorneys contract and fees are a recognize est cases also a collateral proper damage arising element of for awarding reason such breach. Boise Motor Co. St. Paul ages: bring encourage plaintiffs suit Mercury Co., Indem. supra; Pendlebury v. engaged defendants who have Socony- Western Cas. & supra; Sur. 708, 496 antisocial Id. at P.2d conduct. Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Cas. 945; Stolworthy, Cox v. supra. Uriguen is entitled to recover the P.2d attorneys reasonable fees occasioned U. coverage insurance While S. Fire’s breach of contract and further predomi- may tend to defeat the allowed its fees incurred deterring public policy purpose nant pursuing present action, both trial conduct, unequivocably similar antisocial appeal. and on promotes purpose the collateral of encour- judgment of the district court is re- aging plaintiffs bring aginst defend- suit versed and remanded with instructions to ants who such conduct engaged determine the Uriguen’s amount of attor- and who are covered under insur- neys fees in both this action at trial and on policies ance fail to exclude appeal and the initial defense of the damages. circumstances, I Under these am damage judgment claims and enter pre- unable to conclude that accordingly. appel- Costs pu- cludes lant. nitive *9 question is deter- Once insured, I feel that of the mined favor opinion fol- remainder determination, and I concur from that
lows reasoning expressed therein. corpora-
READY-TO-POUR, INC., an Idaho Plaintiff-Respondent, tion, Inspector Building McCOY, as
Leonard B. City Ketchum, al., et Defend- ants-Appellants, Party Murphy al., Third Intervenors et
W. E. Appellants.
No.
Supreme of Idaho. Court
July 3, 1973.
