92 Ala. 571 | Ala. | 1890
The estoppel of a grantor, who remains in. possession of land after a conveyance with general warranty, to set up a claim to the land inimical to the rights of the-grantee, can not be extended so far as to prevent the grantor’s acquisition of title by a subsequent holding adverse to the' grantee; and the title so acquired by adverse possession does not pass to the grantee by operation of the covenants of warranty in the deed. The estoppel upon the grantor is similar to that operating in favor of a landlord as against his tenant so long' as that relation exists and is recognized between them. But the tenant may repudiate the relationship and set up an adyerse claim and possession in himself, which, when properly brought home, whether expressly or by implication, to the knowledge of the landlord, will put in operation the statute of limitations in the tenant’s favor.— Wells v. Sheerer, 78 Ala. 142. In like manner, the grantor, who by remaining in possession becomes the grantee’s tenant, may repudiate the relationship evidenced by his deed and may re-acquire title by an adverse possession for the requisite length of time. No more than in the case of an ordinary tenancy, it is necessary that such possession should have been hostile in its inception. Full effect is given to the deed when it is held to vest the absolute title at its delivery, and that it estops the grantor from setting-up any other title as then held adversely. A subsequent acquisition of title by adverse possession is no more a breach of warranty than w-ould be a re-conveyance by the grantee to the grantor. So' far as the parties to this suit are concerned, the deed to the appellant vested in him a perfect legal title. It does not appear that there has been a breach of any of the warranties in that instrument. In the absence of such breach, the warranties do not operate to preclude the grantor from holding an independent title subsequently acquired. Appellant’s title could be as effectually divested by an adverse possession as by his own conveyance, and no more in the one case than in the other would such divestiture of title be defeated by the warranties in the deed. If Mrs. Booth and the appellees claiming under her have, bv adverse possession, acquired
At the date of her deed to appellant, Mrs. Booth was living on the south end of the lot described in the deed. She continued to live there up to the time of her death in 1882. It was not improper to admit proof that, after appellant had gone into possession of the north end of the lot, Mrs. Booth pointed out to him what she called the dividing line between them, and that thereupon appellant built a fence along that line. This -evidence was competent, not to show a mistake in the conveyance as to the boundary line therein described, but upon the •question of the alleged adverse character of the possession retained by Mrs. Booth of the portion of the lot south of the line.
There was no error in refusing to give charge 2. It is urged that this charge should have been given because there was no evidence to show any possession between the death of Mrs. Booth and the entry by Banks, the landlord of the defendants Page and Nobles. If the proof shows that Mrs. Booth had adverse possession, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that possession may be presumed to have continued, and that her heirs or personal representative succeeded thereto. Marston v. Rowe, 43 Ala. 271. Nor was there error in allowing a witness to be asked if the plaintiff knew that Miss Davis, to whom Mrs. Booth had made a deed to a portion of the lot, had improved her property. A person’s knowledge of a thing is a fact to which a witness may testify. If it was desired to •ascertain the grounds upon which the witness based his conclusion as to such facts, this could have been done by a cross-examination. — Elliott v. Stocks, 67 Ala. 290; Hoodv. Disston, 90 Ala. 277; Chenault v. Walker, 14 Ala. 151.
The defendants did not rely alone on the claim of title by adverse possession. The plaintiff’s right of recovery was also denied on the ground that there had been no re-conveyance to him of the legal title which was vested in Mrs. Booth by his mortgage to her to secure the deferred payments on the purchase of the lot. The defendants did not claim that the mortgage debt had not been paid. The evidence was conflicting as to whether the payment was made before or after the law day of the mortgage. Under the common law as recog-, nized in this State, payment of the mortgage debt did not divest the legal title of the mortgagee.- — Jackson v. Scott,
Beversed and remanded.