37 Ala. 106 | Ala. | 1861
The jurors- Drish .-and Choate were mere tenants and occupants, by yearly letting, of rooms used as sleeping apartments. The section of the Code which defines the qualifications of jurors, declares that it is a good ground of challenge for either -party, “ that the juror has not been a resident householder or freeholder of the county, for one year preceding the time he is sworn.” — § 3583. The term “ householder” is defined by Mr. Webster to mean, “the master or chief of a family;-; one who keeps house with his family.” “ Household: ;.those who dwell under the same roof, and compose a family.” In the case of Brown v. Witt, (19 Wend. 475,.) Bronson, J., said, “ The word householder, in this statute, means the head, master, or person who has the charge of, and provides for a family.” “ A person having and providing for a household, is a householder.” — Griffin v. Sutherland, 14 Barb. Sup. Ct. 456. See, also, Rex v. Inhabitants of Rufford, 8. Mod. 40; Slade’s bail, 1 Chitty, 502; Rex v. Poynder, 1 B. & Cress. 178 ; 3 Petersdorff’s Abr. 103. Householder, in our statute, 'means something moré than 'the 'mere occupant of a room, or house. It implies in its term the idea of a domestic establishment — of the management of -a household. — Sallec v. Waters, 17 Ala. 482 ; Boykin v. Edwards, 21 Ala. 261; 2 Mart. La. 313 ; Burrill’s Law Dictionary, “ Household,” .-Under this rule, Messrs. Drish and Choate were noLcompe-
The questions as to the other two jurors will probably not arise again in the present form.
In some cases, we think the rule which excludes confessions, as being procured by hopes held out, or fears excited, has been carried to the verge of propriety, if not beyond it. In Reg. v. Drew, (S. C. & P.,) the language used was, “ Do not say anything to prej udice yourself, as what you say I will take down, and it will be used for nr against you at the trial.” We confess we cannot perceive on what principle this confession was excluded. So, in the case of Reg. v. Morton, (2 Mood. & Rob. 514,) where the language was, “ What you are charged with is a very heavy offense, and you must be very careful in making any statement to me or any body else, that may tend to injure you ; but anything you can say in your defense, we shall be ready to hear, or send to assist you.” In each of these cases, the decision was pronounced by Coleridge, J. In the case of Rex v. Upchurch, (1 Moody, 465,) a hope was held out to
Although we fully approve the sentiments expressed by this -court dn the ease of Wyatt, supra, that, “ in -considering questions of the kind before us, we must bear in mind the dependent relation of the -sla-ve — the absolute dominion under Which he lives,'” (see, also, Clarissa’s case, 11 Ala. 60,) — yet, we agrée with Parke, B., “ that cases on this subject have gone quite far enough, and ought not to be extended.” — Reg. v. Moore, 12 Eng. Law and Eq. 586. In Seaborn's case, the confession was made to the committing magistrate, after he had told the prisoner, (a slave and in custody,). that it was a bad business, or bad situation he Was in; — 20 Ala. 15. The confession Was held admissible. - See, also, Reg. v. Baldry, 2. Lead. Cr. Cases, 164 ; Hawkins v. The State, 7 Missouri, 190.
The substance of what the bailiff said to the prisoner inn this casé Was, that truth was the best policy thatrif he •; did'the act, it was-best to confess it; but, if he did-not do the act; then there was no wish he should say so. Now; iff there lie in this language any inducement offeredto the prisoner to obtain a confession, that inducement w&s -placedi ointhe express condition that he, the prisoner;-'Was-guilty. Hence, to suppose that the prisoner was irifluénéed by the declaration to make the confession, is to-cotíeedé-his-.guilty for, in no other contingency, was he <advised to--' confess The prisoner, if innocent, was warned not- to say'he had -done the deed, in language equally- as strong as th&t “which sought his confession if guilty; Truth was asked for ; and we cannot perceive that any- hope or feariWááúffered to the prisoner, to induce him to make a false confession of guilt. The circuit court did-not err in receiving evidence of the confessions.
Judgment of the circuit court reversed, and cause remanded. Let the prisoner remain in custody, until discharged by due course of law.