110 So. 120 | Miss. | 1926
Appellant purchased a lot and residence thereon from Williamson, a member of the firm of Davis Williamson, who were agents of appellee. At the time of the purchase, Williamson held three fire insurance policies on the residence in appellee company. Appellant's evidence tended to show that, when she purchased the lot and residence from Williamson, Davis Williamson, the agents of appellee company, agreed to transfer the three insurance policies to appellant, and that such transfer was a part of the transaction of the purchase and conveyance of the residence and lot. The evidence on the part of appellee tended to show that Davis Williamson, as agents for appellee, agreed to transfer the policies of insurance to appellant, provided she would pay the unearned premiums thereon, but that, when it came to the consummation of the transaction, appellant declined to pay the unearned premiums, and stated that she did not desire to carry insurance on the residence, and that thereupon the policies of insurance were canceled and surrendered. In other words, according to the evidence on the part of the appellant, the three policies of insurance were in force when the residence was burned, while, according to the evidence of appellee, they were not in force. The evidence presented a square issue of fact.
The trial court, sitting as judge and jury, rendered a judgment in favor of appellee. Therefore the case stands exactly as it would if there had been a jury trial, and the jury properly instructed by the court as to the law of the case and a verdict and judgment for appellee. If the judgment of the court can be justified from the record in the case, it must be done. It can be justified on the theory that the court found for appellee on the issue *482 of fact whether or not the policies were in force. Appellant's evidence tended to show that they were in force; that of appellee tended to show that they were not.
Affirmed.