*1 Byrd AARON, III, Plaintiff-Appellee, AARON, Catherine Defendant-
Appellant. Tennessee,
Supreme
at Jackson.
Sept. 1995. Denying Rehearing Nov. 1995.
Order *2 family in innu- welfare to
and contributed trial, ways. At the time of other merable Shelby attending State Ms. Aaron was a College pursuit of bachelor’s Community Blanton, Caywood, Darrell D. David E. degree. McManus, Causey, Caywood, Taylor & Mem- efforts of the talents and The combined phis, plaintiff-appellee. enjoy relatively enabled them Aarons Aaron, se, pro Memphis, Mary Catherine living. They purchased ex- high standard of defendant-appellant. clothing, household fur- pensive jewelry, and family Additionally, the vacationed nishings. OPINION More- Europe and Hawaii. places in such as BIRCH, Justice. music, ballet, over, enjoyed the children lessons, athletics and oth- dancing as well as cause, granted Mary Catherine In this meaningful activities. er 11, application for review under Rule wheth- Tenn.RApp.P., in order to determine to Ms. decreed the divorce The trial court correctly reversed er the Court of inappropriate mari- grounds of Aaron on the judgment trial court’s or- and modified the custody of The court awarded tal conduct. 1) Aaron, III, pay dering Byrd to: and ordered children to Ms. Aaron the two month until Ms. futuro $2,459.68monthly for their pay Aaron to Mr. 2) remarriage; pay or Ms. Aaron’s death Additionally, he was ordered to support. $35,- of fees the amount medical, dental, ortho- hospital, maintain 3) 184.98; provide funds for tuition and insurance for the children. dontic complete a supplies to enable Ms. Aaron to procure him and main- the court ordered degree. four-year college in the policy on his life tain an insurance ruling $750,000, opinion of that the as ben- We are with the children amount of Appeals regarding each of the three Court of eficiaries. erroneous, questions and for the reasons is pay Mr. Aaron to Ms. The court ordered developed, judgment
herein is reversed. $1,500 alimo- per month as Aaron the sum remarriage. ny until her death or in futuro I obligation, the fulfillment of this To ensure The Aarons married on December policy of insur- ordered to maintain he was marriage and his fourth. 1979—her third $250,000, on his life the amount ance marriage— of this There are two children beneficiary, until his as the with Ms. Aaron IV, Starr, 11, 1980, July bom and Newton further alimony obligation ended. He was 10, 1981. At the time of di- bom October attorney’s fees of to Ms. Aaron’s ordered vorce, forty-five, and Ms. Mr. Aaron was $35,184.98. ordered Finally, the trial court forty-six. Aaron was necessary costs Aaron to tuition and Mr. de- complete Aaron to a bachelor’s for Ms. heard, was Mr. Aaron was When the case gree. Company employed by the Gleason Peacock Atlanta, $130,000 Georgia; an- he earned appeal Mr. On pro- nually. Additionally, employment custody award and the Appeals affirmed the major and reim- medical insurance vided Though finding that Ms. property division. him He has bursed for business rehabilitated within Aaron was not able be degree Georgia Uni- an M.B.A. from State § 36-5- meaning Tenn.Code Ann. years twenty-five versity approximately 101(d), court nevertheless the intermediate force. For each of experience in the work by reducing its alimony order modified average through his years light modifica- years. of this term to six $295,000. approximately gross income was tion, permitted Mr. the intermediate insurance the amount of life Aaron to reduce in the home and had Aaron worked amount nec- reflective of the to a face value employment. Additional- never held outside fulfillment of the modified essary to ensure associates ly, entertained her husband’s stated, is, $1,500 monthly the trial court awarded Ms. alimony obligation; that $1,500 per month Aaron years. court also relieved Mr. for six futuro remarriage. Additionally, until her death or obligation Aaron of the Ms. Aaron’s Aaron was ordered to name Ms. fees; rather, Mr. it ordered the attor- $250,000 beneficiary of a life insurance as the proceeds of the ney’s fees be from the *3 policy alimony obligation ceased. until his (realty in Polk sale of a marital asset located County, proceeds Georgia) before the were preference In is a for Tennessee there Thus, equally parties. divided between the However, alimony. re- rehabilitative where effectively, party one-half of each was feasible, may grant habilitation is not a court Finally, attorney’s fees. the Ms. § alimony Ann. 36-5- in Tenn.Code futuro. of intermediate court relieved Mr. Aaron the 101(d)(1) Self, (Supp.1994); v. 861 Self responsibility to Ms. Aaron’s education (Tenn.1993). 360, S.W.2d 361 costs. Using a for their the above section as basis Court, insisting appeals Aaron to this Ms. analyses, trial court and the respective the modifying Appeals in that the Court of erred that Appeals of concluded Ms. Court awards, and fees and the capable being rehabilitated. was not of pro- reversing in the order that Mr. Aaron regarding findings on of fact Based the expenses.1 vide education education, history, employment marriage, living enjoyed during
standard of II finding in that is not we concur the capable of rehabilitation. consider are: The issues we here in Appeals 1. the Court of erred Whether led, trial court to find This conclusion the modifying of the trial court’s award entitled to that Ms. Aaron was alimony; remarriage; month until her death or contrast, Appeals of found that she Appeals 2. erred Whether years. six was to that amount for entitled modifying the trial court’s order of at- question is a mixed of fees; the trial court’s award torney’s fact, now it. law and review Appeals erred in 3. Whether the Court of reversing the trial court’s order edu- alimony to be al “The amount of cational any case is a matter the discre lowed particular under tion of the trial court view of the In cases such as the one Ingram, submission, Ingram v. 721 tried with circumstances.” where the cause was 262, (citing (Tenn.Ct.App.1986) jury, 264 out a we note that while concurrent S.W.2d (Tenn. Newberry Newberry, v. 493 99 findings binding reviewing on the S.W.2d of fact are evidence, Ct.App.1973)). there is no absolute supported by any material While determining the amount of alimo apply questions not of law formula for such a rule does seeking the ny, spouse of the questions of and fact. Bubis v. “the real need or mixed law (Tenn.Ct. Blackman, 492, single important factor. support is the most 498 435 S.W.2d disadvantaged In need of the questions of and fact addition App.1968). Mixed law Acceptance spouse, the courts most often consider subject are to review. Murdock (Tenn.Ct. provide sup Jones, 266, ability obligor spouse to 268 Corp. v. 362 S.W.2d 48, Cranford, port.” v. 772 S.W.2d presumption a App.1961). We find that Cranford omitted). (citations attach, (Tenn.Ct.App.1989) not but as with 50 correctness does Further, law, should be great lati the amount questions this Court has party obtaining the so “that the findings as to determined tude to determine whether in a worse financial situa by not] divorce left questions [is of fact and law made mixed opposite by probative tion than he or she had before evi trial court are sustained brought about the di- party’s misconduct appeal. dence on with Appeals the trial court urges Court of affirmed that the Court of 1. Ms. Aaron also issue, requested, this is not respect as she regard division of to this with to the issue of the erred justiciable a issue. property. we find that marital Because 4H Crouch, 1992); Shackleford, Crouch v. 385 S.W.2d vorce.” Shackleford (citations (Tenn.Ct.App.1980) (Tenn.Ct.App.1964). S.W.2d omitted). Here, $62,885.30 Mr. Aaron incurred case, trial court that Mr. this found fees. He this from marital primary wage-earner Aaron was the with a Thus, effect, Ms. Aaron’s share of assets. $130,000 an historical then income $31,442.65, though obligation was even $200,000. salary in excess of On the other obligation no these fees. Be she has hand, the trial court found that Ms. Aaron approxi cause the fees she incurred were homemaker, worked, had was never mately and in one half of those of Mr. college degree. Although not had earned view of the fact that Mr. Aaron’s desire school, go she intended to back to her earn- precipitated attorney, her for an divorce need ing power age was limited her and lack of *4 say we cannot that the trial court abused its significant experience. ordering pay discretion Mr. to parties The trial also court found that both attorney’s Additionally, by fees. or enjoyed high during living had standard of dering attorney’s her fees to be out of marriage. proof the Ms. Aaron offered that has, assets, Appeals marital the Court of in order for her and the to maintain children fact, required pay Ms. Aaron to one-half of pre-divorce they living their standard of her fees in addition to one-half of Mr. own $6,461.70 per would need month. ali- While trial Aaron’s fees. This is not what the court mony provide is not intended to a former mind, had in can neither discern nor we ease, spouse with relative financial we stress Appeals’ determine the basis for the Court of alimony that should be awarded in such a Therefore, ruling. we reverse the Court of way spouses approach equity. that the Fi- Appeals attorney’s on the issue of fees and nally, proof Mr. Aaron offered no that he is judgment. reinstate the trial court’s alimony by unable to the ordered the that, trial court. We conclude based on The last issue concerns education ex facts, $1,500 per these month is insufficient trial, penses. note that at the time of the We Thus, to meet Ms. Aaron’s needs. we award pursuing Ms. Aaron was her education. We her month. While this will not improve commend her to her situa efforts put position her in the same in which she was tion. The trial court ordered Mr. Aaron to divorce, prior provide to the it will her with expenses. her education Since she is is, “closing money; in” that en- she will be entitled, opinion, as noted earlier in this closely approach abled to more her former position, in” “close on her former economic Further, position. economic we find that she Appeals’ judgment we reverse the Court permanent is alimony, entitled to not to be pay and reinstate the trial court’s order for remarriage. terminated until her death or expenses. ment of education Therefore, regard with ali- to the issue of conclusion, the reverse mony, and the trial alimony Appeals. The shall be as futuro Further, court are reversed. we remand attorney’s stated herein and the fees and the trial court for a redetermination of the expenses trial education awarded amount of life insurance Mr. Aaron must court shall be reinstated. beneficiary secure with Ms. Aaron as the alimony ensure the fulfillment of his obli- ANDERSON, C.J., DROWOTA and gation predecease he should her. REID, JJ., FONES, Justice, Special concur. fees, the trial court $35,184.98 ordered Mr. Aaron to to Ms. ORDER ON PETITION TO REHEAR legal Aaron for fees and The al III, Byrd appellee, has largely in the lowance fees is Chiefly, court, petition to rehear. he is appellate discretion of the trial filed and the increased except upon concerned that this Court court will not interfere a clear though showing Storey alimony even of abuse of that discretion. futuro thus, contends, Storey, (Tenn.Ct.App. request; v. made no such he S.W.2d requested, by separate Mary Aaron has We find that issue was not before Court. motion, increased payment that are without merit Newton Aaron’s assertions is, be ordered ret- amount of hereby, re- Petition to Rehear and his futuro 18,1992, of the final to June the date roactive spectfully, DENIED. to do. The in- decree. This we decline issue of was before futuro payments shall take effect on creased Court, princi- of no rule or and we know release of this order. date ple would thwart our efforts of law which justice. is complete do “The rule well settled REID, ANDERSON, C.J., DROWOTA, prayer general in this state that under a Justice, JJ., FONES, Special concur. may any grant other and relief the specifically indicat- different relief from that justified by prayed
ed and for which is
pleadings proof. and the The Connecticut Company DeGalleford, 470
Indemnity omitted). (Tenn.1971) (citations 5, 7
S.W.2d forms, equity regards not mere a court of DAVIS, Lillard, Patri Ella Larita Patricia things; *5 to the substance of but looks Turner, Northcutt, and Marietta on cia bill, appear upon the face of the the facts of all and on behalf their own behalves relief, specific party that entitle the to a situated, similarly persons Plaintiffs- speech adopted in although the forms of Appellees, technically appro- the most the bill be not prayer priate, although the form of does not in totidum verbis embrace Director, Sup Joyce McCLARAN, Child the facts stated specific relief to which Services, Department port Tennessee complainant. entitles the Services, Defendant-Appellant, Human Benthal, 51 (citing Id. Dodd v. Tenn. (1871). counter-complaint, Mary Aar- In her specifically requested reasonable on III, Attorney Johnson, District Victor S. further and prayed and she “for such other District, for the 20th Judicial General general may appear ... and be relief which Metropolitan Government and the ade- proper.” she addressed the County, Defen Nashville and Davidson quacy alimony in her brief to of the dants. “Despite the best efforts Wife Court: Court’s Tennessee, Supreme dramatically lesser financial [sic] is left is at Nashville. justi- modification is situation.” Court’s pleadings proof. and the fied 30, 1995. Oct. Furthermore, Aaron is cor- even Newton appeal on
rect in his assertion that alimony, request additional
Aaron did not 13(b)
Tenn.RApp.P. grants this Court con- issues not
siderable discretion to consider fair-
presented for review in order achieve justice.
ness and
Finally, Aaron’s contention as to Newton possible notice of a increase
that he lacked award, the Court’s modification purview relief “within
constituted [Mary Aar- equities forth
spirit set at 7. bill.” 470 S.W.2d
on’s]