354 Mass. 390 | Mass. | 1968
This is an appeal from a decision of the Department of Public Utilities (department) dated February 23, 1967. The petitioners are common carriers by motor and are members of the Massachusetts Furniture and Piano Movers Association, Inc. (association). The association, on
The dispute on this appeal relates to the commodity description for household goods to be contained in any new tariff.
The decision of the .department states that "[rfijany carriers operating under the tariff have confused the description in the tariff with their operating authority as contained in the certificates of public convenience and necessity issued by this [department and are carrying commodities . . . which they are not authorized to transport. Moreover with this broad definition, the tariff overlaps some commodities described in other agency tariffs in which a number of the association members also concur. The result is that the carrier has a choice of rates to apply . . ..” In its decision, the department therefore orders that this definition be deleted from any future tariff, and that such tariff "shall clearly state on its title page: ‘Rates, Rules and Regulations Applying on the Transportation of household goods in whole or in part incident to a move by a householder from one dwelling to another and of office equipment or property of a commercial establishment incident to the removal of an establishment in whole or in part from one location to another. Rates and charges stated herein apply only to the extent participating carriers are certificated by the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities.’ ” The purpose of this change, as stated in the decision, "is to make clear that the tariff does not expand the authority contained in the certificates.”
The petitioners concede the desirability of preventing a carrier from enlarging "its certificate powers by filing a tariff” or from being "able to choose the rate which is to apply to a given transaction.” They contend, however, that there was not sufficient evidence at the hearings to justify the department in determining that such abuses exist or that the proposed changes would put an end to them. At the second hearing, there was testimony by Paul M. Fitz-simmons, currently Director of the Commercial Motor Ye-
General Laws c. 30A, § 11 (2), provides that “agencies need not observe the rules of evidence observed by courts,” and that “(Vjvidence may be admitted and given probative effect only if it is the kind of evidence on which reasonable persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs.” Fitzsimmons testified to matters within his personal knowledge as an official of the department. No objection was made to his testimony, nor did the association offer any evidence on these issues.
The department has wide latitude in the admission of evidence and “unless the admission of the evidence resulted in a denial ... of substantial justice,” the petitioners “have no complaint adequate in law to nullify the findings . . ..” Mayor of Everett v. Superior Court, 324 Mass. 144, 148. Sudbury v. Department of Pub. Util. 351 Mass. 214, 220. The testimony of Fitzsimmons appears to be “the kind of evidence on which reasonable persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs,” and it supports the decision of the department.
The petitioners further argue that there is no evidence that the measures prescribed by the department will cure the evils they are designedgto meet. Conceivably, this may be true. However, we do not believe that the department is obligated to present such proof if the proposed change appears to be reasonably calculated 'to achieve the results described. While the proposed language does not seek to define “household goods,” it suggests a functional definition based on whether the transaction to be covered is related to the removal of a household or a business from one place to another. In this regard it seems to us a marked improvement over the objectionable inclusiveness of the previous definition. Fitzsimmons testified that “[t]his tariff over the years has been understood ... to be primarily-a tariff covering moving.” We believe that it is reasonable to- define the tariff’s coverage not in terms of what is carried:but in terms of whether the carrying is “moving” in the senáe of the removal of a household or other establishment.-'
The decision of the department was “accompanied by a
So ordered.
The department admits that the increased liability limits contained in the orders are not supported by substantial evidence and that this matter should be remanded to the department for further hearings.