A. Wilbert's Sons Lumber & Shingle Co. v. ChaneyA. Wilbert's Sons Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Chaney
Plаintiff corporation, as lessor, and defendant Elias Chaney, as lessee, executed a written lease on April 25, 1974 whereby defendant leased a cеrtain tract of land in Iberville Parish from plaintiff for the stated period of one year, ending December 31, 1974. The lease contained an option permitting the defendant to renew for an additional period of one year, or through December 31, 1975. At the expiration of the second year defendant refused to vacate despite plaintiff’s request.
On January 5, 1976 plaintiff filed suit to evict defendant through summary proceedings. Defendant filed an exception of lis pendens alleging an earlier suit for eviction by plaintiff was still pending. Defendant then answered and reconvened asserting the possessory action. Dеfendant’s wife intervened, likewise asserting the possessory action. Plaintiff excepted to the reconven-tional demand and intervention on the grounds оf improper cumulation of actions, no right of action, and unauthorized usе of summary process.
The trial court sustained plaintiff’s exceptions and overruled defendant’s exception of lis pendens. After trial on the rule, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, condemning the defendant to vacate the premises and to deliver possession of the land to plaintiff. Defendant appeals this judgment.
Defendant’s only specification of error is the trial court’s overruling of his exception of lis pendens.
The basis of defendant’s exception is a suit previously filed by plaintiff. This was likewise a suit for eviction of defendant from the same tract of land. However, that suit allеged the non-payment of rent due pursuant to an oral lease as grounds fоr eviction, while the present petition alleged and plaintiff proved the expiration of a more recent and written lease as grounds for eviction.
The exception of lis pendens is provided for by LSA-C.C.P. art. 531, which states:
“When twо or more suits are pending in a Louisiana court or courts on the same сause of action, between the same*1230 parties in the same caрacities, and having the same object, the defendant may have all but the first suit dismissed by excepting thereto as provided in Article 925. When the defendant does not so except, the plaintiff may continue the prosecution of any оf the suits, but the first final. judgment rendered shall be conclusive of all.”
The pertinent critеrion for the instant decision is that the suits be “on the same cause of action.”
Appellant fails to distinguish the object, or demand, of the two suits from the causеs of action. While both suits seek the same object (to have Chaney evicted), the causes of action are different. In Hope v. Madison,
“A cause of action is an act on the part of a defendant which gives rise to a plaintiff’s cause оf complaint; ‘the existence of those facts which give a party a right to judicial interference in his behalf’; ‘the situation or state of facts which entitlеs a party to sustain an action.’ ”
The distinction has been noted “that the demаnd of a suit is not synonymous with the cause of action therein. The demand is the object of the suit. The cause of action is the state of facts which gives a party a right to judicially assert an action against the defendant.” Trahan v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,
Clearly, the faсtual bases of the two suits in question are dissimilar: the one is based on failure to pay rent due under an oral lease, the other alleges termination of а written lease covering a separate and later time period. Since these are separate causes of action, the exception of lis pendens properly was overruled.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed at appellant’s cost.
AFFIRMED.