Lead Opinion
This action was brought to recover the sum of $1,650 and interest therpon for labor performed and materials furnished on a building which was being constructed by the Wolff Construction Company, • the complaint alleging that the plaintiff had a contract with it to perform work and furnish materials in and about the roof, but before any of the work was performed or any of the materials furnished, the construction company became financially embarrassed and the plaintiff refused to proceed under its contract; thereafter, at the request of the defendant, who was interested in the completion of .the building, and upon his promise to pay the plaintiff, the work and materials in question were performed and furnished. The answer denied the material allegations of the complaint and alleged as an affirmative defense that the promise, if made was oral, was to answer for the debt or default of another and void under the Statute of Frauds. The complaint was dismissed at the close of plaintiffs’ case and plaintiff- appeals.
At the trial only one witness was sworn — Schwoerer, the treas-urer and active manager of the plaintiff—from whose testimony it appears that the. plaintiff entered into a contract with the Wolff Construction Company, the main contractor, to do certain work and furnish certain materials on the building ; that before the plaintiff
The testimony of the witness Schwoerer to the effect that the defendant personally promised to pay the plaintiff was corroborated by the affidavit of Eoach, which was put in evidence without objection.
Upon this state of facts I think the plaintiff made a ¡prima facie case which entitled it to recover. It is fairly to be inferred from Schwoerer’s testimony that the defendant not only was interested in the Mannados Eealty Company, which was foreclosing the mortgage upon the building, but that he in fact constituted substantially the Wolff Construction Company. He stated that he had removed Wolff from the construction company and put Eoach, his superintendent, in his place. The promise sought to be enforced related to the indebtedness thereafter to be created. It was an original promise, founded upon a new consideration, which was work there
The judgment appealed from should be reversed and a new trial ordered, With costs to appellant to abide event.
Clarke and Houghton, JJ., concurred; Ingraham and Scott, JJ., dissented.
Dissenting Opinion
So far as appears from this record, the defendant had no personal interest in the performance of this contract. He appears to have been an officer of a corporation who had a mortgage upon the prop erty that was being improved; but the record certainly shows no personal-interest which would be benefited by the performance of the plaintiff’s contract. The' .plaintiff having a contract with, a contractor to-erect a building upon the premises described, who was in financial difficulties, had refused to carry out his contract. He saw the defendant, stated his position, and the defendant asked him what lie would do the work for if the defendant promised to pay the amount due. According to the plaintiff’s testimony, an agreement was then arrived at by which the defendant would pay the anfount of a new contract to be made with the original contractor. Subsequently a new contract was made, not between the plaintiff and the defendant, but between the plaintiff and the original contractor, which contained no reference to the defendant, and under which the plaintiff furnished the materials and performed the work that lie had undertaken to do.
I think that all prior negotiations were merged in this new contract when it was executed. The only question presented is whether, subsequent to the execution of the new contract, there
In the casé, of Raabe v. Squier (148 N. Y. 81) it was held that the Statute of Frauds was not applicable to the contract there under consideration, and the reasons given were because “ the promise, in so far as it is here sought to be enforced, related to the indebtedness thereafter to be created. The promisors were th¿ owners of the buildings in process of construction. The woodwork furnished by the plaintiffs was for their benefit. The contrae toi’S had neglected to pay the plaintiffs for the material furnished, and they refused to deliver more, as they had the right to do. Under such circumstances the promise was made,, and ft- was in reliance upon the promise that the plaintiffs delivered the rest of the woodwork. The promise thus made was. original and founded upon a new consideration, that of the goods. It- was beneficial, as we have seen, to the promisors.” In Reisler v. Silbermintz (99 App. Div. 131) the promisor was the owner of the building, and the contract that was made was for alterations in it.
In both these cases, which have been sustained as on an original promise, the promisor was beneficially interested in the performance of the contract, and stress in both cases is laid upon that condition. To make such a promise original, it seems to me there must be a new consideration which was beneficial to the promisor, and in addition to wdiat the promisee was bound to perform by .reason of his original contract. Here the plaintiff had entered into a contract with - the Wolff Construction Company. The Wolff Construction Company had not in any way violated its contract, and the plaintiff was under legal obligation to perform that contract. He went to the defendant with that contract and the defendant agreed to pay him for the materials and what he furnished under it. In both Raabe v. Squier (supra) and Reisler v. Silbermintz (supra) the original contractors had failed to perform their contract-, and thus the promisee was absolved from carrying it out. Under those circumstances he went to the owner of the building, who was beneficially interested in having the work performed, and the owner of the building, to secure that benefit, promised that what was furnished in. future he would pay for, making a new and independent contract to furnish work and materials for his, the promisor’s, bene
Scott, J., concurred.
Judgment reversed,, new trial ordered, costs to appellant to abide event.