John A. Murray sued O. Sami Durukan, Apel Dido, and A & S Grоup, Inc., seeking to recover unpaid salary, expenses, and commissions under his employment contract. Following a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint as tо Durukan and Dido, and awarded Murray $24,933.92 on his claims against A & S Group for unreimbursed expenses and commissions. A & S Group appeals, contending that there was no evidence to support the trial court’s findings as to either liability or damages. We disagree and affirm for the reasons set forth below.
In addition to his salary, Architectural Craftsmen agreed to pay Murray one percent of its net profits on projects he managed directly during the first year of his employment, and two percent of the net profits on such projects thereafter. Architectural Craftsmen agreed to pay his job-related exрenses. On the day that he was hired, Murray met with Durukan, who was co-owner with Dido of A & S Group, at A & S Group’s corporate offices. Durukan reviewed the terms of the employment contract, and, аccording to Murray, Durukan “was quite pleased.”
In addition to the employment contract describing Architectural Craftsmen as a division of A & S Group, a project proposal from Architectural Craftsmen to a prospective client was admitted into evidence. The proposal, which appears to be on printed stationery, shows “Architectural Craftsmen a Division of A & S Group, Inc.,” and the address at the bottom is the same street address as A & S Group’s offices. Murray testified that he received one or two paychecks directly from A & S Group in the early stages of his employment but that the name listed on the majority of his paychecks was Denimland. Murray understood that Denimland was also a division of A & S Group.
Murrаy worked and was paid in accordance with the employment agreement without receipt of his commissions because final payments on most of the projects Murray managed were not made until 2003. Murray was terminated in July 2003, and the following month he wrote to Durukan and Dido demanding payment for his unpaid expenses and for commissions due him for work on seven projects. There is no evidence that Durukan or Dido replied to the demand letter.
Notwithstanding Murray’s testimony, A & S Group presented evidence tending to show that Murray was not employed by A & S Group оr a division thereof. Durukan testified that Architectural Craftsmen was a division of Denimland, Inc. and not A & S Group. According to Durukan, Denimland was owned by a Turkish national named Huesyn Cak. Durukan helped Cak set up Denimland, and for a time Denimland and A & S Group shared office space. Durukan performed work for Denimland, but did not have any ownership interest in the company. Durukan maintained that he hired Montour to manage Architectural Craftsmen on behalf of Denimland, but Montour was not on A & S Group’s payroll. Durukan claimed he never saw Murray’s employment contract.
Dido testified that Murray never received a paycheck from A & S Group. Rather, to Dido’s knowledge, Murray and Montour worked for Denimland. According to Dido, he never gave Montour the authority to sign any documents on behalf of A & S Group. Dido dеnied ever seeing a document with “Architectural Craftsmen a Division of A & S Group” written on it.
1. A & S Group claims that the trial court erred in finding it liable to Murray under the employment contract because, among other things, there was no evidence showing that Montour had authority to act for the corporation. We disagree. “In a bench trial, the tried court’s findings will be upheld on appeal when there is any evidence to support them.” 2 There was at least some evidence to support the conclusion that, even if Montour was not authorized to execute the employment contract on behalf of A & S Group, A & S Group ratified the agreement.
Evidence shows that on the same day that Montour signed the employment contract, Murray met with Durukan in the offices of A & S Group. According to Murray, Durukan “had [the contract] right here and went through it. He was quite pleased.” Thus, in Murray’s presence, the co-owner of A & S Group reviewed and appeared to be pleased with an employment contract in which A & S Group purported to hire Murray to work in one of its unincorporated divisions. Pretermitting whеther the foregoing is evidence of express ratification, Durukan’s continuing silence under the circumstances could be construed as a ratification of the contract by A & S Group. “If, after knowledge of what the agent has done, the principal makes no objection for an unreasonable time, a ratification results by operation of law. Generally, the question of what is an unreasonable period of time is one for the jury.” 6 The trial court was authorized to conclude that, notwithstanding his testimony to the contrary, Duru-kan, and therefore A & S Group, had full knowledge that Murray’s employment contract was signed on behalf of A & S Group by Montour; that Durukan allowed Murray to begin and continue work under the reasоnable impression that he had an employment contract with A & S Group; and that A & S Group failed to object to the contract within a reasonable time, thus ratifying the agreement. 7 We note that although A & S Group claims that Murray was hired by Denimland, the name of this company does not appear in the employment contract. Evidence also showed that Murray received at least twо paychecks directly from A & S Group. The trial court did not err in finding A & S Group bound by the employment contract.
2. Alternatively, A & S Group contends that, even if liability exists, the trial court erred in awarding Murray damages for commissions and expenses. Again, we disagree.
Murray testified аt trial that he had based his $17,970 claim for commissions based on a percentage of net profits as set forth in the employment contract and from his knowledge of the contract amounts and the job cost summary reports he received weekly as the project manager. The breakdown of the net profits claimed by Murray as to the specifiс projects on which he worked, the contract year in which the work was performed, and the method for calculating the commissions was detailed in the demand letter from Murrаy to Durukan and Dido, which was admitted into evidence. Murray also claimed $6,963.92 in expenses, the sum of three expense reports he had prepared and submitted for “traveling,. .. [and] рurchasing] several items on my own funds to finish up jobs, manage jobs, or run the jobs.” The written job cost summary and expense reports were not submitted into evidence. A & S Group did not object to Murray’s testimony.
“On appellate rеview of a bench trial, we must affirm the court’s award of damages if there is any evidence showing with reasonable
certainty the amount of damages.”
8
A
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Plaza Properties v. Prime Business Investments,
(Citation and footnote omitted.)
Hayes v. Alexander,
OCGA§ 10-6-1.
OCGA § 10-6-52.
Wielgorecki v. White,
(Citations omitted.)
Klingbeil v. Renbaum,
See id. at 592-593 (1) (“[a] principal may by ratification or by failure to repudiate acts of his alleged agent beсome bound”) (citations omitted).
(Footnote omitted.)
Cannon Air Transport Svcs. v. Stevens Aviation, Inc.,
See id. (testimony of vice-president of finance, who was personally familiar with invoices, as to amounts outstanding was sufficient to show that award оn counterclaim was within the range of the evidence). Compare
Ga. Power Co. v. Maxwell,