Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court:
The superior court of Cook county overruled the demurrer of appellants to the bill of complaint filed against them by the appellees in said court seeking an injunction restraining appellants from interfering with the business of appellees or with their employees, and picketing appellees’ premises. The defendants elected to stand by their demurrer and the court entered a decree in accordance with the prayer of the bill, perpetually enjoining defendants “from in any manner interfering with, hindering, obstructing or stopping the business of said complainants, or any of them, or of their agents, servants or employeеs, in the. operation of the business of said complainants, respectively; from picketing or maintaining at or near the premises of said complainants, or any of them, any picket or pickets; from assaulting or intimidating, by threats or otherwise, the employees of any of said complainants or any persons 'who may become or seek to become employees of said complainants, or either of them; from congregating about or near the places of business of any of said complainants or about or near any place where their employees are lodged or boarded, for the purpose of compelling, inducing or soliciting the employees of any of said complainants to leave their service or to refuse to work for them or any of them, or for the purpose of preventing, or attempting to prevent, any person from freely entering into the service of any of said complainants; from interfering with or attempting to hinder complainants, or any of them, in carrying on their business in the usual and ordinary way; from following the employees of any of said complainants to their homes or other places, or calling upon them, for the purpose of inducing them to leave the employ of said complainants or of molesting or intimidating them or their families; from attempting, by bribery, payment or promise of money, offers of transportation or other rewards, to induce the employees of any of said complainants to leave their service; from organizing or maintaining any_boycott against said complainants or any of them; from attempting to induce customers or other persons to abstain from working for or accepting work from said complainants or any of them; from attempting to prevent, by threats or injury or by threats of calling strike, any person from accepting work from or doing work for said complainants or any of them; frоm attempting to create or enforce any boycott against any of the employees of the complainants, or any of them, and from attempting to induce people in their neighborhood or elsewhere not to deal with them; from sending any circular or other communications to customers or other persons who might deal or transact business with said complainants, or either of them, for the purpose of dissuading such persons from so doing, and from doing any other act or thing in furtherance of the conspiracy set forth in said bill.” The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court for the First District, and the branch of that court affirmed the decree. From the judgment of the Appellate Court this further appeal was prosecuted.
The demurrer admitted the existence of the facts stated in the bill, and the question to be determined is whether such facts authorized the decree. Briefly stated, the facts so alleged and admitted are as follows:
At the time of filing the bill the complainants were, and for several years had been, engaged in the printing business and each had a valuable plant and an extensive business, in the conduct of which they had made contracts for printing for future delivery which would afford a substantial profit. They were and had been members of а voluntary association known as the Chicago Typothetze, which was organized for the purpose of advancing and improving the printing and binding business and for the purpose of employing skilled mechanics whose services might be required by the members of the association. The defendants were Typographical Union No. 16 and its officers, a labor union existing in the city of Chicago whose members are typesetters and compositors, one of the rules of which was that its members should not work with those who did not belong to that union, and said members were bound, at the command of the union and its officers, to strike and leave the employment of anyоne who insisted upon employing non-union men. The plant or shop from which all employees not belonging to this union were excluded was called a closed shop, while one in which the employer exercised his right of employing whom he pleased was called an open shop. In July, 1905, the Typographical Union announced that after January 1, 1906, eight hours should constitute a day’s work; that no workman should be allowed to work more than that time and that no employer should be allowed to employ workmen who worked more than eight hours. Some of the complainants employed compositors who were not members of the union, аnd the union directed its members who were working for said complainants to strike because of that fact. The officials of the union called upon members of complainants’ association and demanded that they agree with the union that on and after January i, 1906, they would submit to the demand for an eight-hour day and a closed shop. The complainants so applied to refused to accede to the demand or make the agreement, and the officials of the union called a strike in said shops. Upon calling the strike the defendants inaugurated and afterward maintained a system of picketing the places of business of said cоmplainants with pickets, who surrounded the respective places of business and maintained a constant watch upon the employees going to and from their work, and in many cases intimidated them, and endeavored by threats, and in some cases by assaults and open violence, to compel said employees to leave the employment of complainants. In other cases the pickets and members of the union endeavored to induce employees to leave by bribes and offers of money and by offering to procure for them work in other places or offering them transportation to leave the сity, and the money necessary for such purposes was furnished by the union. The pickets were maintained by and were under the control and direction of the union and its officers and committees appointed by it. This picketing and interference with employees had continued for several weeks before the bill was filed, and forty-seven affidavits of employees were annexed to the bill, detailing particular acts of the members of the union and the pickets, which affidavits the bill stated were made a part thereof. By these means the defendants seriously interfered with the business of each of the complainants and took away many оf their employees and prevented them from obtaining other employees who were willing to work, whereby the complainants were prevented from carrying out-their contracts and completing unfinished work. The defendants were all acting together and in concert, in pursuance of a common plan to injure the complainants and interfere with their business for the purpose of compelling them to agree to the terms imposed by the union and to enter into the said contract. The union was alleged to be a voluntary organization and its members financially irresponsible, so that no adequate judgment for damages against thеm, or any of them, could be collected. The agreement which the union had presented to the different printing houses and which it was endeavoring to coerce the complainants into executing, provided that no one but members of Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 should be employed; that the employer should respect and observe the conditions imposed by the constitution, by-laws and scale of prices of the union of current date; that beginning January i, 1906, an eight-hour day should go into effect; that no work should be done for struck shops having difficulty with Typographical Union No. 16, and that the said union agreed to furnish competent union workmen on demand. In the shops where union men were employed, which were called “chapels,” the union had a man who was known as the chapel foreman or chairman of the chapel, and the union had issued circulars directed to these chapel foremen requesting them to report immediately any work coming to their offices from any of the nineteen firms named in the notice, which were mostly firms of the complainants, and stating that the executive committee had ordered that all work stop on work for strike-bound houses. The defendants were attempting to enforce a boycott against the complainаnts by preventing them from having work done by other printing houses or by shops to whom they might apply for work, and thus preventing them from carrying on their business except upon the condition that they should make the agreement demanded by the union. The union published weekly what was called a directory of union printing offices of Chicago, containing the names of offices where the demands of the union were submitted to and a list of offices on strike, in which latter list were published the names of complainants. The purpose of this directory was to induce people not to deal with the complainants and to compel employees to leave their service. The affidavits stated in detail acts both of persuasion and threatened violence tor ward employees of the complainants which sustained the charges of the bill in that respect.
The argument that the court erred in overruling the demurrer is upon the two grounds that the bill did not state definite facts but only conclusions and generalities and that all the facts alleged did not authorize any relief or injunction. It is also contended that if the decree is not reversed as a whole, it should be modified so as not to enjoin the defendants from doing certain acts which they claim to be within their lawful and constitutional rights.
It was not necessаry that the bill should contain the evidence which would support its general statements, or the circumstances, in detail, which would prove the ultimate facts alleged. It distinctly and clearly averred the essential facts forming the basis of the prayer for relief, so .as to be readily understood and to apprise the defendants of what they were required to meet. It alleged that the defendants were acting in combination and by agreement in an endeavor to coerce the complainants as to whom they should employ and what policy they should adopt in the conduct of their business; that defendants had proposed the contract by which the complainants were to comply with the demands of the union with reference to the hours of labor, the scale of wages, and should join in boycotts by refusing to do any work for shops having difficulty with the union; that complainants refused to accede to such demands and insisted upon the right to conduct their business in their own way, and that the defendants, for the purpose of coercing the complainants into submitting to the demands of the union, established a picket system around complainants’ shops, enticed away their employees and resorted to threats, intimidation and assaults to accomplish their ends. The bill charged the сombinatioHÍ, the intent and the acts of the defendants, and averred that they proposed to continue the same conduct in furtherance of their scheme. The bill was not defective on the ground that its allegations were not sufficiently specific.
It is not claimed that an injunction was not the proper remedy if the acts of the defendants were without lawful right, but it is argued that there was nothing unlawful, about what was done, because it was done in the course of labor competition for the promotion of welfare of union laborers. The controversies between labor unions and employers have occasionally developed some curious and unusual notions of what constitutes competition, but they have never been generally adopted and have not been approved by the courts. It is true that competition in business justifies action for the benefit of one of the competing parties which results in injury to the other, and a reason frequently given is that the general public benefits outweigh occasional individual losses. One who is seeking employment for himself may offer to work on any terms that he may choose, and the exercise of his legal right may result in the discharge of another laborer. But that rule does not apply to this case. It is not very clear whаt is meant by competition for the purpose of promoting the welfare of the union and its members, but it is clear that the union and its members were not in competition with the complainants in respect to labor or anything else. The members of the union had left service of the complainants, and their only purpose was to prevent the complainants from carrying on their business. They were endeavoring to compel the complainants to submit to their dictation by depriving the complainants of their legal right to .employ such laborers as they might choose. If there is a combination to injure a person because he refuses tо comply with some demand where he has a legal right to refuse, there is no way of classifying acts in furtheriance of such purpose as competition. The acts alleged in ;the bill were directed primarily against the complainants for the purpose of doing them harm, and that sort of action inot lawful competition. That question was discussed in the case of Doremus v. Hennessy,
In London Guarantee and Accident Co. v. Horn, supra, the court quoted from Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B. D. 333, as follows: “If the persuasion be used for the indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff or of benefiting the defendant at the expensе of the plaintiff it is a malicious act, which is in law and in fact a wrong act, and therefore a wrongful act, and therefore an actionable act if injury ensues from it.” The court also there re-affirmed the doctrines of Doremus v. Hennessy by quoting therefrom, as follows: “No persons, individually or by combination, have the right to directly or indirectly interfere or disturb another in his lawful business or occupation, or to threaten to do so, for the sake of compelling him to do some act which, in his judgment, his own interest does not require. Losses willfully caused by another, from motives of malice, to one who seeks to exercise and enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill and credit, will sustain an action. It is clear that it is unlawful and actionable for one man, from unlawful motives, to interfere with another’s trade by fraud or misrepresentation, or by molesting his customers or those who would be customers, or by preventing others from working for him or causing them to leave his employ by fraud or misrepresentation or physical or moral intimidation or persuasion, with an intent to inflict an injury which causes loss.”
In the case of O’Brein v. People,
In Purington v. Hinchliff,
The facts stated in the bill authorized an injunction to prevent carrying out the scheme of the defendants.
It is next contended that if any injunction was authorized, the injunction granted was too broad in enjоining appellants from peaceful picketing of complainants’ premises and from congregating about or near their places of business for the purpose of inducing or soliciting employees to leave the employment. It is contended that a peaceful picket line around a shop is entirely lawful. But this court has held otherwise in Franklin Union v. People, supra where endorsement was given to the doctrine of Beck v. Railway Teamsters’ Protective Union,
Another supposed right of the defendants asserted by counsel is the exercise of the power of persuasion, and it must be conceded that argument and persuasion are lawful if not directed to the accomplishment of an illegal and unlawful purpose. The object of the defendants as set forth in the bill was illegal, and if there is a malevolent intent to produce an illegal result, and it is produced, it makes no difference whether it is accomplished by mere persuasion or by physical violences -(Curran v. Galen,
The principles declared by this court in the cases referred to and stated in this opinion have the support of practically all the courts of the country. Inasmuch as this court has plainly declared the law upon the subject, it would be useless to cite the very numerous decisions to the same effect. Among them are Martin v. McFall, 65 N. J. Eq. 91; Martel v. White,
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
The repeated expression of our dissenting views in cases of this character is justified by firm conviction that the nisi prius courts in such cases brought here for review have persistently exceeded the lawful limits of their power. Under the law as it stands no one can deny that the courts have the power to interfere between employer and employee by injunction, which may issue at the suit of either in proper case. It is the duty of persons enjoined to obey the injunction so long as it continues in force, save in instances where the court has proceeded wholly without jurisdiction, and for a violation of the injunction punishment may be administered. The constitution of this State, however, provides, in substance, that no man shall be punished for crime except upon conviction by a jury, and that upon his trial he is entitled to meet the witnesses face to face. In a proceeding to punish for a violation of an injunction, where it is charged by the written accusation that a crime has been committed, courts of equity in cases relied upon by appellees have determined the innocence or guilt of the defendants without the intervention of a jury, upon ex parte affidavits, usually drawn in the words of the solicitor for the complaining party, where the defendants have no opportunity to cross-examine or even see the witnesses. ' While that course has been frequently approved, we yet hold that no reasoning, however strong, can disguise the fact that in pursuing such a course the court of chancery denies to the defendants their constitutional right of trial by jury and their constitutional right to be confronted by the witnesses against them.
Changing conditions in the industrial world constantly require us to make applications of existing laws to situations nоt before contemplated. Such varying conditions never change the law regulating the property rights of the employer nor the personal rights of the employee, in the absence of legislative action, but such rights continue as before, and may not be, by the judicial department of the government, either increased or diminished. To us the following language from our bill of rights seems apropos: “A frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of civil government is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty.” It amounts to nothing to assert that laborers may organize for the purpose of bettering their condition in life while denying to them the right to do anything as an organization except those acts which could be as well done without organization.
We regard the decree of the' court below as going a step farther than is warranted even by the latest precedents. Appellants sought to have the period of labor for compositors in the printing shops of Chicago reduced from nine to eight hours per day, and for the purpose of bringing about this result a strike was instituted. The injunction forbids the striking workmen calling upon any of the employees of the complainants, at their homes or elsewhere, for the purpose of inducing them to leave thе employ of the complainants.
Mere persuasion or like orderly inducement used by one laborer to lead another to quit the common employment, in order that the employer may be compelled to pay a higher wage or make the conditions of employment less irksome, is not unlawful. 18 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, (2d ed.) p. 86; A. S. & W. Co. v. W. D. Union, 90 Fed. Rep. 608; C. S. Manf. Co. v. G. B. Ass. 59 N. J. Eq. 49; Krebs v. Rosenstein, 66 N. Y. Sup. 42; Rogers v. Evarts, 17 id. 264; People v. Kostka, 4 N. Y. Crim. 429; Master B. Ass. v. Damascio,
In London Guarantee Co. v. Horn,
In Doremus v. Hennessy,
In London Guarantee Co. v. Horn, supra, the fact that the law as there stated is not applicable to that phase of the present case which we are now considering was pointed out in these words: “If the only object of appellant had been to secure appellee’s discharge for the purpose of obtaining .his position for another, or for the reason that the employment of appellеe by Arnold, Schwinn & Co. in some way conflicted with the right of appellant, or some organization to which it belonged, to obtain the same or similar employment, a very different question, and one not now before this court, would be presented, and Allen v. Flood, 67 L. J. Q. B. 119, and other cases of that character cited by the appellant, would then be worthy of greater consideration.”
In our judgment competition such as here existed afforded sufficient justification for the use of persuasion, or other like peaceable method by appellants, to induce employees of appellees to leave their work, in order that better conditions for labor might be brought about in the shops of appellees.
We conclude that the decree herein should not be affirmed.