A.O. v. StateA.O. v. State
Lead Opinion
The juvenile pled nolo coiitendere to a petition for adjudication оf delinquency, specifically reserving the right to appeal the question of whеther a dependent can be adjudicated delinquent based upon a violаtion of a court order to attend school. We answer in the affirmative.
The сhild had previously been adjudicated dependent with the special terms that he: (a) attend school; (b) obey an established curfew; and (c) obey his mother’s reasonable demands. When it appeared that he had failed to attend school, the state petitioned for a determination of delinquency charging that thе juvenile was in contempt of the court’s dependency order. While the deрendent acknowledges that he may be held in contempt for violation of thе conditions of his dependency, R.M.P. v. Jones,
It is true that Section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (1981) provides that truancy is a basis for a finding of dependency and Section 39.01(8), Florida Statutes (1981) does not describe it as а basis for an adjudication of delinquency. However, Section 39.01(8) expressly authorizes a petition for delinquency upon a finding of contempt of court. Sincе the juvenile cannot dispute the finding of contempt, see R.M.P. v. Jones, supra, we find no merit to his contentiоn that an adjudication of delinquency is improper.
We hereby certify to the Suрreme Court of Florida, as provided for in Article V, Section 3(b)(4) of the Constitution of Flori
Affirmed.
Notes
. We have considered Judge Jorgenson’s thoughtful dissent but nonethelеss respectfully disagree. The alternative to the proceeding suggested by the majority is for the state to commence another dependency proceeding with the probable outcome being that the court will impose the sаme conditions as those which have already been violated. We are of the view that the legislature intentionally designed Section 39.01 to avoid such a cumbеrsome procedure and to allow remedial action to be taken bеfore it is too late to be of assistance to the juvenile and society. Nоr do we share Judge Jorgenson’s concern that the procedure apрroved by the majority necessarily means that the next time a dependent child bеcomes involved with the law it will result in criminal sanctions. The answer is that the juvenile can avoid criminal sanctions by complying with the dependency order.
We realizе that neither the majority’s nor Judge Jorgenson’s alternative presents a happy answer to this delicate problem. We are persuaded, however, to fоllow what we perceive to be the legislative solution.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I do not agree that a child found guilty of contempt may be adjudicated a delinquеnt when the basis for that finding is a violation of an order entered during a dependency proceeding.
A.O., fifteen years old at the time of this adjudication, now faces a potential four years of incarceration in institutions populаted by young offenders who have committed real crimes; all this for the “crime” of not going to school. Such a result was not intended by the legislature. See
. The record does not reflect whether the dependency proceeding which occasioned the go-to-school order afforded A.O. due process safeguards. See In re Gault,
. I join the majority in the certified question.