A.K.H. v. R.C.T.A.K.H. v. R.C.T.
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Gillette
This case presents a question of law certified to us by the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. See generally
Plaintiff filed the underlying action in the District Court, alleging that she had been sexually abused by defendant when she was a minor and asserting claims for breach of a fiduciary duty, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs complaint on the ground that the action was barred by the applicable statutes of limitation —
“DoesORS 12.117 apply to actions based on child abuse filed after its effective date [October 3, 1989] if such action was previously barred byORS 12.110 and 12.160?”
We accepted the certification on June 19,1990.
After this court had accepted certification of the District Court’s question, the legislature once again entered the picture by enacting HB 2668 (Or Laws 1991, ch 932). That measure provided, in part:
“Section 2. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law,ORS 12.117 , as amended by Section 1 of this Act, applies to all actions commenced on or after October 3,1989, including any action that would have been barred by application of any period of limitations prior to October 3,1989.”
By virtue of an emergency clause, the amendment to
“Yes. Or Laws 1991, ch 932, § 2.”
Defendant argues that, if the foregoing answer is correct, the measure is unconstitutional on several different grounds. All of these grounds, save one, are based on one or another provision of the United States Constitution. We shall not address the federal constitutional theories. Our authority to consider a certified question under
In the one constitutional argument advanced by defendant that does relate to a matter specifically within this court’s authority to answer, defendant argues that applying the amendment to
Article III, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, provides:
“The powers of the Government shall be divided into three seperate [sic] departments, the Legislative, the Executive, including the administrative, and the Judicial; and no person charged with official duties under one of these departments, shall exercise any of the functions of another * * *.”
Defendant argues that the 1991 amendment to
This argument is unpersuasive. It is a function of legislation to draw lines. We do not see how legislative awareness of the facts of a particular case that would fall within the terms of its enactment of a general law in any way changes the purely legislative nature of the enactment. Oregon Laws 1991, chapter 932, section 2, does not violate Article III, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, in the manner argued by defendant.6
Certified question answered.
Notes
“An action for assault, battery, false imprisonment, or for any injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract, and not especially enumerated in this chapter, shall be commenced within two years; provided, that in an action at law based upon fraud or deceit, the limitation shall be deemed to commence only from the discovery of the fraud or deceit.”
“If, at the time the cause of action accrues, any person entitled to bring an action mentioned inORS 12.010 to 12.050 and 12.070 to 12.250 is:
“(1) Within the age of 18 years,
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“the time of such disability shall not be a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action; but the period within which the action shall be brought shall not be extended more than five years by any such disability, nor shall it be extended in any case longer than one year sifter such disability ceases. ”
Former
“NotwithstandingORS 12.110 ,12.115 or 12.160, an action based on child abuse or conduct knowingly allowing, permitting or encouraging child abuse accruing while the person who is entitled to bring the action is within 18 years of age shall be commenced not more than five years after that person attains 18 years of age.”
It appears that, from the legislative history cited to us by the parties, the legislature specifically was made aware of the present case as an illustration of the kind of case to which supporters of the 1991 measure wished to have it apply.
This is a discretionary power that this court will use sparingly. We use it in this case because (1) we assume the certifying court would wish to have our answer on this issue, and (2) it is easily resolved without further briefing from the parties.
We express no opinion as to any other issue that might hereafter be raised concerning the constitutionality of the measure under the Oregon Constitution.