delivered the opinion of the court.
Thе A. J. Phillips Company is a manufacturer of doors at Fenton, Michigan. For use in its business it purchased large quantities of lumber, much of which was shipped from points in Alabama, over the lines of the Illinois Centrаl, the Southern, the Grand Trunk Western, and the Detroit & Milwaukee Railway Companies. Prior to April, 1903, the rate to Fenton was 28 cents a hundred,— of which 14 cents was the charge for the haul, over the Southern аnd the Illinois Central, from Alabama points to the Ohio River. The remaining 14 cents represented the charge of the Grand Trunk and the Detroit Companies for the haul from the Ohio River to Fenton.
In' April, 1903, the Illinоis Central, the Southern Railway, and other carriers operating in the Gulf States, filed a tariff which made an advance of 2 cents per hundred on lumber shipped from Alabama mills to the Ohio River and bеyond.
On July 24, 1903, the Yellow Pine Association filed a complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commission seeking to have this increase declared to be unreasonable.
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After a hearing the Commissiоn held (10 I. C. C. 505-547) that “the advance of 2 cents was not warranted under all the facts and evidence and that the resultant increased rate is unreasonable and unjust. An order will be issued in accordanсe with these views.” The carriers sought to have this order enjoined, but the action of the Commission was sustained by the Circuit-Court and, on May 27, 1907, that ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States (
The Southern Railway wаs not served. The Illinois Central having no office in the district was ultimately dismissed from the case. The. demurrer of the other two *665 defendants was sustained. That judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and thе case brought here by writ of error.
1. The Phillips Company, relying on a finding by the Commission on the complaint of the Yellow Pine Association, that a 2 cents advance in a lumber rate was unreasonаble, brought suit against four carriers to recover an overcharge collected on .90,432,500 pounds of lumber shipped to it over their connecting lines. But as the plaintiff was not a party before the Commission the defendants insist that it cannot take advantage of the order that the rate was unjust, so as to be able to maintain the present suit.
But the proceeding before the Commissiоn, to determine the reasonableness of the 2 cents advance, was not in the nature of private litigation between a Lumber Association and the carriers, but was a matter of public сoncern in which the whole body of shippers was interested. The inquiry as to the reasonableness of the advance was general in its nature. The finding thereon was general in its operation аnd inured to the benefit of every person that had been obliged to pay the unjust rate. Otherwise those who filed the complaint, or intervened during the hearing, would have secured an advantage over the general body of the public, with the result that the order of the Commission would have created a preference in favor of the parties .to the record and would have dеstroyed the very uniformity which that body had been organized to secure. The plaintiff and every other shipper similarly situated was entitled by appropriate proceedings before the Commission or the courts to obtain the benefit of that general finding and order. See
Abilene Case,
2. But while every person who had paid the rate could *666 take advantage of the finding that the advance- was unreasonable, he was obliged to assert his claim within the timе fixed by law. When the overcharge was collected a cause of action at once arose and the shipper at once had the right to file a complaint or to intervene in proceedings instituted by others. If he failed to take either of those steps and there was a finding of unreasonableness in the proceedings begun by others, he could, if in time, present his claim, and await the result of the litigation over the validity of any order made at the instance of those parties. If it was ultimately sustained by the court as valid he would then be in position to obtain reрaration from the Commission — or a judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction, on a claim that had been seasonably presented. But neither proceedings begun by other shippers, nor findings of unreasonableness and orders issued thereon by the Commission, would save the rights of those who disregarded the requirements of the Hepburn Amendment, that, .
“all complaints for the recovery of dаmages shall be filed with the Commission within two years from the time the cause of action accrues, and not after, and a petition for the enforcement of an order for the payment оf money shall be filed in the Circuit Court within one year from the date of the order, and not after; provided, that claims accrued prior to the passage of this act may be presented within one year.” 34 Stat. 586.
In the present case the overcharges were made and paid prior to August, 1904. The present suit was brought May 9, 1909, — less than two years after the validity of the Commission’s order was sustained by the Supreme Court, — but, more than one year after the passage of the Hepburn Amendment, and more than four years after the plaintiff’s cause of action arose.
3. It is argued, howevеr, that under the Conformity Act (R. S. 914), the case is to be governed by the Michigan
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practice, which does not permit a defendant to take advantage of the statute of limitations by a general dеmurrer to the declaration. But that rule does not apply to a cause of action arising under a statute which indicates its purpose to prevent suits on delayed claims, by the provisiоn that all complaints for damages should be filed within two years
and not after.
Under such a statute the lapse of time not only bars the remedy but destroys the liability
(Finn
v.
United States,
4. There is the further contention that the connecting carriers operating, north of the Ohio River had to collect the filed tariff rate of. 30 cents per hundred, even though they were not responsible for the advance, and that in no event could they be held liable for the refund until after they had been heard by the Commission. There is nothing in this record indicating that the Commission undertook to impose a liability upon those who had not been heard. But the conclusion that the plaintiff’s cause of action had been lost by lapse of time, makes it unnecessary to determine whether сarriers participating in the haul,— but who did not put in the advance, or who were not parties to the proceeding in which a portion of the rate was held to be unreasonable, — could be held jointly and severally liable for the collections made by them while the 30 cent rate was in force. The suit was properly dismissed on other grounds and the judgment is
Affirmed.