DECISION
T1 AH. (Fаther) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his three children. The juvenile court found three grounds to support the termination of Father's parental rights. First, the juvenile court concluded that the parents were unfit or incompetent parents. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-507(1)(c) (2008). The court further concluded that the children were being carеd for in an out-of-home placement; that the parents had substantially neglected, willfully refused, or been unable or unwilling to remedy the cireumstances that caused the children to be in the out-of home placement; and that there was a substantial likelihood that the parents will not be capable of exercising proper and effеctive parental care in the near future. See id. § T78A-6-507(1)(d). The court next concluded that the parents had made only token efforts to support or communicate with the children, to eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental or emotional abuse, or to avoid being unfit parents. See id. § T8A-6-
12 On appeal, Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence "tо support termination of parental rights." However, Father does not undertake any specific analysis of the three separate grounds for termination found by the juvenile court. The juvenile court "may terminate all parental rights with respect to a parent if the court finds any one of" the grounds enumerated in Utah Code section T8A-6-507. Seе id. § 78A-6-507(1). We will overturn the juvenile court's decision "only if it either failed to consider all of the facts or considered аll of the facts and its decision was nonetheless against the clear weight of the evidence." In re B.R.,
13 Father claims that the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) did not provided him with the recommended reunification services. He contends that he was willing to participate in services, but he was not provided with resources or referrals. We construe this as a challenge to the juvenile court's finding that DCFS made reasоnable efforts to finalize the goal of reunification. See Utah Code Amn. § TB8A-6-507(8)(a) (requiring the juvenile court to find that DCFS madе reasonable efforts to provide court-ordered services before the court may terminate pаrental rights). "The juvenile court has been granted broad discretion in determining whether or not DCFS made 'reasonable еfforts' to reunify a child with its parents." In re A.C.,
'I 4 The evidence does not support Father's assertion that he was willing to participate in, but was denied, reunification services. His lack of any substantial effort as of the time of the permanency hearing held in June 2010 resulted in the termination of reunification services. Throughout the proceedings, Father denied that there was any reason for involvement by DCFS or that he had any parenting problems. In the month after the children's removal, Fathеr participated in a mental health and parenting assessment. However, after being left to complete a written test, Father wrote, "no comment," rendering the results invalid. He did not appear for the originally scheduled drug and alcohol evaluation in April 2010 due to incarceration and did not complete that evaluation until August 2010, which was after reunification services had been terminated. That evaluation raised significant mental health issues that wоuld need to be addressed before Father could participate in drug treatment. Father took eight drug tests but missed sеventy-six drug tests during the case. At the termination trial, Father testified that he believed he was an excellent parent whо should regain custody of his children at that time. He testified that he did not believe that any reason had ever existed to justify their removal. Father's claim on appeal that he was willing to engage in services but was not provided appropriate services by DCFS is without merit. The evidence amply supports the finding that DCFS made reasonable efforts to implement the service plan and accomplish reunification.
T5 Father next claims that the evidencе was insufficient to support the juvenile court's best interests determination because the children had been in four foster homes and had moved to the legal risk home approved as a prospective adoptive рlacement only one day before the termination trial. The children's therapist testified that both H.H. and A.H. had been diаgnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and that E.H. had been diagnosed with "disordered infancy, childhood, or adolescence." All three children were making progress in treatment, but they needed ongoing treatment and a stable, predictable, and permanent home in order to
T 6 Accordingly, we affirm.
