I. INTRODUCTION
This сase arises out of a claim that Defendant, Minersville Area School District,
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleges the following facts which, for the purposes of resolving Defendant's Motiоn, the Court takes as true:
Plaintiff, A.H., is an eight-year-old girl currently enrolled in the second grade at Minersville Elementary School. (Doc. 10 at ¶ 2). Plaintiff is transgender, "meaning that she was assigned the sex of male at birth but she has a female gender identity." (Id. at ¶ 3). While in kindergarten, Plaintiff was diagnosed with gender dysphoria, a condition recognized in the fifth edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders which, according to the Amended Complaint, "refers to clinically significant distrеss that can result when a person's gender identity differs from the person's sex assigned at birth." (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5). Under the care of a pediatric psychologist, Plaintiff and her family have been exploring ways for Plaintiff to express her gender identity at home, in school, and in the community. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-18).
In 2014, Plaintiff enrolled in kindergarten at the Minersville Elementary School. (Id. at ¶ 1). Minersville Elementary School is part of the Minersville Area School District, a public school district in Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania, that is the recipient of federal financial assistance. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 103). Since beginning kindergarten in 2014, Plaintiff has continuously presented herself both in and out of school as a female. (Id. at ¶¶ 21-23). Plaintiff uses a female name, dresses in clothing traditionally associated with females, is addressed using female pronouns, and is known to her classmates as a female student. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 23).
Before the start of the 2014 school year, Plaintiff's mother, Tracey Handling, requested that the school allow Plaintiff to use the girl's bathroom but was told by the district superintendent, Carl McBreen, that the school could not make such an allowance because of the privacy rights of the other students. (Id. at ¶¶ 12, 24-25). The school, however, did allow Plaintiff the option of using a unisex bathroom. (Id. at ¶ 26). Because the kindergarten classroom has a single use bathroom for use by all the students, bathroom usage was not a significant problem for Plaintiff during the 2014-2015 school year except for one incident in May of 2015. (Id. at ¶¶ 29-30, 33). While on a field trip, school staff made Plaintiff wait while all the other students used the bathroom. (Id. at ¶ 34). After the male studеnts were finished, a teacher cleared the boy's bathroom of students and then made Plaintiff use it by herself while her classmates waited. (Id. at ¶¶ 34-35). The incident upset Plaintiff and resulted in some of her classmates asking her why
When Plaintiff's mother questioned the school's principal, James Yacobacci, about the incident, he informed Ms. Handling that it was school policy that a child must use the bathroom that corresponds with the sex listed on the child's birth certificate. (Id. at ¶¶ 14, 42). During the conversation, Principal Yacobаcci stated that it was his "job to protect all of the students from [Plaintiff]." (Id. at ¶ 43). Despite requesting a copy of the school's bathroom policy from Superintendent McBreen and Principal Yacobacci, Plaintiff's mother was never shown a policy that would prohibit Plaintiff from using the girl's bathroom. (Id. at ¶¶ 57-58).
Before the 2015-2016 school year began, Plaintiff's mother once again requested that the school allow Plaintiff to use the girl's bathroom while at school. (Id. at ¶ 51). The school, through Superintendent McBreen, deniеd Plaintiff's request. (Id. at ¶ 52). Superintendent McBreen expressed that he did not believe there would be much acceptance from other parents if Plaintiff was allowed to use the girl's bathroom and added that "Minersville isn't ready for this." (Id. at ¶¶ 53-54, 56). Soon thereafter, while giving a school tour to Ms. Handling, Principal Yacobacci repeatedly referred to Plaintiff using male pronouns despite being corrected by Plaintiff's mother. (Id. at ¶ 60).
Once Plaintiff began grade school, there was no single use bathroom in her classroom, and Plaintiff began using the unisex bathroom in the school. (Id. at ¶¶ 68-69). In February of 2016, staff from the Bradbury-Sullivan LGBT Community Center provided training to the Minersville Area School District on the topic of transgender students and the requirements of Title IX with respect to bathroom use policies. (Id. at ¶¶ 63-66). In March of 2016, Principal Yacobacci told Ms. Handling that for Plaintiff to be allowed to use the girl's bathroom while on a school field trip, Ms. Handling would have to accompany Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 70-73).
On May 27, 2016, soon after the Department of Justice and thе Department of Education issued a guidance document on how schools should accommodate transgender students with respect to bathrooms, Plaintiff's mother was told by Superintendent McBreen that Plaintiff would now be allowed to use the girl's bathroom. (Id. at ¶¶ 82-83). Plaintiff began using the girl's bathroom during the last week of the 2015-2016 school year. (Id. at ¶ 85). The school, however, has not created any policy on bathroom access for transgender students. (Id. at ¶¶ 84, 86).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly ,
"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly ,
"Although the plausibility standard 'does not impose a probability requirement,' it does require a pleading to show 'more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.' " Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp. ,
IV. ANALYSIS
Defendant seeks to dismiss both counts of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. The Court will address each count separately.
A. Title IX
Defendant first moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claim under Title IX. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides, in part, that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, оr be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
"To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title IX, a plaintiff must allege (1) that he or she was subjected to discrimination in an educational program, (2) that the program receives federal assistance, and (3) that the discrimination was on the basis of sex." Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist. ,
Defendant first argues that because the government has withdrawn its prior guidance which had interpreted Title IX to require schools to allow transgender students to use the bathrooms that correspond
Defendant contends that in light of the 2017 Guidance, Plaintiff may not maintain her Title IX claim. (Doc. 12 at 5). The 2017 Guidance, however, "did not propound any 'new' or different interpretation of Title IX or [
Since the time the 2017 Guidance was issued, a district court within this circuit and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit have held that a claim under Title IX exists when a school prohibits a transgender student from using the bathroom corresponding with the student's gender identity. See Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. ,
Ash can demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim because he has alleged that the School District has denied him access to the boys' restroom because he is transgender. A policy that requires an individual to use a bathroom that does not conform with his or her gender identity punishes that individual for his or her gender non-conformance, which in turn violates Title IX. The School District's policy also subjects Ash, as a transgender student, to different rules, sanctions, and treatment than non-transgender students, in violation of Title IX. Providing a gender-neutral alternative is not sufficient to relieve the School District from liability, as it is the policy itself which violates the Act.
Similarly, Evancho involved three transgender high school students who sought a preliminary injunction that would enjoin their school from enforcing a policy promulgated by the school board which required the students to use either a single-user bathroom or the bathroom that corresponded with the sex that the students were assigned at birth. Evancho ,
the law surrounding [34 C.F.R. § 106.33 ] and its interpretation and application to Title IX claims relative to the use of common restrooms by transgender students, including the impact of the 2017 Guidance, is at this moment so clouded with uncertainty that this Court is not in a position to conclude which party in this casе has the likelihood of success on the merits of that statutory claim.
Nevertheless, the Court denied the school district's motion to dismiss the students' Title IX claim, holding that the students "made a more than sufficient 'showing' in their Complaint of a right to relief under ... Title IX."
Defendant does not attempt to distinguish Evancho and Whitaker or present any arguments as to why this Court should not follow their holdings. The Court, further, sees no reason why the analysis and holdings of either Evancho or Whitaker are unsound when applied to the facts of this case.
Defendant, however, argues that because there were no formal government directives as to how schools should accommodate the bathroom needs of transgender students during the relevant time period of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, it is clear that Defendant made every reasonable effort to accommodate Plaintiff. (Doc. 12 at 7-8; Doc. 18 at 4-5). Defendant points out that, according to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was provided a unisex bathroom, the school voluntarily received education on the needs of transgender students, and, once the 2016 Guidance was issued, Defendant allowed Plaintiff to use the girl's bathroom.
Contrary to Defendant's argument, a specific practice need not be identified as unlawful by the government before a plaintiff may bring a claim under Title IX. See generally Evancho ,
To the extent that Defendant is arguing that the lack of formal guidance and the school's attеmpts to accommodate Plaintiff show that Defendant did
Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as it pertains to Plaintiff's Title IX claim.
B. Fourteenth Amendment
Defendant next moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim brought pursuant to
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part, that no State may "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
In light of the above, the "first step in evaluating a claim that a law or government action violates the Equal Protection Clause is to determine the appropriate standard of review." Donatelli v. Mitchell ,
Here, Defendant does not advance any important objective that its bathroom policy served. Instead, Defendant reiterates its argument that, in the absence of guidance from the government, Defendant made all reasonable efforts to accommodate Plaintiff. (Doc. 12 at 10). For the same reasons that this argument failed in the context of Title IX, it fails here. Plaintiff has adequately alleged the existence of a school policy that treated her differently on the basis of her transgender status or nonconformity to gender stereotypes. As such, she has sufficiently stated a claim for relief under the Equal Protection Clause.
Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as it pertains to Plaintiff's Equal Protection claim.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, this Court will deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 11). A separate Order follows.
Notes
The Evancho Court did, however, grant the students' motion for a preliminary injunction pursuant to their claim that the school's policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Evancho ,
Although not cited by Defendant, Johnston v. University of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education ,
Defendant also argues that it had nо control over the bathrooms during the school field trips because the bathrooms were offered by outside facilities that were not connected with the school. (Doc. 12 at 8). At the pleading stage, such an argument is premature. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges that on the field trip that took place in May of 2015, Plaintiff was required to use the boy's bathroom at the direction of school officials pursuant to Defendant's policy. (Doc. 10 at ¶¶ 34-42). Similarly, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges that on thе field trip that took place in March of 2016, a school official informed Plaintiff's mother that she would need to accompany Plaintiff on the field trip in order for Plaintiff to be allowed to use the girl's bathroom. (Id. at ¶¶ 71-73). Thus, the Amended Complaint claims that it was Defendant, and not the outside facility, which prohibited Plaintiff from using the girl's bathroom while on field trips.
The Fourteenth Amendment is fully applicable to public school districts and their employees. See, e.g., Fitzgerald ,
To the extent that Plaintiff is required to allege purposeful discrimination to adequately plead her § 1983 claim, see Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist. ,