| Ill. App. Ct. | Aug 1, 1888
The question presented for decision is whether, under the circumstances of this case, the opera chairs are to be considered fixtures, as between the real estate mortgagee and the holder of the chattel mortgage, who sold and delivered the chairs upon a contract that the deferred payments for them should be secured by a chattel mortgage upoiW them. "Whether articles which are attached to a building become a part of the realty or remain movable fixtures, will depend, according to the weight of authority, upon the intention of the party affixing them, particularly where the articles attached can be removed without injury to the articles themselves or to the freehold.
Here the intention of Lanyon, that the opera chairs should remain personal property, is very clearly evidenced by his agreement in the contract of purchase that he would give a chattel mortgage upon them to secure part of the purchase money, and that he would insure them, “ loss, if any, payable to A. H. Andrews & Co.”
We can not see that the rights of appellant are at all affected by the fact that the first chattel mortgage expired and that a new one was executed to secure the balance of the purchase money yet remaining unpaid. While the lien secured by the first chattel mortgage expired, the intention with which the chairs were put in the building continued and the new chattel mortgage created a new lien upon them, whereas the lien of the real estate mortgage did not extend to them, they continu-. ing to be chattels. It is not deemed necessary to examine and discuss the various authorities with reference to the law of fixtures as applicable to the facts of this case. We regard, the case as controlled by Sword v. Low, recently decided by the Supreme Court, 11 Western Rep. 719, in which" the cases on the subject are fully cited and considered. And see, also, Campbell v. Roddy, 12 Central Rep. 821.
It is not alleged in the bill that Lanyon is insolvent, or that the removal of the chairs would so reduce the value of the property as to make the security inadequate. The answer alleges that the property covered by the mortgage is of the valúe of §10,000, and the loan secured is §9,000. Under that state of facts it seems to be established that the mortgagee is not entitled to an injunction to restrain the removal of fixtures which are subject to the lien of the mortgage. Ewell on Fixtures, 49, and cases cited.
This condition of the record was proper to be considered on the motion to dissolve, and would, in our opinion, warrant the granting of the order of dissolution.
The order overruling the motion to dissolve the injunction will he reversed, and the case will be remanded to the Circuit Court, with directions to enter an order dissolving the preliminary injunction now existing in said cause.
Reversed and remanded.