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A.E.P. Industries, Inc. v. McClure
302 S.E.2d 754
N.C.
1983
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*1 A.E.P. Industries v. McClure INDUSTRIES, A.E.P. v. R. INC. BRUCE McCLURE

No. 445A82 (Filed 1983) May Appeal preliminary injunction appeal § Error 6.2— denial of 1. —immediate plaintiffs preliminary injunction The denial of motion for a to restrain deprived plaintiff breaching compete of a defendant from a covenant not to 1-277; immediately right appealable. 7A-27. and was G.S. G.S. substantial 21.8; compete —applicable § § 7.1— to 2. Courts Contracts covenants —validity law compete employment agreements governed not to were Covenants Jersey agreements provi- law of New where the contained a the substantive Jersey,” they “governed the laws of the State of New sion that would be question appear to be valid and enforceable under New and the covenants Jersey territory, they writing, time and law where are in are reasonable as to part employment, were based on were made a consideration, of the contracts of reasonable protect legitimate designed business interest of and »re to plaintiff employer. Injunctions preliminary injunction protection plaintiff’s rights § 3. 13.1— — issue, injunction determining preliminary the trial whether a should injury. question irreparable inquiry not limited to the court’s second court, Rather, if, injunction opinion in the issuance issue litiga- necessary protection plaintiffs rights during for the of a the course of tion. 7.1; 6; restraining § Injunctions § § 11.1— Contracts Master and Servant 4. injunction compete right preliminary to breach of covenant not to — preliminary in- plaintiffs for a have allowed motion The trial court should compete breaching in an junction a covenant not to to restrain defendant from that the cove- employment agreement where there was a reasonable likelihood merits; likely prevail plaintiff would was valid and that nant permanent injunction the cove- plaintiff sought to enforce was a ultimate injunction stage of preliminary compete; made at the nant not to the decision effect, became, merits because of a determination on the proceedings covenant; plaintiffs principal limitation of the duration of the time the brief nature; preliminary in- necessarily of a equitable in and the denial relief was plaintiff. effectively adequate relief to junction to foreclose would serve injunction Injunctions right preliminary § 13— remedy injunction; sought where the primary is an ultimate Where effectively adequate injunction to foreclose preliminary would serve of a denial (as remedy equitable) will suf- “legal” opposed plaintiff; where no relief fice; deny injunction in preliminary effect grant or the decision to and where merits, showing that the made a has in a determination on results rights necessary protection of its for the of a issuance during litigation. the course of IN THE SUPREME COURT v. McClure Industries *2 dissenting. Martin Justice Copeland join dissenting opinion. and Exum this

Justices Appeals, of the Court of from decision appeals PLAINTIFF (1982), of affirming 293 S.E. 2d 232 the denial App. Snepp, entered motion for a plaintiffs preliminary Court, J., 1981 in Superior 2 December order filed MECKLEN- Ap- decision of the of County. Plaintiff appeals BURG 7A-30(2). to G.S. peals pursuant § Appeals issue before us is whether the Court of The sole denial of motion affirming plaintiffs erred in Court’s Superior injunction to restrain the defendant for a employment agree- in an compete a covenant not breaching below, forth we hold that ment. For the reasons set 1-485 and is therefore en- burden to G.S. pursuant satisfied its § final determination on the sought pending the relief titled to merits. facts: following

The Record discloses the of in the manufacture and distribution engaged Plaintiff States. On throughout the United products various polyethylene a sales hired the defendant October As office. out of North Carolina plaintiffs to work representative plaintiffs and consistent with employment, of this a condition information, proprietary its confidential and practice protecting agreement execute a written was required defendant alia, that: inter provided, a) me; continued your employment In consideration of b) you bonus which are a salesman’s your to me of payment c) my skills further development obligated pay; while my earnings potential increase anticipated

and an by your employed firm..... a) Industries, A.E.P. Inc. hereby acknowledge

I through- and sells them products and processes manufactures b) Industries, States; Inc. A.E.P. United continental out the solicitations ex- telephone mail and employ personal salesmen developing and tensively marketing products in the course of IN THE COURT SUPREME A.E.P. Industries v. McClure c) Industries, Inc.; the names of new customers for A.E.P. Industries, are not prospects Inc.’s customers and of the con- known the trade. As a generally consequence lists, and other prospect fidential nature the customer which has sales and financial information product, prices, my to me in employment been and be made available firm, not, my your I will the term of during the reason (regardless for a 18 months thereafter period my employment). for the termination of or indirectly, sole as a Directly proprietor, A. as a officer, stockholder, director, employee, partner, principal, *3 or become participate representative, engage, or other agent with, in, by or employed or be affiliated connected interested firm, association, to, or other any service corporation, render or or the same substantial- which shall market sell enterprise by or A.E.P. those marketed sold ly products similar Industries, my employ- of termination of Inc. at the time immediately period preceding within the 6 month ment or termination. such orders, any or service accept for orders

B. Solicit Industries, I whom or which contact Inc. of A.E.P. customer em- or while or serviced telegraph, mail personally, Industries, Inc. by A.E.P. ployed from, orders, any or service accept orders for Solicit C. whom or which was enterprise firm or other person, Industries, my term during Inc. of A.E.P. customer personally customer was or not such whether employment, or me. solicited serviced from, orders, any or service accept orders for D. Solicit Industries, I con- whom or which Inc. A.E.P. prospects of, during I learned names whose

tacted personally, Industries, Inc. of A.E.P. my employment term association, firm, individual, corpora- any Disclose E. benefit, any own my nor use enterprise, tion or other customer, trade, financial, informa- business, or sales product my in the course to me known shall become tion which Industries, being information Inc. such by A.E.P. in the generally not known to the extent confidential deemed trade.

A.E.P. Industries v. McClure F. I acknowledge the remedies at law for the any of the restrictive covenants contained in the breach immediately shall be deemed to be preceding paragraph Industries, and that A.E.P. Inc. shall entitled to adequate injunctive relief for such breach. having eight

After worked for the for approximately months, was promoted position manager. defendant of sales In this defendant was for the capacity responsible employment, training, supervision of all of sales plaintiffs personnel twelve southeastern states. Defendant had access to information concerning manufacturing requirements customers. 23 August

On defendant entered into a second written employment agreement the terms of which plaintiff, substantially were similar to the first agreement. The recited con- Furthermore, sideration in the 23 August agreement $100.00. was agreement the second limited expressly defendant’s activities to “the area of the continental United States located east of the River.” Mississippi 21 August

On and defendant entered into an alia, on Termination which Agreement provided, inter that: is, fact, manufacture, engaged WHEREAS, *4 and production distribution of various polyethylene plastic States, the products throughout directly United either or one or through more of its subsidiaries or affiliated com- panies; and the Employee employed has been for A.E.P.

WHEREAS, Matthews, in its primarily plant location at North Carolina time; significant for a period of and the by A.E.P. employment of the Employee WHEREAS, hereof; will terminate as of the date and Employee the will be by hired an affiliated WHEREAS, i.e., company, Poly Design Bag Corp., Jersey a New corpora- tion; and the Employee acknowledges that in his capaci- Whereas, A.E.P., ty employee as an of he was necessarily provided with a deal great of confidential and proprietory informa- v. McClure Industries A.E.P., customers of addresses of names and including tion of as all for same as well pricing needs and A.E.P. and product information and proprietory of confidential type the other entered into between agreement in a certain described by employment of his inception A.E.P. at the and Employee A.E.P.; and and agreed previously has Employee

WHEREAS, not to engage for such agreement consideration received to the ter- of time period subsequent activities for a certain A.E.P.; with and relationship mination of his into an additional wish to enter parties WHEREAS, herein to return for the consideration further agreement and (an Poly Corp. af- by Design Bag the hiring and expressed A.E.P.) of Employee. filiated corporation THEREFORE, NOW, acknowledge, hereto do parties as follows: agree understand and by acknowledges previous Employee 1. The vital, of Employee and as receipt acquisition

A.E.P. and his A.E.P. as information proprietory and confidential and Employee between Agreement in the described employment. of his beginning at the A.E.P. which commenced and val- of receipt good reacknowledges Employee The and reack- Agreement said earlier uable consideration viability continuing efficacy and reaffirms the nowledges of same. $20,000.00 in hand to receipt

2. In consideration of time period A.E.P. over such Employee paid receipt in consideration may agree, parties as the McClure, same, agrees Bruce Employee, any portion any pro- or disclose use any time hereafter he will not at acquired been A.E.P. which has information prietory employ- his previous a result of directly solely him lists that customer agrees Employee A.E.P. The ment with addresses together customers lists of prospective same, *5 same, information price acquired products and A.E.P. information of financial sales and and customers in- are information proprietory of confidential all items limitation, but by way Not Agreement. within this cluded IN THE SUPREME COURT A.E.P. Industries v. McClure way of hereto is a list of customers example, attached Industries, to names have been disclosed A.E.P. Inc. whose Poly Bag Corp. for the business of Employee. Except (an Design A.E.P.) not, affiliated corporation Employee circumstances, or with any any contact communicate under officer, or of the agent employee representative, principal, to customers of A.E.P. whose names have been made known on the and some of those names are set forth Employee attached list. all of the Employee reacknowledges

3. The reaffirms set forth representations acknowledgements previously Employee. between A.E.P. and the agreement an earlier included a to agreement compete This third covenant to in the two earlier agreements, geographic similar limitation areas “within a radius of 300 miles encompassing offices, otherwise, regional location at which of A.E.P.’s may be located.” to defendant’s respect subsequent

With includes a memo Poly Bag Corp., indicating the Record Design was to receive as follows: compensation that defendant Agreement Subject: Compensation year for 52 wks. commencing I. 1st 8/21/81 total Compensation $42,500 — A) —$20,000 to be in 52 paid equal A.E.P. for the attached con-

stallments consideration tract —no deduction. payroll B) weekly to for the paid draw Design $22,500 — yr. —no deduction. payroll 1st yr. only: 1st compensation Other C) company use of the continued provide

car. D) directly be billed Design telephone expense

Design. E) Design once in consideration of $100.00 to be paid

employment agreement. *6 399 IN THE SUPREME COURT McClure

A.E.P. Industries v. F) by Design and for provided paid to be space Office month. per $250.00

at net sales a rate of of total To be at 5% paid Commissions: $850,000 commencing after sales 8/21/81 monthly. paid 52 wks. to be subsequent year II. 2nd

A) on a of sales straight to be based 5% Commission monthly based subject change to be paid (Draw in selling price. on increases and decreases may be on a arranged commissions

against basis.) mutually agreeable B) space. office Design provide —to C) responsibility. All to be salesman’s expenses other Defendant, however, his termi- upon affidavit alleges pay months “severance” he was offered six plaintiff, nation with $42,000.00, in addition to a one salary of of one-half of his annual salary the same he was Poly at year Design Bag contract with seen the memo having He denied ever plaintiff. with the earning after he had executed the his new until concerning Termination. on August Agreement Poly Bag September on 18 Design from resigned Defendant August 1979 and the 21 the 23 August 1981. violation of immediately several of began contacting defendant agreements, formerly as a dealing he had been with which companies At least two of these plaintiff. sales manager salesman and (Chatham Elkin, C.,N. and Reeves Bros. Inc. of Manufacturing C.) Cornelius, list of customers attached to the N. on the appeared Termination. on August Agreement on grounds suit defendant brought against Plaintiff agreements covenants contained breaching was defendant conjunction 1981. In with this 21 August of 23 August suit, order to restraining stop a temporary motion for plaintiffs granted the covenants was October breaching defendant in effect until this order remained By parties, 1981. consent of the Snepp entered Judge 20 November 17 November On order. The court ruled restraining continuing an order A.E.P. Industries v. McClure motion for a pending the out- litigation come of the on 30 1981. Judge Snepp November denied *7 motion and dissolved the order temporary restraining 22 first entered October that there was conceding “probable cause to may believe that the at the but prevail hearing,” had “failed to establish through its evidence the any reasonable monetary likelihood of substantial Plain- damage.” tiff appealed denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction Appeals, affirmed to which opinion Judge Webb dissented.

Bell, Seltzer, Gibson, Park & by Myers James D. and Ronald T. Lindsay, plaintiff-appellant. for Elam, Stroud, Seaford, Stroud, McGinnis & Keith M.

defendant-appellee.

MEYER, Justice. [1] A preliminary injunction interlocutory nature, issued after notice and hearing, which restrains a party final pending 1A-1, determination on the merits. G.S. Rule 65. Pursuant § 7A-27, 1-277 G.S. and G.S. no lies to an appeal appellate court § § interlocutory from an order or ruling of a trial judge unless such order or ruling deprives of a appellant substantial right which he would lose absent a review prior to final determination. As we School, 351, 357-58, recently stated in State 908, 913, (1980): dismissed, 2d appeal U.S. The of a purpose preliminary injunction ordinarily preserve the status quo pending trial on the merits. Its is- suance ais matter of discretion to be exercised the hear- ing judge after a careful balancing of the equities. Its impact temporary and lasts no longer than the pendency of the action. Its decree bears no precedent guide the final deter- form, mination of the rights of the In parties. purpose, and ef- fect, Thus, it is purely interlocutory. the threshold question presented a purported appeal an order granting preliminary injunction is whether the appellant has been deprived substantial right which might be lost should the order escape appellate review before final judgment. If no such right is endangered, the appeal cannot be main- (Citations omitted.) tained.

A.E.P. Industries v. McClure Personnel, Inc., See Waters v. S.E. 2d 338 (1978); Williams, Pruitt v. S.E. 2d 348 The Court of Appeals did not consider the appealability of this interlocutory order. There is little doubt the denial of the motion for a preliminary injunction in this case deprived fact, plaintiff of a substantial right. as of the filing of this opin- ion, plaintiff has essentially lost its case because the eighteen month time limitation under the employment agreements expired Likewise, in March of 1983. order, as the trial judge noted in his had the preliminary injunction been granted, “the plaintiff would in effect have prevailed in the action no matter what the final Thus, determination might be.” it appears a case such as consideration, the one now under although involving a substan- essence, tive right appealing party, where time is of the *8 the appellate process is not the procedural mechanism best suited for resolving the dispute. The parties would be better advised to seek a final determination on the merits at the earliest possible Nevertheless, time. because this presents case an important ques- tion the affecting respective rights of employers and employees who choose to agreements execute involving covenants not compete, we have determined to address the issues. rule, general

As a a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary by measure taken a court preserve the status quo of the parties during It will litigation. be issued (1) only if plaintiff a is able to show likelihood of success on (2) the merits of his case and if a plaintiff likely is to sustain issued, if, irreparable loss unless the is or in the Court, opinion of the necessary issuance is protection the of a plaintiffs rights the course during litigation. Waff Bros., Bank, 198, 273; Inc. v. 289 221 S.E. N.C. 2d Pruitt v. Williams, 368, 348; 288 218 S.E. N.C. 2d v. Conference Creech, 128, 256 123 S.E. N.C. 2d Investors, 688, 701, 566, Inc. v. 293 Berry, 574 N.C. 2d is, therefore,

The first of the stage inquiry whether plaintiff is able to show likelihood of success on the merits. In the present case, the trial “that judge probable conceded there cause to plaintiff may believe the at the that prevail hearing” “plain- 402 v. McClure Industries an for issuance of a temporary

tiff out case apparent makes Thus the court equity.” some trial junction by recognized showing the agreements a likelihood that found that there was reasonable likely would prevail valid and that were reasonable and merits. the [2] granting We note that on denying appeal injunction, an order appellate superior court court evi may the findings, weigh but review and not bound 368, Williams, v. for itself. Pruitt dence and find facts 232, 348; Plastics, Inc., 287 Co. v. 218 S.E. 2d Telephone 357, (1975); 2d 116 S.E. Hospital, S.E. Huskins 2d court before questioned Plaintiff before trial the employment effect of a in Appeals provision the laws “governed that would agreements agreements 1) Thus, Jersey.” we must first State of New consider of the are, fact, Jersey agreements, governed New whether the 2) so, law, if whether there is a likelihood that Jersey New law. light on the merits prevail Co. v. Byrd, we stated Land question, As to the first (1980), “where to a parties 2d S.E. law substantive agreed given jurisdiction’s have contract contract, such a contractual interpretation shall govern a New effect.” We note that will be provision given Jersey in New and that with Jersey corporation headquarters contacts had numerous employment, his defendant during substan- Jersey office. We therefore hold New *9 Jersey applicable interpretation New is tive law of agreements. Jersey validity and New law the area of review of

Our enforceability compete not to indicates covenants are similar to those in North Carolina. governing principles and enforceable compete a covenant not valid this State it is: showing upon

1. In writing. of a contract of employment. 2. Made part Based on reasonable consideration. 3. IN THE SUPREME 403 COURT Industries v. McClure

4. Reasonable both as to time territory.

5. Not against public policy. Jones, 284, (1967); U-Haul Co. v. 269 152 S.E. 2d 65 Exter- Jones, minating Co. v. Co. v. Exterminating Griffin 179, (1962); 128 S.E. 2d 139 Asheville Associates v. Miller and Berman, 400, Asheville Associates v. 255 121 S.E. 2d 593 (1961); Gillis, (1929). 223, Scott v. The seminal ease in New Jersey recognizing validity enforceability of noncompetitive clauses employment agree- Industries, 571, ments is Solari Inc. v. Malady, N.J. 264 A. 2d (1970), where that court stated that: . . . while a covenant employee not to compete after the not, termination of his employment because of the counter- considerations, enforceable, vailing policy freely it will nonetheless given effect if it is reasonable in view of all the circumstances of the particular case. It will generally be found to be reasonable where it simply protects the legiti- mate interests of the employer, no imposes undue hardship on the employee, injurious and is not .... public 576, Id. at 264 A. 2d at Carolina, As in North Jersey New courts have con-

sidered, as a prerequisite to the enforceability of noncompetitive employment agreements:

1. Whether the covenant is reasonable as to time and Mailman, Ross, Edelson, territory. etc. v. 183 N.J. Super. 444 A. 2d 75 2. Whether it is made a of a part contract of employ- ment and based on reasonable consideration. Hogan Bergen Brunswig Corp., N.J. 378 A. Super. 2d 1164 3. Whether the covenant against public policy or. Lionikis, unreasonable. Ellis v. Super. N.J. 394 A. 2d (1978) (invalid where the sole purpose is to prevent com- petition rather than protect a legitimate interest of the *10 employer).

404 McClure Industries v. fact, has, violated the terms the employee 4. Whether Edelson, Mailman, Ross, 183 v. N.J. etc. of the covenant. 434, 444 A. 2d 75. Super. Heim, v. 276 N.C. Inc. Enterprises, cases see

For North Carolina Morrow, (1970); 475, 272 Box Jewel Stores 173 S.E. 2d 659, (1968); Swartzberg, Moskin Bros. v. S.E. 2d 840 (1930); 539, Assoc. v. Ingram, 155 S.E. 154 Schultz Amdar, (1978); Inc. v. Satter 248 S.E. 2d App. 38 N.C. white, disc. rev. den. 246 S.E. 2d App. us, is a reasonable we that there agree the Record before On on the prevail hearing will at plaintiff likelihood that It is in to be valid and enforceable. appears The covenant merits. territory, was made a part as to time and reasonable writing, considera- was based on reasonable employment, the contracts tion, business interest of legitimate a designed protect and is rule, the primary As a courts have denied general the plaintiff. itself is found to be agreement enforcement where the relief of is, harsh, void; agreement unreasonable or where the unjust, validity. its satisfy insuring one or more of the criteria fails every where the case Injunctions 43A See C.J.S. § valid, reasonable and compete found to be covenant however, remedy; agree- is entitled to a either the plaintiff has an plaintiff or the court must find that ment must be enforced money remedy damages. at law for adequate court, would having merits, plaintiff The trial determined that; likely on the nonetheless found prevail In this case the evidence does not establish All facie a case of of the state- prima irreparable damage. conclusory ments contained in the and affidavit are complaint only inference which can be drawn is that the dam- any, if be sustained are ages, conjectural. In view as to the speculative of the evidence out, I polyethylene manner which the sales of are carried cannot find that would as the result defend- activity sustain damage, reparable irreparable. ant’s However, though apparent even makes out an temporary injunction by showing case for issuance of a some must nevertheless exercise its recognized equity, *11 IN THE SUPREME COURT v. McClure Industries in whether the writ should determining sound discretion issue, and to this end the affidavits relative weigh conflicting to the conveniences and inconveniences which would result from the issuance of the writ and the Court should refuse to great injury the writ when to do so would cause grant in the comparison upon defendant and confer little benefit Huskins v. N.C. 357. plaintiff. Hospital, I of this find that the the light balancing equities, injury by defendant would be caused tremendous issuance of injunction. the court, holding

The with the trial Appeals agreed in denying injunc- “the trial court did not abuse its discretion harm to showing irreparable tion based on inadequate McClure, . . . .” A.E.P. at App. Industries 2d at liminary injunction should

[3] We first emphasize issue, the trial court’s second determining whether inquiry pre injury. injunction The question irreparable not limited to the Court, “if, necessary in the of the issuance is opinion issue the course rights during litiga protection Investors, at 239 S.E. 2d at 574 Berry, tion.” Inc. v. added). (emphasis of this important aspects further note that there are two We substantively and from the procedurally it distinguish case The sought. in which a preliminary more usual case of a is that the ultimate relief seeks is first enforcement The promised performance to compete. covenant remedy is one for specific is forbearance to act and the employee injunction pro- nature of an of the contract performance Jones, Co. v. violation of it. See U-Haul further hibiting 65; 152 S.E. 2d 5A Corbin Contracts § feature of this case is distinguishing The second of the injunction stage pro- made at decision effect, becomes, on the merits. This a determination ceedings among other validity depends, of the covenant so because the which, in to be limitation order of the time on the duration things, reasonable, immediacy. The case is clothed must be brief. final expired prior will have the time limitation Frequently A.E.P. Industries v. McClure Moreover, primary relief sought determination. because many is a injunction, considerations permanent deny in the grant preliminary injunc- involved decision tion involved in a final determination on the merits. parallel those remedy sought the court must decide whether the Specifically, *12 for preserving the is the most plaintiff appropriate protecting remedy adequate its or whether there is an at law. rights is in injunctive that nature and recognize equitable We courts, that equities, that in the have determined weighing some justice judg- can obtain full and complete because money hardship and because to the defendant damages, ment for any his has not met outweighs hardship plaintiff, plaintiff likely it has of that or is to sustain showing irreparable burden The in cases the jury. Injunctions 43A C.J.S. 95. focus such as § however, consideration, only one under is not plain- now whether but, more irreparable injury, important, tiff has sustained for necessary protec- the issuance of the is the whether is, tion the of that rights during litigation; of course remedy has an at law. adequate whether argues authority sup- and there is to persuasively, Plaintiff in a breach argument, “noncompetition agreement, the that port injunctive is factor and relief follows almost as controlling the course; ir- damage from the is to be presumed matter of breach remedy and the at law is It is reparable inadequate. considered necessary damage to show actual instances of successful in if such violation of competition, but it is sufficient competition, covenant, in 95. may Injunctions result 43A injury.” the C.J.S. § fact, In which each contain agreements signed defendant recognized which has been evidence following language, Satterwhite, Amdar, Inc. v. money damages. See inadequacy 246 S.E. 2d disc. rev. den. 295 N.C. 645 N.C. App. that remedies law for the breach acknowledge I at immediately in the any of the restrictive covenants contained shall to be paragraph inadequate be deemed preceding Industries, to injunctive A.E.P. Inc. shall be entitled that relief for such breach. law that one factor used

It a basic contract principle is remedy money damages at for of a law determining adequacy difficulty the amount uncertainty determining is the IN THE SUPREME COURT Industries v. McClure to be awarded for defendant’s breach. 5A damages See Corbin Thus, where the “injury irreparable damages Contracts § only by conjecture, by any are estimable and not stand- accurate fact, Injunctions 42 Am. in holding ard.” Jur. 2d 49§ to injunctive that a was entitled relief for breach of a not to covenant this characterized as “untenable” compete, Court that a contract argument provision liquidated damages Jones, provided remedy at Co. v. adequate law. U-Haul 287, 152 This at S.E. 2d at 67. has further held that it not essential it be injury constitute irreparable “[t]o injury beyond repair shown that possibility pos- damages, injury but is one compensation sible should not or the complainant required submit inflict, other and is of such continuous and fre- party permitted recurrence no reasonable can be in a court quent redress had Troutman, 47, 50, Barrier v. 55 S.E. 2d law.” added). (1949) (emphasis *13 with of the agree implication We cannot the decisions below to entitled some measure although plaintiff legally that relief, no or in Those remedy equity. it has in law nevertheless to to plaintiff, unable a deter- imply assign decisions seem competitive to has no ade- practices, minable value defendant’s remedy “damage, at it has sustained no law. And because quate relief, too, or is foreclosed. Yet irreparable,” reparable equitable to reasonable given legally recognizable right has been protection against competition: all carefully contracts a man’s limiting scrutinize

‘Courts any anywhere or he profession to follow trade right natural just important manner. But it is and lawful pleases or of an enjoyment pro- to fession, establishment trade protect by has his own honest up which built possessor its duty to every-day performance the faithful and application day ordinary man. every imposes upon tasks his. Public does policy one his own What creates labor shall reap than the producer not intend that another right to him who labors the of labor. it gives fruits Rather and the fruits his labor protect means every legitimate Freedom con- of them to himself. enjoyment secure unreasonably Neither must abridged. must tract McClure A.E.P. Industries v. which a man restrictions by reasonable right protect be denied.’ up, has built judgment and by industry, good skill 315, 228, 223, Gillis, 317-318 See 197 N.C. v. Scott 316; 475, Heim, Jewel S.E. 2d 276 N.C. Inc. v. Enterprises, 659, Morrow, was 840. Plaintiff 158 S.E. 2d v. Box Stores enforcement relief—the to ultimate clearly equitable entitled in competitive engaging defendant prohibiting the covenant assuming territory specified, time and within the practices legally binding: was found to be valid the agreement restrictions with to enforceable respect rule general The of the that if the nature 9 A.L.R. 1468: ‘It is clear is stated in in personal bring employee is such as will or enable employer, or customers patrons contact to the nature and valuable information as him to acquire the names and requirements of the business and character customers, in a com- engaging him enabling or patrons behalf, another, to take ad- in his own business peting with the of or knowledge acquaintance of such vantage thereby employer, of his former and customers patrons interpose behalf advantage, equity unfair gain . . . the cove- providing restrain the breach employer ... as to time or as the rule that against nant does not offend be no than is territory greater it embraces it shall of the business necessary to secure the reasonably protection will of the employer.’ or good Associates v. Ber- Associates v. Miller and Asheville

Asheville 403-404, man, Inc. Enterprises, at S.E. 2d at 595. See 316, 320; Heim, Moskin Bros. v. 173 S.E. 2d 155 S.E. 154. Swartzberg, properly [4] Having and thus determined necessarily equitable in plaintiff’s principal nature in the form of an in *14 relief was covenant, the we hold that was en junction to enforce injunction. Beginning Clegg, with Cobb v. preliminary titled to a (1904), 153, consistently this has 49 S.E. Court N.C. that where the relief proposition principal sought adhered to the necessary it the particularly is permanent injunction, of the distinction be injunction speaking issue. injunctions special injunc tween the old forms of common and tions, this wrote: Industries v. McClure secondary in aid of or as to another granted

The former was injunction proceedings in case of an to restrain as the equity, enforce an which could protect equity at law in order to and issued, course, in of upon coming of the not be and pleaded, bill, As soon as the defendant answered the without notice. for injunction, move to the and it was then he could dissolve discretion, court, say of its sound to the whether, the exercise answer, or, it is disclosed the on the facts confessed, termed, injunction the the technically upon equity If the facts hearing. or continued to the should be dissolved denied, fully fairly the the were and constituting equity some reason special was dissolved unless there was junction injunction, which is special it. Not so with a continuing for when the injury, prevention irreparable, for the granted only ultimate and court of is the equity aid of the preventive involved the suit. is the sought primary equity relief rule is not to dissolve injunctions the special In the case answer, may deny it though in of even the upon coming if hearing but to continue equity supposing cause probable there rea- and there is a maintain his primary equity

be able to unless it remains loss irreparable sonable apprehension force, reasonably appears of the court it opinion or if in the controversy until the necessary right protect It is gen- can be determined. him and the defendant between concerning are at issue erally parties when the proper, interlocutory injunction right, grant equitable legal until the determination quo in statu right preserve the prin- the rule when is this controversy, especially because a dis- an injunction, is in sought cipal itself or the injunction, interlocutory a pending solution refusal instance, will one, in the upon application first therefor deprive its merits case upon decide the virtually relief, he should though even remedy or all plaintiff of a case. good show ever so able to afterwards added). Pleaters, 158-59, Inc. v. 82-83 (emphasis 49 S.E. at Id. at (1963); 131, Finance Kostakes, Company 129 S.E. 2d 259 (1963); College, v. Jordan, Church 2d 882 259 N.C. v. Brotherhood, (1961); v. Lines Coach 119 S.E. 2d 867 Goldston, (1961); Studios 118 S.E. 2d 254 *15 IN THE SUPREME COURT Industries McClure v. (1958) S.E. 2d was entitled have a tem- (plaintiff to law); continued as a matter of Boone porary restraining order Boone, 9 S.E. 2d

[5] Because of the need for immediacy appropriate relief in dealing compete, example cases with covenants not to for not in a present engage case where defendant contracted to months, only eighteen business the law as stated competitive for We primary above is hold that where the particularly applicable. remedy injunction; is an where denial of a ultimate sought effectively serve to ade injunction would foreclose preliminary (as opposed equitable) where no plaintiff; “legal” relief to quate suffice; deny a grant where the remedy decision determination in effect in a on the injunction results preliminary merits, has of a showing made issuance necessary protection rights' for the of its preliminary course of during litigation.

Finally, we that our is in with the holding believe accordance in new tech” encourage growth “high State to policy of our dustry. North rapid technological accompanying “The advances employment oppor- industrial increased growth Carolina’s tunities, professional occupations, for technical and especially en- immediacy problem significance added gives forceability of covenants not to contained in compete H. Not Constangy, Employment Contract Covenants contracts.” Law, Enforceability 10 Wake Under North Carolina Compete: Forest L. Rev. has been the effective equitable While here denied (the injunction), which it since relief to was entitled completely has there elapsed, month restriction now eighteen a claim including other claims for still remains money damages. for substantial case is reversed and the Appeals The decision the Court Court, remand to the Superior

is remanded to court County, inconsistent proceedings for further Mecklenburg with this opinion. and remanded.

Reversed *16 v. McClure A.E.P. Industries dissenting. Justice Martin ap- are now moot and the by raised this appeal The questions 345, 132 260 Morganton, Fulton v. should be dismissed.

peal (1963). cannot restrain 687 “It is obvious that a court quite S.E. 2d Austin already which has been consummated.” of that doing 662, 663, 702, 703 The Dare 240 2d County, not com- the defendant would upon specified contract sued months after the date period eighteen with for a pete plaintiff Industries, by employed plaintiff. which he ceased to be on 4 1981. non- summarily August The Inc. fired defendant the latest on 18 expired at competitive eighteen-month period injunction, to an March 1983.1 Even if were entitled not, of discretion for which I maintain it is it would be an abuse restraining defendant preliminary injunction court to issue a The agreement. of the in the expiration period specified after the is now compete of the covenant not to eighteen-month period fait so, the issuance being nothing support This there is accompli. Brown, at this time. Com. v. 238 N.C. Highway of an 293, A Jones Co. v. 77 S.E. 2d 780 similar case is Herff (1978), in which Judge S.E. 2d Allegood, App. (now Justice) Morris, for the Judge concurring, with Mitchell held for twelve months ex- compete court that when a covenant not to moot and while the case was on the issue became pired appeal, before the court decision: longer was no this subject covenant not to which is the compete The year to one expressly following action was limited duration between relationship the termination of the employment defendants. Plaintiff’s evidence shows that termination of was mailed to defend- representation notice of July 1976. testified Allegood ants and dated Defendant began working Publishing Company, he for Hunter Thus, early April assuming as competitor plaintiff, July ended no later than 28 employment that defendants’ which through the latest date defendants could would have been competing restrained Design Poly-Bag Corp., an affiliated com- 1. Defendant left Assuming argument plaintiff, September 1981. for the sake of pany of on 18 agreement applied employment with with A.E.P. to his defendant’s termination period expired Design Poly-Bag, eighteen-month would have 18 March 1983. v. McClure

A.E.P. Industries consideration having pending 1977. That date July passed Court, relating pro questions this appeal this not before below are injunctive granted priety Parent-Teacher Assoc. Supreme us. As stated 675, 679, Education, 170 S.E. 2d v. Bd. (1969): Court, “When, develop- to this pending appeal occurs, questions originally *17 reason of the ment controversy the are no at parties longer in between issue, will be dismissed for the reason that appeal the proceed this will not entertain or a cause Court merely to determine abstract of law or to propositions in determine which should have won the party rightly court.” lower

Thus, by the in- regarding the raised defendants questions junctive relief the trial court have been rendered granted Heim, Inc. v. Enterprises, moot of time. See passage (1970). 475, 276 173 S.E. 2d 316 N.C. 478-79, 42 Injunc- Id. at 241 S.E. 2d at 702. also Am. 2d See Jur. 6, tions 7 The should be dismissed. appeal §§ However, majority has seen fit to examine the moot issue, is whether in Appeals erred affirming denial of A.E.P.’s motion for preliminary court’s a in- superior Bruce junction restraining breaching McClure certain cov- in agreements enants contained between the two For the parties. reasons, I from the following majority’s dissent resolution of the issue. Investors, 688, 701, Berry, As stated Inc. v. 293 239 N.C. (1977): 566, 574

S.E. 2d A preliminary injunction, here is an ex- sought, traordinary measure taken a court to preserve the status (1) parties of the It will quo during litigation. only be issued if a is able to show likelihood of success on the merits (2) if likely of his case and sustain irreparable if, issued, injunction unless the loss or in the opinion Court, necessary issuance is for the of a protection Bros., during the course of rights litigation. Inc. v. Waff Bank, 198, 273; Williams, 289 N.C. 2d Pruitt v. IN THE SUPREME COURT Industries v. McClure 348; Creech, 128, v. 218 S.E. 2d Conference S.E. 2d may A issue unless injunction not the movant carries E.g., each of these persuasion the burden of as to prerequisites. Williams, 218 S.E. 2d Pruitt v. Once this carried, burden in it still remains the trial court’s discretion Id. injunction. a preliminary whether the motion for grant Cf. (Cum. 1981). As 1-485 Ervin stated Supp. N.C. Gen. Stat. Justice § 357, 360, 119-20 S.E. 2d Hospital, Huskins (1953): interlocutory injunction issue an judge does not hearing The merely avowedly because as matter of course equitable writ on a recognized bases his for the application who judge While hears ground. equity permit does merits, does re- the cause on the it decide application in determining him to exercise a sound discretion quire interlocutory granted should be whether refused.

I a motion for a preliminary at outset emphasize *18 a enforce- junction request specific to be confused with for not valid in a which has been proven ment of a contract provision extraordinary equitable for request The former a enforceable. controversy litigants. resolution of between the pending relief or stipulated after a has been either The latter arises contract established the movant has his valid and enforceable and proven has Although contract defendant right to have the enforced. suit, validity suggests in this record that the yet filed answer dispute is a of be- enforceability of these contracts matter ultimately on and will be resolved at trial tween the parties course, this is concerned of Court present appeal, merits. In the is, only preliminary injunction, motion for a the mo- denying court abused its discretion in whether the trial for relief. tion equitable may be cause that probable there it conceded that

Although controversy, the trial merits of the prevail would per- carried its burden that A.E.P. had not court determined denying plaintiff’s In its order irreparable damage. suasion as to stated: injunction, court preliminary motion for Industries v. McClure In this case plaintiffs evidence does not establish prima facie a case of irreparable All of damage. the state- ments contained in the complaint and affidavit are conclusory only and the inference which can be drawn is that the dam- any, if ages, be sustained the plaintiff are speculative conjectural. In view of the evidence as to the out, manner which the polyethylene sales of are carried I cannot find that the plaintiff would as the result of defend- activity ant’s sustain damage, reparable irreparable. Thus, carry because failed to its burden persuasion loss, a fortiori it irreparable failed to establish a reasonable ap- prehension irreparable loss interlocutory unless relief was granted. Although reviewing denial of a preliminary injunc- court, tion this is not bound findings the lower Bank, 198, (1976); Bros. v. 221 S.E. 2d 273 Waff Plastics, Inc., (1975), Co. v. Telephone 214 S.E. 2d 49 there is a presumption the lower court’s decision was cor- rect, and the appellant burden is on the to show error. Conference Creech, 2d 619 For the following reasons, I with the lower agree court’s finding failed to establish a reasonable apprehension irreparable loss unless its motion was granted.

An applicant injunction must do more than allege that he is apprehensive that loss will irreparable occur. He to set out with required particularity the facts supporting his allegations so that the court can decide for itself whether there is apprehension reasonable irreparable injury unless Plastics, Inc., terlocutory is granted. Co. v. Telephone Garibaldi, Pharr v. supra; S.E. 2d 18 A injunction, prohibitory preliminary such as the one sought case, will granted only instant irreparable injury when is real Plastics, Inc., and immediate. Co. v. Telephone supra; Membership *19 Co., v. Corp. Light 122 S.E. 2d 761 In motion for preliminary injunction, its plaintiff stated that its customer lists and order were specifications confidential information; proprietary and that using defendant was this in- covenants; formation in breach of contractual that defendant has customers, contacted a number of plaintiff’s which customers ac- percent counted for ten to fifteen of A.E.P.’s annual sales within Industries McClure A.E.P. had solicited sales and that defendant region; southeastern direct; which were by not products produced orders of and breaching contractual

ly with A.E.P.’s thus products, competitive affiant also stated: not Plaintiffs sole compete. covenants confiden- my utilizing that the It is honest belief defendant in ma- contacting information and such tial of of customers Such activities the defendant jor plaintiff. sales highly plaintiffs program, are damaging great of effort and through expenditure was established finances, leading confusion these damaging are also plain- in the defendant was employed customers that year, such con- August tiff until 21 of this so that customers him represent plaintiff. tacted no doubt consider to still activities, only ... If continues such the defendant suffer irreparable the sales program nature of information damage, but also the confidential seriously will be utilizing jeopardized. which the defendant affidavit, in his own defendant submitted addition to reply, managerial sales or associated employees the affidavits A.E.P.’s had after leav- six of customers defendant contacted These concurred employment. employees generally ing plaintiffs them left in that Mr. had contacted after he stating McClure had ceased Poly-Bag; that he informed them he had Design himself; for A.E.P. was in that neither working business nor customer lists were secret or product specifications lists in manufacturing polyethyl- the sales and market for confidential bid competitive ene and that the market products; operated which, from system or after the submission of bids quote who had the decision product specifications, salesmen studied factors, place with whom to an order was based on a number of service, of these reliability, Several including quality, price. they placed stated that had trial orders with McClure employees him; had stated that receiving after bids others McClure with their com- merely doing an interest business expressed panies. while con-

I with the court defendant’s agree superior contract, may has may not have been breach duct facts particularity allowing enough to set forth with failed reasonable apprehension irreparable conclusion that there is *20 416 IN THE SUPREME COURT

A.E.P. Industries v. McClure jury preliminary injunction granted. unless a is To demonstrate a one apprehension irreparable injury, reasonable of must show injury very likely injunctive that is if is irreparable occur relief injury not In this if granted. irreparable context an it cannot money compensated damages. E.g., in Frink v. Board adequately 218 S.E. 2d 713 An Transportation, App. of an jury remedy which has at law is not adequate irreparable litigation therefore outcome of between equitable pending Perkins, (1857); parties required. Gause District, Light and Water Comrs. v. Sanitary N.C. App. (1980), denied, 271 S.E. 2d 402 disc. rev. In the present any injury case has not shown that it suf- might by fer virtue defendant’s activities cannot be compensated fact, money an award of damages. the record fails to disclose evidence damage actual plaintiff. Mere contact A.EJP.’s customers and solicitation of orders from them defendant not show does has suffered or will suffer injury is not money compensable damages. No injury shown, less irreparable injury, much until plaintiff demonstrates that defendant’s contact and solicitation in fact diverted orders for polyethylene products away from A.E.P. This has not been in the established record before us.

Further, there has been no credible demonstration defendant confidential exploited information in con- tacting various customers of plaintiff. Several af- defendant’s fiants, customers, employees sales of these stated that product specifications readily were anyone available to re- industry questing them and that of potential lists polyethylene customers Further, were published periodically. defendant had worked as salesman of polyethylene products the Southeast for eleven years becoming before employed plaintiff, and he stated that before joined he he identity was aware of the great majority of the industrial users of polyethylene upon whom he has leaving called since Design Finally, Poly-Bag. there is no evidence that defendant’s contacts with A.E.P. customers has damaged A.E.P. because such customers “no doubt consider to represent the plaintiff.” contrary, On the defend- [defendant] them, ant’s affiants stated that when he contacted defendant had clearly stated each that was he no longer working for A.E.P. and that he was in business for himself.

A.E.P. Industries v. McClure The majority states:

We hold that where the primary remedy ultimate sought injunction; where the denial of a preliminary injunction would serve effectively to foreclose adequate relief to plain- (as tiff; where no “legal” opposed to equitable) remedy will suffice; and where the decision grant deny to a prelim- inary injunction in effect in results a determination on the merits, plaintiff has made a showing that the issuance of a preliminary injunction necessary for the protection of its rights during course of litigation.

The statement authority, without citation of and well it should be, as there is no basis in legal for it the laws of our state. This “holding” removes the requirement of a showing of real and im- mediate irreparable injury before preliminary injunctive relief can be allowed. It is a well established rule North Carolina that injunctive relief will granted only when irreparable injury is Plastics, Inc., both real and immediate. Co. v. Telephone supra, 232, (1975); 287 214 N.C. S.E. 2d 49 Membership Corp. Light Co., (1961) (and 56, 256 supra, 122 S.E. N.C. 2d 761 cases cited therein). The ultimate decision injunctive whether to grant remains within the discretion of the trial after judge a party establishes prima facie to showing support such relief. Huskins v. Hospital, 238 78 supra, N.C. S.E. 2d 116 In the discretion, absence of a of abuse of showing such decision is bind- Harmon, ing (1956). us. upon Harmon v. 95 S.E. 2d 355 The majority’s is an “holding” abstract statement ap not Here, plicable to this case. plaintiffs complaint requests over a money million dollars in money where damages. Again, can com Perkins, for the pensate injury, it is not Gause v. irreparable. (1857); supra, Light and Water Comrs. v. Sanitary District, (1980), supra, App. 2d disc. rev. denied, Surely, the denial of the preliminary injunction did not effectively deny serve to all relief to plaintiff. The majority itself states that the case is to be remanded for con sideration of “plaintiffs other claims for relief a claim including facts, money for substantial damages.” Under these how can it be seriously argued remedy does not have an adequate at law? IN THE SUPREME COURT v. McClure Industries had not carried its determining

In addition apprehension injury, of proving irreparable burden reasonable trial its the issuance implicitly opinion court held necessary protect plaintiffs was When litigation. weighing the course of rights during parties, the court found: between equities his livelihood and sup- Since 1965 has earned [defendant] family himself and as a sales- ported through his skilled in field long man of He was polyethylene products. plaintiff. before he went work He used *22 of the he had ac- knowledge theretofore any of of names and addresses customers the quired of his for them performance the duties gained during secret, not nor information general concerning is trade is Britt, of Kadis plaintiff. supra the methods business v. 154, 29 (1954)]. S.E. 2d 543 in If the is restrained this engaging [defendant] to months the him period eighteen injury business for a of immediate, and he could not made whole be real and be ultimately he a determination of though prevails upon even the merits. hand, the has to establish

On the other failed likelihood substan- its evidence the reasonable of through plain- the is the monetary granted tial If damage. no in effect in the action matter prevailed tiff would have what final determination be. might the of in exercise the discretion based

Therefore the Court’s I to in this case a analysis, decline issue upon foregoing the of the mat- the determination temporary injunction pending ter. its majority rely upon the would statement

Whereas effectively to would serve preliminary injunction “the denial of a in whether determining relief to plaintiff’ foreclose adequate issue, the trial must also consider judge should the relief junctive is, his discretion. That the exercising of that coin in side opposite injunctive the of granting must also consider judge trial the validity defense to may effectively foreclose defendant’s relief adversely to him the case the effect decide contract Wedgewood Corp. Lamb v. South before he to opportunity has be heard the This upon merits. one of the reasons that the grant ultimate decision whether to is left equitable to the sound the discretion of trial judge. this, case such as no matter how judge the with to respect rules relief, request injunctive effectively he is deciding the respect issue the enforcement the covenant not to com- be; This as it pete. should judge trial is in the best position evidence, this exercise discretion. He hears observes the witnesses, counsel, considers arguments and weighs and balances the so equities. After his not doing, determination should be disturbed absence of abuse of discretion.

Plaintiff has failed show court abused its discre- tion in denying the motion for injunction. a preliminary Huskins supra, S.E. Hospital, 2d 116 dismissed,

If the appeal decision Appeals should affirmed. opinion.

Justices COPELAND and Exum join dissenting this LAMB, HOFFMAN GWENDOLYN Executrix Estate of Thomas Wade *23 CORPORATION, HILTON, INC., Lamb v. WEDGEWOODSOUTH STATLER INNS, INC., WEAVER, W. H. W. H. HILTON WEAVER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., DUDLEY, JR., Individually, HARRY R. LOUIS RIGHTMIER, Individually, MORRISETTE, Individually, H. B. THOMAS DUDLEY, RIGHTMIER, ASSOCIATES, MORRISETTE AND a Profes- TEAGUE, Association, DARRELL W. E. TED CRAD- GRIFFIN sional DOCK

No. 156A82 (Filed 1983) May Appeal § discretionary Error 20— review of denial for sum- motions mary judgment error reviewing Appeals The erred court’s denial some trial summary judgment plaintiffs since defendants’ motions claims against allegedly negligent the defendants rest their acts as well as their rarely responsibility agency principles, negligence under claims are summary adjudication ordinarily

susceptible of and should be resolved trial of the issues.

Case Details

Case Name: A.E.P. Industries, Inc. v. McClure
Court Name: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Date Published: May 31, 1983
Citation: 302 S.E.2d 754
Docket Number: 445A82
Court Abbreviation: N.C.
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