A&B MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS AND WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, Pеtitioners, v. LABOR COMMISSION AND SCOTT DRISCOLL, Respondents.
No. 20110923-CA
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
September 19, 2013
2013 UT App 230
Memorandum Decision; Original Proceeding in this Court
Gary E. Atkin and K. Dawn Atkin, Attorneys for Respondent Scott Driscoll
Alan L. Hennebold, Attorney for Respondent Labor Commission
JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this Memorandum Decision, in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and CAROLYN B. MCHUGH concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:
¶1 Petitioners A&B Mechanical Contractors and Workers Compensation Fund (collectively, A&B) seek review of the Utah Labor Commission‘s (the Commission) decision affirming the Administrative Law Judge‘s (the ALJ) order awarding permanent total disability benefits to Scott Driscoll. We decline to disturb the Commission‘s decision.
¶2 While working for A&B Mechanical Contractors in 2004, Driscoll was lifting a 175-pound beam when he “felt a ‘pop’ and immediate pain in his left shoulder and neck.” Driscoll underwent
¶3 Driscoll completed an electronics technician certification program as required by the Return to Work Plan, but he remained unable to find work. To improve Driscoll‘s employment prospects, the parties amended the Return to Work Plan to allow Driscoll to pursue and complete a two-year degree in information technology. During this time, Driscoll also diligently searched for jobs as required by the Return to Work Plan but received only one offer in four years—for a job which Driscoll determined he was unable to perform due to his medical restrictions.
¶4 In 2008 A&B and Driscoll entered into a second sеttlement, which the ALJ approved by order on August 25, 2008 (the 2008 Stipulated Order). The new settlement agreement expressly incorporated the 2006 Stipulated Order, and the ALJ ordered that the 2006 Stipulated Order remain in effect except as inconsistent with or modified by the 2008 Stipulated Order. The 2008 Stipulated Order provided for subsistence benefits to continue through September 15, 2008, after which permanent partial disability payments would be made for 12.23 weeks. A&B was also required
¶5 On February 17, 2009, Driscoll filed a Motion for Final Determination of Permanent Total Disability arguing that his rehabilitation was not possible. See
¶6 In its Final Order of Permanent Total Disability, the ALJ concluded that A&B had conceded to an initial determination that
I. Interpretation of the 2006 Stipulated Order and the 2008 Stipulated Order
¶7 A&B first argues that the Commission abused its discretion by disregarding the clear language of the 2008 Stipulated Order and awarding Driscoll permanent total disability benefits without requiring Driscoll to file an Application for Hearing and to present evidence demonstrating that he was entitled to such benefits. “Whether the commission correctly or incorrectly dеnied benefits is a traditional mixed question of law and fact.” Jex v. Labor Comm‘n, 2013 UT 40, ¶ 15 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, because A&B‘s challenge is to the propriety of the ALJ‘s and the Commission‘s interpretation of the ALJ‘s own order, we review that interpretation for abuse of discretion. Cf. Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 2008 UT 15, ¶ 9, 179 P.3d 786 (“A court‘s interpretation of its own order is reviewed for clear abuse of discretion and we afford the district court great dеference.“).
¶8 A&B argues that, under the 2008 Stipulated Order, the ALJ should have required Driscoll to restart the two-step adjudicative process by filing an Application for Hearing and proving not only his inability to be rehabilitated but also his entitlement to permanent total disability benefits. See
¶9 The ALJ determined that the parties had agreed in 2006 and 2008 to Driscoll‘s entitlement to permanent total disability comрensation pursuant to
¶11 Utah‘s legislature and the Commission have devised a system for requesting a hearing at the later stage of the adjudicative process, which allows an employee or the employer to argue that the other party has not diligently pursued or fully cooperated with a reemployment plan. See
¶12 The ALJ interpreted the 2008 Stipulated Order as providing Driscoll with such a means to reinstate his claim for additional benefits, akin to the forms provided in the Utah Administrative Code for the other provisions of section 34A-2-413. We see no abuse of discretion in this interpretation by the ALJ of the 2008 Stipulated Order. See Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 2008 UT 15, ¶ 9. Indeed, our supreme court has held that “great liberality as to form and substance of an application for compensation is to be indulged.” Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, ¶ 17, 993 P.2d 207 (plurality opinion) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Reinsurance Fund v. Labor Comm‘n, 2012 UT 76, ¶ 12, 289 P.3d 576 (adopting the reasoning of the Vigos plurality opinion). Furthermore, as our supreme court has stated in a related context, “the statutory term ‘applicatiоn for hearing’ does not create a formal requirement to file a specific document, but rather requires a filing sufficient to provide notice to all interested parties.” Reinsurance Fund, 2012 UT 76, ¶ 12.
¶13 A&B maintains, however, that if the ALJ had required Driscoll to file an Application for Hearing as required by the 2008 Stipulated Order, Driscoll would have been required to reestablish his entitlement to benefits under
II. Interpretation and Application of Utah Code Section 34A-2-413
¶15 A&B next argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider
III. The ALJ‘s Findings of Fact
¶17 A&B next argues that the ALJ erred by neglecting to consider the evidence that Driscoll is capable of returning to regular, steady work. In support of this argument, A&B presents its vocational expert‘s testimony that Driscoll had been successfully rehabilitated because he had been “‘prepared to return to work‘” through completing his schooling and because “Driscoll ‘has an associate degree, he has virtually two years of experience for job qualifications purposes, and his skill set has been enhanced.‘” A&B also maintains that the ALJ failed to acknowledge the “glowing”
¶18 To the extent that A&B challenges the ALJ‘s factual findings as adopted by the Commission, we may grant relief only if the findings are “not supported by substantial evidence when viewеd in light of the whole record before the court.”
¶19 A&B has merely presented the evidence in favor of its рosition that Driscoll was able to return to regular, steady work. However, if an agency‘s findings of facts are supported by substantial evidence, we will not overturn those findings “even if another conclusion from the evidence is permissible.” Hurley v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm‘n, 767 P.2d 524, 526–27 (Utah 1988). Substantial evidence in the record supports the Commission‘s and the ALJ‘s determination that Driscoll could not be successfully rehabilitated. See
¶20 Finally, A&B argues that the Commission‘s excessive delay in issuing its order affirming the ALJ‘s decision violated its due process rights. “Due process challenges are questions of law that we review applying a correction of error standard.” Utah Auto Auction v. Labor Comm‘n, 2008 UT App 293, ¶ 9, 191 P.3d 1252 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶21 A&B contends that its due process rights were violated because the Commission issued its written decisiоn on A&B‘s Motion to Review twenty-seven months after A&B filed the motion. However, A&B merely describes when the order was issued in relationship to other events in the case, and then concludes that this was an “excessive delay” that caused A&B financial harm and “may have delayed” its ability to reexamine Driscoll‘s case in the future. See
V. Conclusion
¶22 The ALJ and the Commission reasonably interpreted the ALJ‘s own order in not requiring Driscoll to reestablish his eligibility for total disability. The ALJ had previously determined that Driscoll was entitled to permanent total disability benefits, and the stipulated orders contemplated that Driscoll would file a request for permanent benefits upon the failure of the Return to Work Plan. A&B has not shown that the Commission misinterpreted or misapplied the governing statutes or regulations, nor has it shown that the Commission‘s determination that rehabilitation was not possible was unsupported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the Commission‘s decision.