A&B Mechanical Contractors v. Labor CommissionA&B Mechanical Contractors v. Labor Commission
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Michele M. Christiansen, Gregory K. Orme, Carolyn B. Mchugh
CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:
¶1 Petitioners A&B Mechanical Contractors and Workers Compensation Fund (collectively, A&B) seek review of the Utah Labor Commission‘s (the Commission) decision affirming the Administrative Law Judge‘s (the ALJ) order awarding permanent total disability benefits to Scott Driscoll. We decline to disturb the Commission‘s decision.
¶2 While working for A&B Mechanical Contractors in 2004, Driscoll was lifting a 175-pound beam when he “felt a ‘pop’ and immediate pain in his left shoulder and neck.” Driscoll underwent surgery on his left shoulder in June 2004. In September 2005, Driscoll filed an Application for Hearing with the Commission requesting permanent total disability benefits. In late 2005, A&B and Driscoll reached a settlement agreement whereby A&B would pay subsistence benefits to Driscoll until his return to work or further order of the ALJ. A&B also agreed to diligently pursue a vocational rehabilitation plan for Driscoll (the Return to Work Plan), and Driscoll agreed to fully cooperate with the Return to Work Plan. The ALJ approved the settlement by order entered March 21, 2006 (the 2006 Stipulated Order). The settlement agreement provided, “If rehаbilitation is not possible, the administrative law judge shall order payment of permanent total disability benefits. If rehabilitation is successful, permanent partial disability benefits will resume for 12.23 weeks at the rate of $386.00 per week when [Driscoll] returns to work.” The order provided
¶3 Driscoll completed an electronics technician certification program as required by the Return to Work Plan, but he remained unable to find work. To improve Driscoll‘s employment prospects, the parties amended the Return to Work Plan to allow Driscoll to pursue and complete a two-year degree in information technology. During this time, Driscoll also diligently searched for jobs as required by the Return to Work Plan but received only onе offer in four years—for a job which Driscoll determined he was unable to perform due to his medical restrictions.
¶4 In 2008 A&B and Driscoll entered into a second settlement, which the ALJ approved by order on August 25, 2008 (the 2008 Stipulated Order). The new settlement agreement expressly incorporated the 2006 Stipulated Order, and the ALJ ordered that the 2006 Stipulated Order remain in effect except as inconsistent with or modified by the 2008 Stipulated Order. The 2008 Stipulated Order provided for subsistence benefits to continue through September 15, 2008, after which permanent partial disability payments would be made for 12.23 weeks. A&B was also required to provide Driscoll with ninety days of job placement assistance. The 2008 Stipulated Order further provided that if Driscoll was still unemployed after he had completed his schooling and after the permanent partial disability benefit payments had ceased, the parties could revisit Driscoll‘s claims for further benefits either in mediation or by Driscoll filing an Application for Hearing. The parties also agreed that by entering into the settlement, they were not giving up any of their rights, claims, or defenses.
¶5 On February 17, 2009, Driscoll filed a Motion for Final Determination of Permanent Total Disability arguing that his rehabilitation was not possible. See
¶6 In its Final Order of Permanent Total Disability, the ALJ concluded that A&B had conceded to an initial determination that
Driscoll was permanently and totally disabled. The ALJ also found that, although A&B diligently pursued and Driscoll fully cooperated with the Return to Work Plan, Driscoll could not be successfully rehabilitated. Accordingly, the ALJ ordered A&B to pay Driscoll permanent total disability benefits of $492 per weеk until further order of the Commission. A&B thereafter sought review of the ALJ‘s decision with the Commission‘s appeals board. The Commission adopted the ALJ‘s findings of fact and affirmed the ALJ‘s decision. A&B petitioned this court for judicial review.
I. Interpretation of the 2006 Stipulated Order and the 2008 Stipulated Order
¶7 A&B first argues that the Commission abused its discretion by disregarding the clear language of the 2008 Stipulated Order and awarding Driscoll permanent total disability benefits without
¶8 A&B argues that, under the 2008 Stipulated Order, the ALJ should have required Driscoll to restart the two-step adjudicative process by filing an Application for Hearing and proving not only his inability to be rehabilitated but also his entitlement to permаnent total disability benefits. See
¶9 The ALJ determined that the parties had agreed in 2006 and 2008 to Driscoll‘s entitlement to permanent total disability compensation pursuant to
¶10 Although the 2008 Stipulated Order provided for an explicit termination date for the subsistence and disability benefits, it also provided a meаns for Driscoll to reinstate his claim for additional permanent total disability benefits by filing an Application for Hearing or requesting mediation. The ALJ determined that the purpose of this provision was to allow Driscoll to reinitiate proceedings at the second step to determine the success of the Return to Work Plan, not to relitigate his entire claim.
¶11 Utah‘s legislature and the Commission have devised a system for requesting a hearing at the later stage of the adjudicative process, which allows an employee or the employer to argue that the other party has not diligently pursued or fully cooperated
¶12 The ALJ interpreted the 2008 Stipulated Order as providing Driscoll with such a means to reinstate his claim for additional benefits, akin to the forms provided in the Utah Administrative Code for the other provisions of
¶13 A&B maintains, however, that if the ALJ had required Driscoll to file an Application for Hearing as required by the 2008 Stipulated Order, Driscoll would have been required to reestablish his entitlement to benefits under
¶14 Moreover, it is unclear how an order comрelling Driscoll to file an Application for Hearing to reinitiate the adjudicative process would have led to a different result in this case, other than occupying the resources of the parties and the Commission for longer than necessary. A&B concedes that Driscoll proved the elements of
II. Interpretation and Application of Utah Code Section 34A-2-413
¶15 A&B next argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider
¶16 A&B argues that Driscoll was capable of returning to regular, steady work and that the ALJ erred in not determining that
III. The ALJ‘s Findings of Fact
¶17 A&B next argues that the ALJ erred by neglecting to consider the evidence that Driscoll is capable of returning to regular, steady work. In support of this argument, A&B presents its vocational expert‘s testimony that Driscoll had been successfully rehabilitated because he had been “‘prepared to return to work‘” through completing his schooling and because “Driscoll ‘has an associate degree, he has virtually two years of experience for job qualifications purposes, and his skill set has been enhanced.‘” A&B also maintains that the ALJ failed to acknowledge the “glowing” letters from Driscoll‘s instructors concerning his employability and Driscoll‘s own acknowledgment of his newly acquired skills. Finally, A&B сontends that the ALJ incorrectly relied on medical restrictions given four years earlier to conclude that the only job offered to Driscoll did not conform to those restrictions.
¶18 To the extent that A&B challenges the ALJ‘s factual findings as adopted by the Commission, we may grant relief only if the findings are “not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.”
¶19 A&B has merely presented the evidence in favor of its position that Driscoll was able to return to regular, steady work. However, if an agenсy‘s findings of facts are supported by substantial evidence, we will not overturn those findings “even if another conclusion from the evidence is permissible.” Hurley v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm‘n, 767 P.2d 524, 526–27 (Utah 1988). Substantial evidence in the record supports the Commission‘s and the ALJ‘s determination that Driscoll could not be successfully rehabilitated. See
IV. Due Process
¶20 Finally, A&B arguеs that the Commission‘s excessive delay in issuing its order affirming the ALJ‘s decision violated its due process rights. “Due process challenges are questions of law that we review applying a correction of error standard.” Utah Auto Auction v. Labor Comm‘n, 2008 UT App 293, ¶ 9, 191 P.3d 1252 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶21 A&B contends that its due process rights were violated because the Commission issued its written decision on A&B‘s Motion to Review twenty-seven months after A&B filed the motion. However, A&B merely describes when the order was issued in relationship to other events in the case, and thеn concludes that this was an “excessive delay” that caused A&B financial harm and “may have delayed” its ability to reexamine Driscoll‘s case in the future. See
carry its burden of demonstrating error. See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998).
V. Conclusion
¶22 The ALJ and the Commission reasonably interpreted the ALJ‘s own order in not requiring Driscoll to reestablish his eligibility for total disability. The ALJ had previously determined that Driscoll was entitled to permanent total disability benefits, and the stipulated orders contemplated that Driscoll would file a request for permanent benefits upon the failure of the Return to Work Plan.