89 PINE HOLLOW ROAD REALTY CORP. et al., Appellants, v AMERICAN TAX FUND, FOOTHILL, et al., Defendants, and AFAFB, INC., Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
840 N.Y.S.2d 85
Ordered that the order dated March 30, 2006 is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and, upon reargument, the order dated September 28, 2005, granting the motion of the defendant AFAFB, Inc., for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it and cancelling the notice of pendency is vacated, and the motion of the defendant AFAFB, Inc., for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it and cancelling the notice of pendency is denied as premature.
The plaintiff 89 Pine Hollow Road Realty Corp. (hereinafter the Corporation) was the owner of real property located in Oyster Bay. The decedent, Frank Pettineo, was the Corporation‘s sole shareholder until his death on November 11, 2002.
In or about July 2000 the Nassau County Treasurer (hereinafter the County Treasurer) notified the Corporation that taxes for the subject property were overdue, and additional notices were sent to the Corporation in October 2000 and October 2001. The validity and effectiveness of these notices are not challenged.
On or about February 20, 2001 the County Treasurer sold a tax lien on the subject property to the defendant American Tax Fund, Foothill (hereinafter ATF), at public auction. The tax lien certificate stated that the sale was “held pursuant to the provisions of the Nassau County Administrative Code.” Prior to the sale, the County Treasurer was required, pursuant to
At any time after the expiration of 21 months from the date of the sale of the tax lien, ATF, as the lienholder, had the right to notify the Corporation of its intent to accept conveyance of the subject property from the County Treasurer (see
Here, the notice in question was sent to the Corporation by ATF‘s agent, the defendant GKB Tax Lien Services, Inc., at the address of the subject property, on November 22, 2002, 11 days after the death of the Corporation‘s officer and sole shareholder Frank Pettineo. The notice stated, in relevant part, that “[a]nyone interested in protecting his property interest can do so by paying this tax lien before 2/27/03 which is the first day of [sic] the tax lien buyer has the right to apply for a tax deed” (emphasis in original). The certified mail receipt card, however, was returned unsigned with the word “[r]efused” handwritten on it, and the envelope containing the notice was returned unopened. According to the plaintiffs, the tenant at the subject premises refused to accept receipt of the notice on behalf of the Corporation. No further attempt was made to contact the Corporation.
By deed dated June 13, 2003, the County Treasurer conveyed the subject property to ATF, and, on February 10, 2005, ATF conveyed the property to a related entity, the defendant AFAFB, Inc. (hereinafter AFAFB). This litigation ensued.
On this record, AFAFB established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by tendering evidence that it secured conveyance of the subject property in compliance with the procedure set forth in the NCAC. In opposition, however, the plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the notice requirements of the NCAC, as applied to the particular facts of this case, satisfied the Corporation‘s constitutional right to sufficient notice (see Jones v Flowers, 547 US 220 [2006]).
ATF and AFAFB contend, in essence, that the notice required under
A lienholder in Nassau County has up to 15 years to apply to the County Treasurer for a deed (see
Under the unusual circumstances presented, including the death of the Corporation‘s officer and sole shareholder just 11 days before service of the notice by ATF, the constitutional adequacy of the notice ought not to be determined in this case without the benefit of a full evidentiary record. Accordingly, AFAFB‘s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it and cancelling a notice of pendency should have been denied as premature, with leave to renew upon completion of discovery.
Florio, J.P., Fisher, Carni and McCarthy, JJ., concur.
