MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of Stuart M. Hanson (the “Debtor”) to alter or amend this Court’s Memorandum Opinion entered on May 10, 2010. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court denies the motion.
I. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
The Court has jurisdiction to entertain this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and Internal Operating Procedure 15(a) of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. It is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), (I), and (O).
II. FACTS AND BACKGROUND
All of the relevant facts and background are contained in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion dated May 10, 2010 (the “Opin
III. APPLICABLE STANDARD
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as adopted by Bankruptcy Rule 9023, permits a party to move the court to alter or amend a judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Rule 59(e) motions serve a narrow purpose and must clearly establish a manifest error of law or fact, newly discovered evidence,
Obriecht v. Raemisch,
“The rule essentially enables a ... court to correct its own errors, sparing the parties and the appellate courts the burden of unnecessary appellate proceedings.”
Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp.,
The function of a motion to alter or amend a judgment is not to relitigate old matters or present the case under a new legal theory.
Moro v. Shell Oil Co.,
IV. DISCUSSION
The Debtor does not contend that there is any newly discovered evidence or an intervening change in the controlling law. Rather, he argues that the Court’s Opinion contains manifest errors of law and fact, which, when rectified, require the entry of judgment in his favor. Specifically, the Debtor claims that the Court erred by basing its Opinion on events that occurred after July 2008, the time at which the debt
The Court rejects the Debtor’s argument and finds that he has failed to demonstrate a manifest error of law or fact. As the Court painstakingly explained in the Opinion, a false representation for purposes of § 523(a)(2)(A) is an express misrepresentation that can be demonstrated either by a spoken or written statement or through conduct.
New Austin Roosevelt Currency Exch., Inc. v. Sanchez (In re Sanchez),
At the heart of the exception to discharge under any of the prongs of § 523(a)(2)(A) is the element of intent. As the Debtor argues, intent to deceive is generally determined by the debtor’s subjective intention at the inception of the debt.
CFC Wireforms, Inc. v. Monroe (In re Monroe),
It is well established, however, that courts can consider subsequent conduct as long as that conduct provides an indication of the debtor’s state of mind at the time of the actionable representations.
Williamson v. Busconi,
Determining whether a debtor had the requisite intent under § 523(a)(2)(A) is, therefore, a factual, subjective inquiry decided by examining all of the relevant circumstances, including those that took place after the debt was incurred.
See Pearson v. Howard (In re Howard),
After an extensive and thorough re-examination of all of the pertinent facts in this matter, the Court finds that the weight of the evidence supports the position articulated in its Opinion that the Debtor engaged in a deliberate scheme to deceive, mislead, and wrongfully induce 6050 Grant to transfer money to the Debt- or’s construction company. Notwithstanding the Debtor’s dubious contentions that the taking of a second finder’s fee was merely a bookkeeping error and that the amount of an architectural fee that was grossly inflated on a customer statement issued in July was simply an estimate, the record is replete with false representations, all of which the Court finds the Debtor made “willfully, knowingly, and by design” in an effort to do whatever was necessary to cause 6050 Grant to pay mo
Relying on
Levine v. Ward (In re Ward),
As the
Ward
court suggests, one way that misrepresentation or fraud can be established under § 523(a)(2)(A) in cases specifically involving contractor-debtors is to show that the contractor executed the contract never intending to comply with its terms.
Id.
at 516-17;
see also Scheidelman v. Henderson (In re Henderson),
In the matter at bar, however, the false representations made by the Debtor were not based on future acts or promises, nor did they concern the Debtor’s efforts to perform or complete the construction work. Rather, the numerous misrepresentations—that various architectural fees had been incurred, that payment of those fees was due, that expenses for architectural work and soft costs had been paid by the Debtor’s construction company, that both a second finder’s fee and a construction management fee were due—display a pattern of deceit by the Debtor to induce 6050 Grant to give—and continue to give— money to the Debtor’s company. Thus,
Finally, the Debtor asks the Court to alter or amend its Opinion by invoking two fundamental principles of bankruptcy law involving the construction of exceptions to discharge and the “fresh start” purpose of the Bankruptcy Code. The Debtor accurately posits that exceptions to discharge should be construed strictly against the creditor and liberally in favor of the debtor.
See In re Morris,
Although the Debtor here may be unfortunate, the preponderance of the evidence clearly establishes that he is not honest, at least with respect to his conduct in this matter. “[0]nly those debts honestly incurred should be afforded the benefits of a bankruptcy discharge.”
Rahrig,
Y. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the Debtor’s motion.
This Opinion constitutes the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052. A separate order shall be entered pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9021.
Notes
. The Court will not here reiterate the numerous misrepresentations made by the Debtor, nor discuss the trial testimony related thereto. All of the relevant facts were fully and meticulously set forth in the Court's Opinion.
See Hanson,