546-552 West 146th Street LLC v. Arfa546-552 West 146th Street LLC v. Arfa
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Balber Pickard Maldonado & Van Der Tuin, P.C., New York City (Jane Y. Ginns and John Van Der Tuin of counsel), for respondents-appellants.
OPINION OF THE COURT
ANDRIAS, J.
In this appeal, we first consider whether defendants-appellants are entitled to attorneys’ fees incurred in obtaining indemnification under the applicable limited liability company operating agreements. We conclude that Supreme Court properly denied fees on fees.
Defendants Rachel L. Arfa, Alexander Shpigel and Gadi Zamir were the sole members when plaintiff limited liability companies were formed. Outside investors later purchased interests in the LLCs and their investments were used to purchase real property. In 2006, the LLCs commenced this action alleging that defendants-appellants Arfa, Shpigel and American Elite Properties (AEP), which Arfa and Shpigel controlled, concealed the fact that property sellers and mortgage brokers directly or indirectly paid them commissions, which inflated the prices that the LLCs paid for the properties.
This Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the LLCs lacked standing to sue (54 AD3d 543 [2008], lv dismissed in part, denied in part 12 NY3d 840 [2009]). In a subsequent appeal (70 AD3d 512 [2009]), we held that defendants-appellants were entitled to indemnification from the LLCs under the parties’ operating agreements, regardless of the fact that claims for the same alleged wrongdoing were still pending in a parallel action brought by the investors. We declined to address whether the indemnified legal expenses should include those incurred in filing the motion for indemnification or in prosecuting that appeal, because the issue was not fully briefed.
Supreme Court denied defendants-appellants’ request for the legal fees incurred in seeking indemnification and referred the issue of the reasonableness of the remaining fees to a special referee/judicial hearing officer (JHO) to hear and report. The JHO found that $132,176.88 of the expenses sought by defendants-appellants
In New York, “an award of fees on fees must be based on a statute or on an agreement” (Sage Realty Corp. v Proskauer Rose, 288 AD2d 14, 15 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 608 [2002]). Arfa and Shpigel, as managers, and AEP, as Arfa and Shpigel‘s agent, seek indemnification for fees on fees pursuant to section 6.8 of the LLCs’ operating agreements, which state in relevant part:
“The Company shall indemnify and hold harmless each Manager and its or his direct or indirect agents . . . from and against all claims and demands to the maximum extent permitted under the Act [
New York Limited Liability Company Law § 420 ], except to the extent that such claims or demands result from the willful misconduct or gross negligence of the Manager seeking such indemnification.”
“Subject to the standards and restrictions, if any, set forth in its operating agreement, a limited liability company may, and shall have the power to, indemnify and hold harmless, and advance expenses to, any member, manager or other person, or any testator or intestate of such member, manager or other person, from and against any and all claims and demands whatsoever; provided, however, that no indemnification may be made to or on behalf of any member, manager or other person if a judgment or other final adjudication adverse to such member, manager or other person establishes (a) that his or her acts were committed in bad faith or were the result of active and deliberate dishonesty and were material to the cause of action so adjudicated or (b) that he or she personally gained in fact a financial profit or other advantage to which he or she was not legally entitled.”
The dissent believes that section 6.8 of the operating agreements encompasses fees on fees because it employs the term
Although the dissent is correct that Baker did not create a per se rule against “fees on fees” in all cases (see Posner v S. Paul Posner 1976 Irrevocable Family Trust, 12 AD3d 177, 179 [2004]), an analysis of section 6.8 of the operating agreements and
Indemnification statutes are strictly construed (see Baker, 98 NY2d at 88). In Baker, the Court of Appeals refused to award fees on fees absent explicit statutory authority, stating in part that “even if . . . the ‘incurred as a result of’ language of section 722 (a) [of the
While the language “any and all claims and demands whatsoever” in
Furthermore, the statutory language is permissive and does not per se create a legal duty to indemnify. Rather, it empowers a limited liability company to tailor an indemnity clause in accordance with its own “standards and restrictions,” subject to
In Hooper, the Court of Appeals explained:
“Inasmuch as a promise by one party to a contract to indemnify the other for attorney‘s fees incurred in litigation between them is contrary to the well-understood rule that parties are responsible for their own attorney‘s fees, the court should not infer a party‘s intention to waive the benefit of the rule unless the intention to do so is unmistakably clear from the language of the promise” (74 NY2d at 492 [emphasis added]).
Section 6.8 of the operating agreements does not contain unambiguous language providing for the recovery of fees on fees. While including the broad “from and against all” and “to the maximum extent permitted under the Act” language, the provisions are also limited in that they authorize indemnification only with respect to “claims and demands” and do not specifically authorize expenses or legal fees incurred in obtaining indemnification. Thus, it is not “unmistakably clear” that fees on fees were contemplated (see Klock v Grosodonia, 251 AD2d 1050 [1998]; see also Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v Recovery Credit Servs., Inc., 98 F3d 13, 20-21 [2d Cir 1996] [concluding that contract provision provided no “unmistakably clear statement” that fees on fees were intended]). We note that in contrast, the indemnity clause in favor of members contained in section 7.2 (a) of the operating agreements expressly states that it covers “any and all losses, claims, damages, liabilities, expenses (including legal fees and expenses).”
Insofar as Delaware cases have interpreted similar statutory language to allow fees on fees, defendants have not shown that the language used in the applicable operating agreements in those cases was similar to the language used in section 6.8. Further, although the interpretation of the Delaware courts may be instructive, it is by no means binding on this Court (see Ficus Invs., Inc. v Private Capital Mgt., LLC, 61 AD3d 1, 9 [2009]).
In Weaver v ZeniMax Media, Inc. (2004 WL 243163, *7, 2004 Del Ch LEXIS 10, *26 [2004]), the Delaware Court of Chancery explained that the Stifel holding as to fees on fees was not de-pendent
The court properly directed a reference as to the reasonable amount of the attorneys’ fees to be indemnified. Our prior decision (70 AD3d 512 [2009], supra) did not constitute law of the case because we did not rule on the merits of the amount to be awarded (see Thompson v Cooper, 24 AD3d 203, 205 [2005]). Nor was there a clear manifestation of an intent to waive the right to challenge the reasonableness of the fees (see generally Fundamental Portfolio Advisors, Inc. v Tocqueville Asset Mgt., L.P., 7 NY3d 96, 104 [2006]); in any event, the court could have raised the reasonableness of the fees on its own (see Solow Mgt. Corp. v Tanger, 19 AD3d 225, 226 [2005]).
Prejudgment interest on the fee award was also properly denied (see Ficus Invs., Inc. v Private Capital Mgt., LLC, 71 AD3d 591, 592 [2010]; see also Wells Fargo Fin., Inc. v Fernandez, 2001 WL 58010, *2, 2001 US Dist LEXIS 414, *8 [SD NY 2001]). A stay of the indemnified attorneys’ fee award was unwarranted because, among other reasons, a delay in payment would improperly circumvent this Court‘s order.
However, the motion court should have confirmed the report of the JHO, since the law firm‘s block billing did not render the invoiced amounts per se unreasonable and the allocations of work billed between this case and related cases were adequately explained by the billing attorney‘s unrebutted and credible testimony and the spreadsheet he prepared to assist in understanding the invoices.
Accordingly, the order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Charles E. Ramos, J.), entered April 7, 2010, which denied appellants’ motion for attorneys’ fees incurred in obtaining indemnification under certain limited liability company operating agreements, should be affirmed, without costs. The orders of the same court and Justice, entered June 15, 2011 and July 14, 2011, which rejected in part a judicial hearing officer‘s
CATTERSON, J. (dissenting in part). Because I believe the defendants are entitled to recoup the fees incurred in litigating their right to indemnification, I must respectfully dissent in part. The language of the indemnification clauses in the LLC operating agreements permits recovery up to the statutory limit, and the
The plaintiffs in this case are limited liability companies that purchased various properties. Defendants Arfa, Shpigel and Zamir were the LLCs’ sole members, and outside investors were solicited to purchase interests in the LLCs. Arfa and Shpigel also controlled defendant-appellant American Elite Properties (hereinafter referred to as AEP). The plaintiffs brought an action alleging that the defendants misrepresented or failed to disclose to the plaintiffs and investors that they had received commissions from the sellers of the properties.
The motion court dismissed the action on the ground that the LLCs lacked standing, and this Court affirmed. (54 AD3d 543 [1st Dept 2008], lv dismissed in part, denied in part 12 NY3d 840 [2009].) During the time between the motion court‘s dismissal and perfection of the appeal, the investors brought a separate action (Roni LLC v Arfa, index No. 601224/2007) against the same defendants as in this case.
In September 2008, the defendants moved for indemnification of their expenses. Arfa and Shpigel sought indemnification in their capacities as managers of the LLCs and AEP sought indemnification as their agent pursuant to section 6.8 of four LLC operating agreements. The defendants sought approximately $177,000 in fees, which included both attorneys’ fees expended in defense of the underlying litigation and the fees incurred in litigating their indemnification rights. The court denied the motion on the ground that it was premature. The motion court reasoned that the resolution of Roni LLC v Arfa, brought by the LLC investors against the same defendants in this case, could result in a finding that the defendants had engaged in misconduct, which would preclude indemnification.
On February 25, 2010, the defendants moved in Supreme Court for an order directing the escrow agent holding the funds securing the indemnification obligations to release $177,144.18 for (1) expenses for defending the action, (2) expenses for seeking indemnification and obtaining it on appeal, (3) prejudgment interest on the amount indemnified, (4) expenses for moving for release of the escrow, and (5) prejudgment interest thereon. The defendants attached redacted legal invoices in support of the motion.
In an April 7, 2010 order, the motion court denied the defendants’ request for fees on fees and referred the issue of the reasonableness of the remaining fees to a special referee/judicial hearing officer to hear and report. At the hearing, defendants sought $139,395 in attorneys’ fees and $10,760 in disbursements. Because the motion court denied its request for fees on fees, defendants submitted no proof on those fees.
The judicial hearing officer (hereinafter referred to as JHO) found $132,176.88 of the expenses reasonable and indemnifiable, and recommended an award in that amount and prejudgment interest. The plaintiffs moved to reject the JHO‘s recommendation. The defendants opposed and cross-moved to confirm. The motion court confirmed in part, rejected in part, and modified the report, finding that the JHO‘s findings were not supported by the record. (2011 NY Slip Op 31610[U] [2011].) Shortly thereafter, the parties submitted a consent order directing the escrow agent to release $94,051.23, the amount confirmed by the June 15, 2011 order. The defendants reserved their right to appeal the motion court‘s decision, and enforcement of the order was stayed pending appeal.
I agree with the majority that the motion court should have confirmed the JHO‘s report in its June 15 order. However, in my opinion, the motion court‘s denial of the defendants’ fees on
It is well established that “an award of fees on fees must be based on a statute or on an agreement.” (Sage Realty Corp. v Proskauer Rose, 288 AD2d 14, 15 [1st Dept 2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 608 [2002].) In this case, section 6.8 of the LLC operating agreements states in relevant part:
“The Company shall indemnify and hold harmless each Manager and its or his direct or indirect agents . . . from and against all claims and demands to the maximum extent permitted under the [
New York Limited Liability Company Law ], except to the extent that such claims or demands result from the willful misconduct or gross negligence of the Manager seeking such indemnification” (emphasis added).
“[s]ubject to the standards and restrictions, if any, set forth in its operating agreement, a limited liability company may, and shall have the power to, indemnify and hold harmless, and advance expenses to, any member, manager or other person . . . , from and against any and all claims and demands whatsoever; provided, however, that no indemnification may be made to or on behalf of any member, manager or other person if a judgment or other final adjudication adverse to such member, manager or other person establishes (a) that his or her acts were committed in bad faith or were the result of active and deliberate dishonesty and were material to the cause of action so adjudicated or (b) that he or she personally gained in fact a financial profit or other advantage to which he or she was not legally entitled” (emphasis added).
Under the expansive language of the LLC agreements, the defendants are to be indemnified for “all claims and demands” including legal expenses, up to the statutory limitations. Other
Where “the statutory language is clear and unambiguous” and “describes the particular situations in which it is to apply, ‘an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded.‘” (Matter of Schultz Mgt. v Board of Stds. & Appeals of City of N.Y., 103 AD2d 687, 689 [1st Dept 1984] [internal quotations marks omitted], aff‘d 64 NY2d 1057 [1985], citing McKinney‘s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 240.) It would appear then that under
Indeed, the language differs starkly from that in
“[a] corporation may indemnify any person made, or threatened to be made, a party to an action or proceeding (other than one by or in the right of the corporation to procure a judgment in its favor), whether civil or criminal . . . by reason of the fact that [the person] . . . was a director or officer of the corporation . . . against judgments, fines, amounts paid in settlement and reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees actually and necessarily incurred as a result of such action or proceeding, or any appeal therein, if such director or officer acted, in good faith, for a purpose . . . believed to be in . . . the best interests of the corporation” (emphasis added).
The Court determined that the phrase “[attorneys’ fees] ‘actually and necessarily incurred as a result of such action or proceeding‘,” requires a “reasonably substantial nexus between the expenditures and the underlying suit” (98 NY2d at 85), and rejected the plaintiff‘s claim for fees on fees as too attenuated from the underlying action. The Court rejected the plaintiff‘s
In Stifel Fin. Corp., the court observed that “the indemnification statute should be broadly interpreted” to include fees on fees in order to effectuate the remedial purpose of the statute. (809 A2d at 561; see also Gagne v Maher, 594 F2d 336, 344 [2d Cir 1979], aff‘d 448 US 122 [1980] [a fee on fee is compensable under the Civil Rights Attorney‘s Fees Awards Act of 1976; to “deny() attorneys’ fees for time spent in obtaining them would dilute the value of a fees award“] ([internal quotation marks and citations omitted)].) Otherwise, an attorney representing a member or manager who is litigating statutorily authorized indemnification must seek compensation from the member or
Moreover, this Court has explicitly rejected the “argument that Baker v Health Mgt. Sys. . . . created a per se rule against fees on fees.” (Posner v S. Paul Posner 1976 Irrevocable Family Trust, 12 AD3d 177, 179 [1st Dept 2004].) To the contrary, we have found that “persuasive if not binding authority strongly suggests that statutes creating a right to attorneys’ fees are served by [the] allowance [of fees on fees].” (Kumble v Windsor Plaza Co., 161 AD2d 259, 261 [1st Dept 1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 709 [1990] [finding that a “fee on a fee” was authorized under
MAZZARELLI, J.P., FRIEDMAN and FREEDMAN, JJ., concur with ANDRIAS, J.; CATTERSON, J., dissents in part in a separate opinion.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered April 7, 2010, affirmed, without costs. Orders, same court and Justice, entered June 15, 2011 and July 14, 2011, modified, on the facts,
to confirm the report of the Judicial Hearing Officer, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.