{¶ 2} The city of Columbus objected to appellant's application for renewal of its Class D5-6 liquor permit. The Ohio Department of Commerce, Division of Liquor Control ("division") conducted an administrative hearing regarding the application. By an order issued in November of 2003, the superintendent of the division rejected appellant's application for renewal of its liquor permit for: (1) "good cause" pursuant to R.C.
1. The place for which the permit is sought is so located with respect to the neighborhood that substantial interference with public decency, sobriety, peace, or good order would result from the issuance of the permit and operation thereunder by the applicant. R.C. §
2. The applicant, any partner, member, officer, director, or manager thereof, has been convicted of a crime that relates to fitness to operate a liquor permit business. R.C. §
3. The applicant has misrepresented material facts on the application pending with the Division. R.C. §
{¶ 3} Appellant appealed from the superintendent's order to the Liquor Control Commission ("commission"), which denied appellant's motion to stay execution of the superintendent's order and affirmed the order. Pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 4} Appellant appeals from the judgment of the common pleas court and assigns a single error for our consideration:
The trial court erred in affirming the decision of the Ohio Liquor Control Commission to affirm the order of the superintendent of the Ohio Division of the Liquor Control to deny the renewal of appellant's Ohio liquor permit.
{¶ 5} On administrative appeal, R.C.
{¶ 6} Upon appellate review, the standard of review is more limited.Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd. (1993),
* * * While it is incumbent on the trial court to examine the evidence, this is not a function of the appellate court. The appellate court is to determine only if the trial court has abused its discretion,i.e., being not merely an error of judgment, but perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or moral delinquency. Absent an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, a court of appeals may not substitute its judgment for [that of an administrative agency] or a trial court. Instead, the appellate court must affirm the trial court's judgment. * * *
Id. at 621. An appellant court's review of purely legal questions is plenary. Big Bob's, at ¶ 15.
{¶ 7} Former R.C.
{¶ 8} Former R.C.
(A) The division of liquor control may refuse to * * * renew * * * any retail permit issued under this chapter if it finds:
(1) That the applicant * * * or manager thereof * * *
(a) Has been convicted at any time of a crime which relates to fitness to operate a liquor establishment;
* * *
(c) Has misrepresented a material fact in applying to the division for a permit; or
(2) That the place for which the permit is sought: * * *
(c) Is so located with respect to the neighborhood that substantial interference with public decency, sobriety, peace, or good order would result from the issuance, renewal, transfer of location, or transfer of ownership of the permit and operation thereunder by the applicant. * * *
{¶ 9} When interpreting R.C.
{¶ 10} In the present case, on cross-examination Sergeant Ronald A. Jacobs of the city of Columbus, Division of Police testified that the area surrounding appellant's business has a higher propensity for violence than any other area of the city, particularly with respect to shootings. (Tr. 41.) He further testified that the sale of alcohol at appellant's premises contributed to criminal activity in the area. (Tr. 43, 65.)
{¶ 11} The commission's evidence also demonstrates that numerous unlawful and violent acts were committed at or nearby appellant's bar. For example, in January of 2002, several people dragged a man onto the premises and proceeded to beat and rob him, leaving him with broken teeth. (Division Exhibit, at F3.) In May of 2002, a driver tried to run down three people in the bar's parking lot. (Division Exhibit, at F5.) In October of 2002, a bar patron and two other people were robbed at gunpoint in the bar's parking lot. (Division Exhibit, at F7, F8, F11.) And in December of 2002, a fight at the bar led to a reported assault. (Division Exhibit, at F24.)
{¶ 12} Appellee's evidence also demonstrates that appellant's business has adverse effects on law enforcement. Sergeant Jacobs testified that a large portion of the police staff is regularly devoted to patrolling the area surrounding appellant's bar. (Tr. 39.) For example, in 2002 city police made only one dispatched run to appellant's bar for a reported shooting. (Division Exhibit, at E1.) But during the first five months of 2003, city police had made four dispatched runs to appellant's bar for shots fired. (Division Exhibit, at D2.) By the end of 2003, the bar's manager was shot twice and left paralyzed. (Division Exhibit, at K5, K6; Tr. 53.)
{¶ 13} On Easter morning of 2003, Sergeant Jacobs was on patrol and responded to gunfire taking place at appellant's bar. Upon arriving at the scene, he witnessed gunshots being fired from two vehicles parked outside of the bar. Unidentified shooters inside the bar returned a number of gunshots. Although Sergeant Jacobs was pinned down behind a parked car during the gun battle, he was able to see "muzzle blast coming from the front of the establishment." (Tr. 48.) At least 30 gunshots were fired after Sergeant Jacobs arrived at the scene. (Division Exhibit, at J7.)
{¶ 14} The foregoing establishes good cause for denying renewal of appellant's liquor permit and supports the findings that the location of the permit premises substantially interferes with public decency, sobriety, peace, or good order under R.C.
{¶ 15} Nonetheless, appellant argues that the court below abused its discretion when it affirmed the commission's order because the commission relied upon evidence that relates to years prior to the 2003 renewal year in question. Appellant also contends that the common pleas court abused its discretion because the commission relied on evidence of criminal activity near appellant's bar, even though a new liquor permit was issued to a business approximately one block away.
{¶ 16} As for the introduction of evidence relating to before 2003, appellant did not raise this specific issue at the commission's hearing. Appellant objected to the introduction of police reports concerning incidents that took place after May of 2003. (Tr. 22.) Appellant also objected to the authenticity of the police reports. (Tr. 34.) However, appellee's witness testified about dispatched runs and reported incidents that took place in 2001-2002 without objection. (Tr. 18, 27.) Appellant also failed to object to evidence relating to an inspection that took place in July of 2001. (Tr. 13.) Therefore, the issue is waived on appeal. Loyal Order of Moose Lodge No. 1473 v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm.
(1994),
{¶ 17} Moreover, we conclude that the plain error doctrine does not apply in the present case. "[T]he plain error doctrine is not favored and may be applied only in the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself." Goldfuss v. Davidson (1997),
{¶ 18} Regarding the new liquor permit that was issued one block away from appellant's premises, this evidence was properly raised before and considered by the commission (Tr. 97-99), along with other evidence relating to the burden on law enforcement and the reported incidents that occurred at or near appellant's premises. Based upon our review, we cannot conclude that the common pleas court abused its discretion by finding that the commission's order was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.
{¶ 19} Additionally, we note the record contains evidence to support the denial of appellant's application for renewal based on former R.C.
{¶ 20} Accordingly, we conclude that the common pleas court did not abuse its discretion in affirming the commission's order. Appellant's sole assignment of error is overruled. Therefore, the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Bryant and McGrath, JJ., concur.