2710 SUTTER VENTURES, LLC, et al. v. SEAN MILLIS et al.
A162439
IN
Filed 8/31/22
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. CUD-20-667481)
We find plaintiffs’ arguments unavailing and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs own a three-unit residential rental property in San Francisco and invoked the Act.2 Defendants Sean Millis and Michelle Mattera are long-term tenants of one unit owned by plaintiffs at 2710 Sutter Street (the premises). Plaintiffs pled, based on information and belief, that Millis entered into a tenancy agreement for the premises with plaintiffs’ predecessor in 1995. In 1999, Millis entered into a written tenancy agreement with plaintiffs’ predecessor; plaintiffs further alleged, based on information and belief, that Mattera moved into the premises as a co-tenant in 2005. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants are the only occupants of the premises and the only persons entitled to relocation assistance payments under the Rent Ordinance.
On November 13, 2019, plaintiffs served defendants with a 120-Day Notice of Termination of Tenancy (the termination notice) and half of the relocation
On November 15, 2019, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Intent to Withdraw Residential Units from the Rental Market (NOI) with the San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board. On the same day, plaintiffs served defendants with a Notice to Tenant of Filing of Notice of Intent to Withdraw Residential Units from the Rental Market. Defendants exercised their right under the Act to a one-year extension of the withdrawal date of the premises based on their claims of disability status. Defendants did not vacate the premises by November 15, 2020, and plaintiffs filed an unlawful detainer suit.
With respect to the ground under which plaintiffs sought to recover possession, the termination notice stated, “Possession of the aforesaid premises is sought pursuant to San Francisco Administrative Code § 37.9(a)(13) and
The relevant portions of the termination notice addressing relocation assistance payments were as follows. On page 1, the termination notice provided, “You have rights and obligations under [Rent Ordinance] § 37.9A, including, but not limited to, the right to renew the tenancy if proper notification is given within 30 days after vacating the unit, and entitlement to certain relocation payments as described in more detail below. A true and correct copy of [Rent Ordinance] § 37.9A is attached hereto as Exhibit A and
Defendants demurred to the plaintiffs’ operative first amended complaint. As is relevant here, defendants argued their demurrer should be sustained because the termination notice was defective in two respects: (1) it quoted a superseded version of section 37.9, subdivision (a)(13) (section 37.9(a)(13)) as the ground for eviction, thus providing an inaccurate ground for eviction4; and (2) the termination notice did not properly advise defendants of the right to relocation assistance payments because it incorrectly referenced a superseded section of the Rent Ordinance regarding relocation payments.
After argument at the hearing on the demurrer, the trial court announced that it would sustain the demurrer and explained the basis for its ruling. The trial court accepted the defendants’ argument that strict compliance with
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We review an order sustaining a demurrer de novo. (Boshernitsan v. Bach (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 883, 889.) We accept the truth of material facts properly pled in the operative complaint, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Ibid.) The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewed review de novo. (Id. at p. 890.) Whether state law preempts a local ordinance is also question of law subject to de novo review. (Johnson v. City and County of San Francisco (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 7, 12 (Johnson).)
II. The Act
The Act provides that “[n]o public entity . . . shall, by statute, ordinance, or regulation, or by administrative action implementing any statute, ordinance or regulation, compel the owner of any residential real property to offer, or to continue to offer, accommodations in the property for rent or lease . . . .” (
The “Act contains explicit boundaries, leaving areas for local control in a fashion consistent with its terms.” (Yarmark, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 167.) “[C]ourts both recognize and respect the reservations of power set forth in the Ellis Act with respect to local government authorities.” (San Francisco Apartment Assn. v. City and County of San Francisco (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 463, 478.) For example, the Act provides that “[n]otwithstanding Section 7060, nothing in this chapter does any of the following: . . . Diminishes or enhances any power in any public entity to mitigate any adverse impact on persons displaced by reason of the withdrawal from rent or lease of any accommodations.” (
A. The Rent Ordinance
The City and County of San Francisco (the City) enacted the Rent Ordinance in 1979 for the purposes of, among other things, limiting rent increases for tenants in occupancy and restricting the grounds on which landlords could evict tenants. (Danger Panda, LLC v. Launiu (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 502, 506 (Danger Panda).)
“In May 1986, following the passage of the Ellis Act, the Rent Ordinance was amended to add [section 37.9(a)(13)], which recognizes a landlord‘s right to withdraw a residential unit from the rental market.” (Danger Panda, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 507.) “Section 37.9A of the Rent Ordinance was enacted at the same time as section 37.9(a)(13) in order to confer rights on certain tenants displaced by the Ellis Act.” (Ibid.) Prior to amendments in 2005, the City provided for relocation assistance payments to elderly and disabled tenants, as well as low-income tenants, who were displaced by withdrawals under the Act. (Coyne v. City and County of San Francisco (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1215, 1219 (Coyne).)
“In 2005, the City enacted ordinance No. 21–05 (‘Ordinance 21-05‘), which lifted the restrictions limiting the relocation assistance payments to low-income tenants and extended them to all displaced tenants. [Citation.] For units with more than three tenants, Ordinance 21–05 set $13,500 as the maximum relocation payment a landlord was required to pay per unit, in addition to the $3,000 add-on for evicted elderly and disabled tenants. [Citation.] The ordinance also indexed these payments to annual inflation rates.” (Coyne, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 1219.) Ordinance 21-05 further stated, “Any notice to quit pursuant to Section 37.9(a)(13) shall notify the tenant or tenants concerned of the right to receive payment under Subsections 37.9A(e)(1) or (2) or (3) and the amount of payment which the landlord believes to be due.” (§ 37.9A, former subd., (e)(4).)
In 2017, this Division addressed whether a tenant‘s minor child was entitled to be paid a relocation assistance payment as a “tenant” under the Rent
After Danger Panda, the City enacted ordinance No. 123-17 to amend section 37.9A, subdivision (e)(3). This provision provided in pertinent part, “Where a landlord seeks eviction based upon Section 37.9(a)(13), and the notice of intent to withdraw rental units is filed with the Board on or after February 20, 2005, relocation payments shall be paid to the tenants as follows: [¶] (A) Subject to subsections 37.9A(e)(3)(B), (C) and (D) below, the landlord shall be required to pay a relocation benefit on behalf of each authorized occupant of the rental unit regardless of the occupant‘s age (“Eligible Tenant“). The amount of the relocation benefit shall be $4,500 per Eligible Tenant, one-half of which shall be paid at the time of the service of the notice of termination of tenancy, and one-half of which shall be paid when the Eligible Tenant vacates the unit.” (§ 37.9A, subd. (e)(3)(A), italics added.) For units with more than three “Eligible Tenants,” $13,500 is the maximum relocation payment, in addition to the $3,000 add-on for evicted elderly and disabled tenants, and payments are indexed to annual inflation rates. (Id. at subd. (e)(3)(B)–(D).) The Rent Ordinance still provided that “[a]ny notice to quit pursuant to Section 37.9(a)(13) shall notify the tenant or tenants concerned of the right to receive payment under Subsections 37.9A(e)(1) or (2) or (3).” (§ 37.9A(e)(4).)
III. The Act Does Not Preempt Section 37.9A(e)(4)7
We turn first to plaintiffs’ argument that the Act preempts section 37.9A(e)(4).
” ‘A city or county may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations that do not conflict with
“A conflict between local ordinance and state law exists if the local law duplicates, contradicts, or regulates an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication. [Citation.] ‘The first step in a preemption analysis is to determine whether the local regulation explicitly conflicts with any provision of state law. [Citation.] [¶] If the local legislation does not expressly contradict or duplicate state law, its validity must be evaluated under implied preemption principles. “In determining whether the Legislature has preempted by implication to the exclusion of local regulation we must look to the whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme. There are three tests: (1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern; (2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or additional local action; or (3) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to the municipality.’ ” ’ ” (Johnson, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at pp. 13–14.)
Relying on Johnson and Coyne, plaintiffs argue that the Act preempts section 37.9A(e)(4) because that provision imposes a prohibitive price on a landlord‘s right to exit the rental market. With this argument, plaintiffs seek to invoke conflict, or contradiction, preemption. (Coyne, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1226-1227 [“[T]he prohibitive price standard is the appropriate standard to determine conflict [or contradiction] preemption under the Ellis Act“].)
In Johnson, this Division considered whether the Act preempted part of the then-operative version of section 37.9A(e)(4), which required landlords to notify tenants of the right to receive relocation assistance payments and ” ‘the amount of payment which the landlord believes to be due.’ ” (Johnson, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at pp. 11, 16.) The “belief requirement” was the only part of section 37.9A(e)(4) at issue in Johnson. (Ibid.) Because the Rent Ordinance provided for additional relocation assistance payments to elderly or disabled tenants, the belief requirement made the landlord state whether he or she believed the tenants were entitled to payment based on their age or disability. (Ibid.) The court held this requirement was preempted because “it create[d] a substantive defense in eviction proceedings not contemplated by the Act.” (Id. at p. 18.) The court reviewed the Act‘s provisions regarding tenant notice, observing that ” ‘[b]y carefully spelling
Likewise, Coyne found that certain provisions of the Rent Ordinance, which required a landlord who evicted a tenant under the Act to pay two years’ worth of “rent differential” between the rent-controlled price of the unit and the market price, imposed a “prohibitive price” on landlords’ exercise of their rights to go out of business. (Coyne, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1218, 1226–1227.) As in Johnson, Coyne rejected the argument that the rent differential payments mitigated the adverse impacts of the landlord‘s decision to remove residential units from the market: Rent differential payments were not directed at impacts such as the need to pay first and last months’ rent and a security deposit on a replacement rental or moving expenses, but rather were ” ‘explicitly implemented to subsidize the payment of rent that a displaced tenant will face on the open market, regardless of income.’ ” (Id. at p. 1227, italics omitted.) The provisions requiring rent differential payments were therefore invalid for imposing a condition not found in the Act. (Id. at pp. 1229–1230.)
Unlike the provisions of the Rent Ordinance at issue in Johnson and Coyne, we cannot conclude that the Act preempts section 37.9A(e)(4). ”
Nor does section 37.9A(e)(4)‘s notice requirement create an undue burden. “Any notice to quit pursuant to Section 37.9(a)(13) shall notify the tenant or tenants concerned of the right to receive [relocation assistance] payment . . . .” (§ 37.9A(e)(4).) The notice required is to “tenant” or “tenants.” As Danger Panda explained, “tenant” as used in section 37.9A, subdivision (e) is defined in section 37.2, subdivision (t) of the Rent Ordinance and means persons ” ‘entitled by written or oral agreement, sub-tenancy approved by the landlord, or by sufferance, to occupy a residential dwelling unit to the exclusion of others.’ ” (Danger Panda, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 513–517; see also Ord. No.123-17, §§ 1–2 [amending section 37.9A, subd. (e)(3) after Danger Panda to require relocation assistance benefits be paid on behalf of “Eligible Tenants” rather than “tenants,” but leaving reference to “tenant” and “tenants” under section 37.9A(e)(4)].) Thus, what is required is that the landlord notify tenants, who clearly reside at an address known to the landlord, in the termination notice of the right to relocation assistance payments under section 37.9A, subdivision (e). This simple notice requirement is easily complied with and does not put a prohibitive price on the landlord‘s right to go out of business.
Finally, plaintiffs devote much of their briefing to the argument that, on their face, the timing requirements for payment under section 37.9A, subdivision (e)(3)(A) place a prohibitive price on the landlord‘s ability to go out of business because the landlord must guess who lives in a residence and pay that person relocation assistance on day one, rather than having the person who claims entitlement to the benefit provide proof of occupancy before the landlord must pay. But defendants’ argument below was that the termination notice improperly failed to inform defendants that the right to relocation benefits included the right to payment of such benefits on behalf of “Eligible Tenants,” and children specifically. Plaintiffs do not appear to argue that the City has no authority to require that relocation assistance benefits be paid on behalf of authorized occupants. Instead, they argue the timing of the Rent Ordinance‘s payment requirement creates the undue burden. The trial court
IV. Government Code Section 7060.6
Plaintiffs next contend that the judgment must be reversed because defendants cannot assert failure to comply with section 37.9A, subdivision (e)(3) or (e)(4) as a defense under
In construing a statute, ” ‘our fundamental task is to ascertain the Legislature‘s intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ [Citation.] We start with the language of each statute, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning, and construe the statutory language in the context of the statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme, giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act. We do not construe statutes in isolation, but rather read each statute with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain its effectiveness. If statutory terms are ambiguous, we may examine extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. In such circumstance, we will choose the construction that comports most closely with the Legislature‘s apparent intent, and endeavor to promote rather than defeat the statute‘s general purpose, and avoid a construction that would lead to absurd consequences.” (Lincoln Place Tenants Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 425, 440.)
V. Compliance with the Rent Ordinance
Plaintiffs’ final argument requires us to determine whether
the termination notice complied with section 37.9A(e)(4) and,relatedly, what standard applies to assess such compliance.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs did not strictly comply with the
notice provision as required by the Rent Ordinance and unlawful
detainer jurisprudence (e.g., Kwok v. Bergren (1982)
130 Cal.App.3d 596, 599–600). Plaintiffs initially argued that
Courts have applied the doctrine of substantial compliance with statutory requirements when, as a practical matter, they can reasonably conclude that partial compliance with a law has fully attained the statute‘s objectives. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (8th ed. 2021) § 57:26.) ” ’ “Substantial compliance, as the phrase is used in the decisions, means actual compliancein respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute.” [Citation.] Where there is compliance as to all matters of substance[,] technical deviations are not to be given the stature of noncompliance. [Citation.] Substance prevails over form. When the plaintiff embarks [on a course of substantial compliance], every reasonable objective of [the statute at issue] has been satisfied.’ [Citation.] ‘Thus, the doctrine gives effect to our preference for substance over form, but it does not allow for an excuse to literal noncompliance in every situation.’ ” (Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1332–1333, italics omitted.)
Nonetheless, “strict compliance with a statute is warranted
when our Legislature evinces its intent that the statute‘s
requirements are to be followed precisely. We may infer such an
intent when (1) ‘the Legislature has
Here, the enactment against which compliance must be
measured is the Rent Ordinance. The Act allows the San
Francisco Board of Supervisors to exercise its power to require
the notice and relocation assistance payments at issue (
In this case, the local government has made clear its intent
that the Rent Ordinance‘s requirements be followed precisely.
(Prang, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 19.) The Rent Ordinance
provides that a landlord “shall not endeavor to recover possession
of a rental unit unless . . . [t]he landlord wishes to withdraw from
rent or lease all rental units within any detached physicalstructure and, in addition, in the case of any detached physical
structure containing three or fewer rental units, any other rental
units on the same lot, and complies in full with Section 37.9A
with respect to each such unit[.]”11 (§ 37.9, subd. (a)(13), italics
added.) “In full” is synonymous with “fully,” which means “in a
full manner or degree: completely.” (Webster‘s
Further, the directive at issue is that the landlord notify tenants of the full scope of the right to receive relocation assistance payments under section 37.9A, subdivision (e)(1), (2), or (3). In finding compliance here, our dissenting colleague seems to suggest that the statute only requires the landlord to provide notice personalized to each tenant‘s specific circumstances.(Dis. opn. post, at p. 3) Under this theory, for example, notice of the right to additional relocation assistance payments based on elderly and disabled status would be required only if the tenant at issue were, in fact, elderly or disabled. But Johnson forecloses such an interpretation. There, the court held that the Act preempted the “belief requirement” in the then-operative version of section 37.9A(e)(4), which required landlords to notify tenants of ” ‘the amount of [relocation assistance] payment which the landlord believes to be due.’ ” (Johnson, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at pp. 11, 16, italics added.) Because this belief requirement put the burden on the landlord to, in essence, personalize the notice by stating whether the tenants were entitled to payment based on their age or disability—information potentially unknown to the landlord—and there was a substantive defense to eviction for violation of this requirement, the belief requirement placed a prohibitive price on the landlord‘s right to exit the rental market and was preempted. (Id. at pp. 16–18.) Plaintiffs have claimed in this appeal that, similar to a landlord‘s lack of knowledge regarding whether a tenant is elderly or disabled, a landlord may lack knowledge regarding whether certain “Eligible Tenants,” including children, live in the rental accommodations. The current section 37.9A(e)(4) provides a simple mechanism that provides tenants with information regarding the full scope of the right to relocation assistance payments under section 37.9A, subdivision (e)(1), (2), or (3); enables tenants to claim entitlement to the relocation assistance benefits that must be paid on behalfof each “Eligible Tenant“; and does not impermissibly burden landlords. (§ 37.9A, subd. (e)(3)(A)–(C).)12
Even if the doctrine of substantial compliance were
potentially applicable, unlike our dissenting colleague, we would
still find plaintiffs’ notice deficient. “The doctrine of substantial
compliance does not allow an excuse to literal noncompliance inevery situation. [Citation.] It ‘excuses literal noncompliance
only when there has been “actual compliance in respect to the
substance essential to every reasonable objective of the
statute.” ’ ”
Here, there was not actual compliance in respect to the substance of every reasonable objective of section 37.9A(e)(4). One purpose of the notice requirement is to provide tenants subject to evictions under the Act information regarding the full scope of the right to relocation assistance benefits. This serves to ensure that each tenant has the information needed to understand what payment is due (to all “Eligible Tenants“) where the tenant may be in the best position to ascertain what payment is due. Given the termination notice‘s omission of clear information regarding the landlord‘s obligation to provide a relocation payment on behalf of “each authorized occupant . . . regardless of the occupant‘s age” and the obligation to provide additional benefits where such persons are disabled or elderly, the landlord failed to satisfy the Rent Ordinance‘s goal of ensuring that tenants receive clear information regarding the full scope of the right to relocation assistance benefits.
Plaintiffs’ notice also failed to satisfy another objective of
section 37.9(e)(4). Analogizing to California‘s first comprehensive
anti-rent gauging and eviction control law, the Tenant Protection
Act of 2019 (Assem. Bill No. 1482 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.)), we
believe the notice requirement at issue also serves to protect
against abusive evictions in that it acts as a partial deterrent to alandlord‘s disingenuous use of the right to evict under the Act to
evade the City‘s rent control law. Our Legislature has recognized
that requiring relocation assistance payments in non-fault
evictions under the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 serves to deter
abusive non-fault evictions. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of
Assem. Bill 1482, as amended June 28, 2019, p. 9 [TPA relocation
assistance payment requirements for non-fault evictions act as at
least a partial deterrent to a landlord making an end run around
the TPA‘s rent caps].)14 As under the TPA, a landlord is less
likely to disingenuously invoke the Act as a just cause for eviction
under the Rent Ordinance if the landlord must pay relocation
assistance benefits, and a maximal deterrent purpose is further
served if the landlord must provide tenants with information
regarding the full scope of the right to relocation assistance
payments, which will enable them to claim the largest available
relocation assistance payment in all circumstances. Because it
did not fully and accurately apprise defendants of the entirety of
“the right
subdivision (e)(3), plaintiffs’ termination notice does not comply with this objective.15
Our dissenting colleague rejects this analysis, saying that the defendants received “precisely, completely, and understandably all of the information required by the ordinance.” (Dis. opn. post, at p. 1.) Although the dissent concedes that the notice would have been “incomplete and misleading” if the plaintiffs had provided it in a situation where the unit was also occupied by a child or other authorized occupant, our colleague nonetheless contends that the notice here was fully compliant because “it is undisputed that no one other than the two adult defendants occupied the premises, and as to them the notice was absolutely, and literally, accurate.” (Dis. opn. post, at pp. 2–3, italics added.)
In our view, one problem with this reasoning is that section 37.9A(e)(4) requires the landlord to give notice of “the right to receive payment under this subsection 37.9A(e)(1) or (2) or (3).” (§ 37.9A(e)(4), italics added.) The Ordinance does not require the landlord to provide tenants notice of their right to receive payment—i.e., notice tailored to what the landlords subjectively believe their specific tenants are entitled to under one of the specified subsections. The reason for this “the/their” distinction is becomes apparent when one unpacks our dissenting colleague‘s hypothetical: If, as here, a landlord presumes to notify a tenant of the payment amount to which the landlord believes the tenantis entitled, but the landlord is wrong (because the tenant has a child, unbeknownst to the landlord, for example), the shorted tenant would have no way of knowing that the stated payment amount was deficient in a case where the notice of the right to a relocation benefit is, as here, tailored to that specific tenant— because, obviously, when the notice is tailored to a specific tenant, it would invariably match the landlord‘s calculation of that specific tenant‘s presumed payment amount. In a situation where the landlord notifies a tenant of the presumed payment amount (which is no longer required under Johnson), only by the landlord accurately notifying a tenant of the entire scope of “the right to receive payment under this subsection 37.9A(e)(1) or (2) or (3)” can tenants be fully apprised of the information necessary to confirm whether the landlord‘s assessment of the relocation benefit amount is in fact accurate. Put another way, where the Ordinance requires the landlord to notify tenants of “the right to receive payment” as set forth under the Ordinance (by the simple expedient of quoting the language of the relevant subsections, including the definition of “Eligible Tenant“), that requirement cannot be satisfied by a notice, the accuracy of which varies depending on the identity of the recipient.
VI. Leave to Amend
“If the court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, as here, we must decide whether there is a reasonable possibility the plaintiff could cure the defect with an amendment.[Citation.] If we find that an amendment could cure the defect, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, no abuse of discretion has occurred. [Citation.] The plaintiff has the burden of proving that an amendment would cure the defect.’ ” (Perlas v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 429, 433.)
Plaintiffs seek to amend their compliant to assert a claim for ejectment, but they have not established entitlement to leave to amend. The essential elements of an ejectment action are (1) the plaintiff‘s valid interest in the property and (2) the defendant‘s wrongful possession and withholding thereof. (Payne & Dewey v. Treadwell (1860) 16 Cal. 221, 243; Baugh v. Consumers Associates, Ltd. (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 672, 675, superseded by statute on other grounds as noted in WDT- Winchester v. Nilsson (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 516, 526.) Plaintiffs claim they could amend their complaint to assert a viable claim for ejectment, but they do not discuss the required elements or show how they could be met. Specifically, plaintiffs do not explain how they could maintain an action for ejectment when the defendants are not in “wrongful possession” of plaintiffs’ property due to plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy the notice requirement of section 37.9(e)(4).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BROWN, J.
WE CONCUR:
NADLER, J.*
2710 Sutter Ventures, LLC, et al. v. Millis et al. (A162439)
POLLAK, P.J., dissenting
I concur unreservedly with the analysis and conclusions in sections I
through IV of the Discussion in the majority opinion. I agree that the Ellis
Act does
The termination notice in this case told the tenants, on page 1, ”You
have rights and obligations under § 37.9A, including . . . entitlement to
certain relocation payments as described in more detail below.” (Italics
added.) Then, on page 5, “You have rights to relocation assistance payments
as follows: [¶] Each tenant of the premises shall be entitled to receive
$6,985.23, one-half of which shall be paid at the time of the service of the
notice of termination of tenancy, and one-half of which shall be paid when the
tenant vacates the unit. . . . [¶] if any tenant is disabled within the meaning ofSection 12955.3 of the California Government Code, such tenant shall be
entitled to receive an additional supplemental payment of $4,656.81, one-half
of which shall be paid within fifteen (15) calendar days of the landlord‘s
receipt of written notice from the tenant of entitlement to the supplemental
relocation payment, and one-half of which shall be paid when the tenant
vacates the unit.”2 (Italics added.) There is no dispute that two adult tenants
occupied the premises,3 that the stated dollar amounts were calculated
correctly, and that each of the two tenants was paid and accepted one-half
the amounts due when the notice was served and following advisement of
their asserted disability. Unquestionably, the tenants were correctly told
what they were entitled to receive as relocation payments. In addition, the
notice included, as
The majority deems this indisputably accurate information inadequate because the notice refers to a “tenant” rather than to an “Eligible Tenant” as then defined to include children and other authorized occupants of the premises. Granted that if the premises had been occupied by a child or another authorized tenant, the reference to a “tenant” being entitled to a relocation payment would have been incomplete and misleading. But at this stage of the litigation, it is undisputed that no one other than the two adultdefendants occupied the premises, and, as to them, the notice was absolutely, and literally, accurate.
Moreover, the statements in the notice were directed to “you,” the recipients of the notice, as to whom they were accurate. Other than with respect to the possibility of multiple tenants, the notice did not purport to advise the defendants of the rights of others. There is obviously no reason for the notice to have done so, and the notice could not reasonably have been understood to do so.
Nor is there any requirement that the notice do so. Section 37.9A, which imposes the applicable requirement, provides, “Any notice to quit pursuant to Section 37.9(a)(13) shall notify the tenant or tenants concerned of the right to receive payment under Subsections 37.9A(e)(1) or (2) or (3) and the amount of payment which the landlord believes to be due.” The majority opinion‘s implication that this provision requires the notice to state “the right to receive payment” of persons other than the person being evicted is unfounded and non-sensical. The provision necessarily refers only to the rights of the recipient of the notice because the “amount of payment which the landlord believes to be due” can only be the payment that is believed due to that tenant. The landlord obviously is not required to advise a tenant who is being evicted what rights other hypothetical occupants would have if they were being evicted.
Thus, the notice defendants received was in full, or “strict,” compliance with the statute and the Rent Ordinance. Moreover, even if the reference to “tenant” rather than “Eligible Tenant” were considered to negate “strict” compliance, there unquestionably was substantial compliance sufficient to overcome any objection to the form of the notice. ” ‘Substantial compliance, as the phrase is used in the decisions, means actual compliance in respect to thesubstance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute.’ [citation.] Where there is compliance as to all matters of substance technical deviations are not to be given the stature of noncompliance.” ( St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 779.) While strict compliance with many conditions is necessary to enforce summary eviction, the conditions to which this standard has been applied are conditions failure to comply with which defeats the purpose of the statute. (E.g., Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474, 480–482; Lamey v. Masciotra (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 709, 713–714.) The purpose of section 37.9, subdivision (a)(13) is to ensure that a tenant faced with an Ellis Act eviction is timely advised of the relocation benefits which he or she must receive if lawfully obligated to vacate the premises. The notice given in this case complied with that purpose in full. There is absolutely no reason to disregard the substance of the notice because of the inconsequential reference to a “tenant” rather than to an “Eligible Tenant.”
Therefore, I would reverse the judgment.
POLLAK, P.J.
Trial Court: San Francisco City & County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. Vedica Puri
Counsel:
Dowling & Marquez LLP, Curtis F. Dowling, Jak. S. Marquez for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Fried & Williams LLP, Clifford E. Fried as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Stephen L. Collier for Defendants and Respondents.