2311 RACING LLC d/b/a 23XI RACING and FRONT ROW MOTORSPORTS, INC. v. NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, and NHL ENTERPRISES, L.P.
25-mc-00146 (ER)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
June 30, 2025
RAMOS, D.J.
Case 1:25-mc-00146-ER Document 38 Filed 06/30/25
RAMOS, D.J.:
2311 Racing LLC and Front Row Motorsports, Inc. (“Plaintiffs“) initiated this miscellaneous action to compel the National Basketball Association (“NBA“), National Football League (“NFL“), and NHL Enterprises, L.P. (“NHL“) (collectively the “Leagues“) to comply with third-party subpoenas in a case pending in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, 2311 Racing LLC, et al. v. National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing, LLC, et al., No. 3:24-cv-886 (KDB) (SCR) (W.D.N.C.) (the “North Carolina Action“). The Leagues are not parties to the North Carolina Action. For the reasons stated below, the motion to compel is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiffs are premier stock car racing teams in the United States that compete in the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (“NASCAR“) Cup Series, which is the top stock car racing circuit in the United States. Doc. 2 at 6. Plaintiffs filed the North Carolina Action on October 2, 2024, alleging that NASCAR and its CEO James (“Jim“) France (together “Defendants“) hold a monopoly “over the [] market for premier stock car racing [] [in the United States], which Defendants have willfully maintained by
Plaintiffs specifically allege that NASCAR, among other things, “requires teams to enter into non-compete provisions to participate in Cup Series races ...; requires teams to sign a release of claims, which NASCAR argues waives teams’ right to challenge NASCAR‘s monopoly under federal antitrust law ... ; acquired its closest competitor ... ; and has used acquisitions and exclusive deals to lock up the racetracks that are most capable of hosting premier stock car races.” Doc. 2 at 8; see Amended Complaint ¶ 12, 14, 78, 84-91, 96-98, 115. Plaintiffs further allege that “[a]bsent Defendants, a competitive market would have yielded significantly better terms for Plaintiffs to compete in the but-for world, either in NASCAR or in a competitive series.” Amended Complaint ¶ 128.
On February 19, 2025, Plaintiffs served third-party subpoenas on the Leagues under
- Documents sufficient to show the revenues (e.g., media, ticket, concession, etc.) that are shared with or among the [L]eague and its teams.
- A declaration or documents sufficient to show the formula for the split among the teams and [L]eague for the revenue categories.
- A declaration or documents sufficient to show the amounts of revenues shared with or retained by the [L]eague and the teams.
Documents sufficient to show the valuations of expansion or current teams.
Id. at 10. The timeframe for the documents is from January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2024. Id.3 Plaintiffs note that the “timeframe corresponds with the execution of the 2016 agreement between NASCAR and its chartered teams, in which NASCAR exercised its monopoly power to impose the anticompetitive terms that Plaintiffs are challenging in the [North Carolina Action].” Id.
Plaintiffs argue that the subpoenas “seek financial information relevant to proving antitrust injury and calculating the damages incurred by Plaintiffs under the ‘yardstick’ measure of estimating damages in an antitrust litigation.” Id. at 7. Plaintiffs further argue that the information “will enable Plaintiffs to perform a yardstick comparison between the other major professional sports leagues (where competition is not precluded) and NASCAR (where exclusionary conduct has been used to unlawfully maintain a monopoly).” Id.
Plaintiffs note that the Leagues “are joint ventures owned by the teams—unlike NASCAR, which has long been controlled by the France family.” Id. at 9.4 Plaintiffs argue that “[b]ecause the teams in the [Leagues] are not subject to a monopolistic league owner, they get competitive market terms with respect to the sharing of revenues and other economic items.” Id.
In the North Carolina Action, fact discovery is scheduled to close on June 30, 2025, and trial is set to beginning on December 1, 2025. Id. at 6.
B. Procedural History
On March 31, 2025, Plaintiffs initiated this miscellaneous action to compel the Leagues to comply with third-party subpoenas. Doc. 1.5 On May 1, 2025, the Leagues
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A party who has properly served a subpoena “may move the court for the district where compliance is required for an order compelling production or inspection.”
Relevancy “is an extremely broad concept” and needs only be “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Book Dog Books, LLC, 298 F.R.D. 184, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Condit v. Dunne, 225 F.R.D. 100, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). There is a “relatively low threshold” for a party to show that the material sought is relevant to any claim or defense in the litigation. Id. (quoting In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385, 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)).
“Proportionality [] ‘focuses on the marginal utility of the discovery sought.‘” New Falls Corp. v. Soni, No. 16-cv-6805 (ADS) (AKT), 2020 WL 2836787, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2020) (citation omitted). Indeed, “even relevant information must be ‘reasonably proportional to the value of the requested information, the needs of the case, and the parties’ resources.‘” Id. (citation omitted).
“The party issuing the subpoena bears the initial burden of showing that the discovery sought falls within the scope of
A subpoena may be quashed (or motion to compel denied) because, among other grounds, it imposes undue burden,
The Court “has wide latitude to determine the scope of discovery.” Broidy Capital Management LLC v. Benomar, 944 F.3d 436, 446 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “[m]otions to compel and motions to quash a subpoena are both ‘entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court.‘” In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 711, 720 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also In re Terrorist Attacks, 523 F. Supp. 3d at 489 (“The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether a subpoena imposes an undue burden.“).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiffs Fail to Show that Discovery is Relevant or Proportional
1. The Leagues Are Not Reasonably Comparable or Similar
“Damages calculations in antitrust cases seek to ‘compare plaintiffs’ actual experience in the real world with what the plaintiffs’ experience would have been, ‘but for’ the antitrust violation.‘” In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litigation, 292 F. Supp. 3d 14, 56 (D.D.C. 2017) (citation omitted). To measure damages in antitrust cases, the yardstick method, a widely accepted method for calculating antitrust damages, “compares profits earned or prices paid by the plaintiff with the corresponding data for a firm or in a market unaffected by the violation.” In re Keurig Green Mountain Single-Serve Coffee Antitrust Litigation, No. 14-md-2542 (VSB), 2025 WL 354671, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2025). “An antitrust plaintiff who uses a yardstick method bears the burden of demonstrating the reasonable similarity” of the benchmark firm. El Aguila Food Products Inc. v. Gruma Corp., 131 F. App‘x 450, 453 n.7 (5th Cir. 2005); In re Prograf Antitrust Litigation, No. 11-md-02242 (RWZ), 2014 WL 7641156, at *3 (D. Mass. Dec. 23, 2014) (“Antitrust plaintiffs bear the ‘burden of proving comparability’ of their proposed yardstick to the but-for world.“) (citation omitted). A yardstick analysis fails where the “proposed benchmark is so different from the plaintiff that it cannot serve as the ‘corresponding data for a firm or in a market unaffected by the violation’ necessary
Plaintiffs argue that the information requested “will help [their] damages expert formulate an opinion on the financial terms and revenues NASCAR teams would have received but for NASCAR‘s unlawful monopolization of premier stock car racing,” and that the four categories of information are “plainly relevant” to damages and injury. Doc. 2 at 7, 14; see Doc. 36 at 11.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to show that the information is relevant or proportional because they have failed to show or explain how the Leagues are reasonably comparable or similar to NASCAR for benchmark purposes. Although Plaintiffs repeatedly state that the Leagues are comparable, the extent of Plaintiffs’ explanation is that they “are premier professional sport leagues that generate revenue in similar ways.” Doc. 2 at 12, 14-15.
Plaintiffs argue that because the Leagues operate without anticompetitive conduct, it follows that Leagues’ financial information provides a “benchmark” to “assess the impact of NASCAR‘s monopolistic conduct and thus the damages to Plaintiffs.” Id. at 12. However, as the NFL and NBA note, “[t]hat Plaintiffs’ expert chose the Leagues as analogies to NASCAR ... does not transform irrelevant—and extremely sensitive financial information—into relevant and discoverable evidence. And it ... does not satisfy Plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate to this Court how and why this information is relevant.” Doc. 29 at 11 (emphases omitted).
Plaintiffs also highlight the differences between NASCAR and the Leagues, which further supports that the Leagues are not reasonably comparable or appropriate benchmarks.6 Plaintiffs admit that the Leagues are joint ventures owned by teams
“unlike NASCAR, which has long been unilaterally controlled by [the] France family.” Doc. 2 at 9. In the North Carolina Action, Plaintiffs do not allege that NASCAR would operate as joint venture of its racing teams in their but-for world. See Amended Complaint; see also Doc. 25 at 14.
The NHL notes other critical differences between the NHL and NASCAR, including that the NHL is unionized and collectively bargains unlike NASCAR. Doc. 25 at 14. Again, in the North Carolina Action, Plaintiffs do not allege that NASCAR drivers would be unionized and collectively bargain with a joint venture in their but-for world. See Amended Complaint; see also Doc. 25 at 14.
To state the obvious, the Leagues and NASCAR are also different sports with different schedules and structures. For example, “[a] single NHL season includes 1,312 regular season games (with average attendance of 17,500 per game) ... [while] [a] single NASCAR season ... includes only 36 races, with greater attendance per race.” Doc. 25 at 14-15; see Attendance (1946-47 through 2024-2025), NHL, https://records.nhl.com/history/attendance; see Amended Complaint ¶¶ 46, 69 (From 2004 to 2014, “seventeen of the top twenty largest-attended United States sporting events [were] NASCAR races.“). Plaintiffs do not explain why the Leagues would be an appropriate benchmark despite these critical differences.
2. Information is Publicly Available
Plaintiffs also argue that the information they seek is proportional because (1) “it is [the] best data available for comparing competitive conditions in the ‘but for’ world” and (2) “Plaintiffs have no other way to obtain comparable and indisputably accurate financial information about these [L]eagues except from the [L]eagues themselves.” Doc. 2 at 15. However, Plaintiffs do not dispute that they cannot perform the benchmark analysis without the Leagues’ confidential information. As the Leagues argue, Plaintiffs
3. Plaintiffs’ Cases Do Not Support Compelling Third Parties for Financial Data with No Connection to the Case
Plaintiffs argue that “courts regularly compel the production of third-party financial data for purposes of assessing the but-for world and evaluating damages, just as Plaintiffs seek to do here.” Doc. 36 at 10-11; see Doc. 2 at 13.7 However, the third parties in the cases cited by Plaintiffs had some connection to the case, unlike this case. See, e.g., Direct Purchaser Class Plaintiffs v. Apotex Corp., No. 16-mc-62492 (WJZ), 2017 WL 4230124, at *1-2 (S.D. Fla. May 15, 2017) (plaintiffs in the underlying action subpoenaed a third party that directly competed with the defendant in the relevant market and was also impacted by defendant‘s alleged anticompetitive conduct); Guy Chemical Co. v. Romaco AG, 243 F.R.D. 310, 311 (N.D. Ind. 2007) (defendant in the underlying action subpoenaed a third party from whom the plaintiff claimed to lose business).8 As the Leagues point out, Plaintiffs do not point to any case where a third party “with no business or competitive relationship with the parties to the underlying action, and no relation to the conduct alleged in the complaint, has been compelled to produce ... confidential financial and commercial information for the purposes of a plaintiff‘s damages analysis.” Doc. 25 at 21; see also Doc. 29 at 15-16.
A subpoena may be quashed—or motion to compel denied—because it requires disclosure of “confidential research, development, or commercial information.”
Even if the Court had determined that the requested data was relevant and proportional, the Court would quash the subpoenas. Here, the Leagues establish that the information requested is confidential commercial information and that disclosure would be harmful. See Doc. 25 at 22-23; Doc. 26 ¶ 9; Doc. 29 at 19; Doc. 30 ¶¶ 6-10; Doc. 31 ¶¶ 6-9.9 Plaintiffs also do not contest that information requested is confidential commercial information. Doc. 2 at 17. Plaintiffs further have not met their burden of demonstrating a substantial need for the confidential information. Plaintiffs do not argue
“[I]n the absence of some showing that the publicly available information . . . is inadequate, the onus is properly on ... [the] party to the litigation” to search the publicly available source for the information sought, even if that task is “very burdensome.” Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 228 F.R.D. 111, 114 (D. Conn. 2005); see also U.S. Bank National Association v. Dermer, No. 2:16-cv-230 (WKS), 2020 WL 13268119, at *1 (D. Vt. Oct. 16, 2020) (“When a party to litigation has ready access to public information, the Court will not require a non-party to obtain and produce such information.“).
Here, most of the information that Plaintiffs seek is publicly available. Plaintiffs further do not deny that publicly available information would allow the expert to do their work. See Doc. 25 at 19, 26; Doc. 29 at 13-14. Plaintiffs only argue that they have “no other way to obtain comparable and indisputably accurate financial information.” Doc. 2 at 15. In fact, Plaintiffs have admitted to the Leagues that “[their] expert also intends to rely upon publicly available information in performing his purported analysis.” Doc. 32 ¶ 7 (emphasis added). In response to the Leagues’ arguments that Plaintiffs should or could rely on publicly available information, Plaintiffs simply argue “[t]he [L]eagues’ actual financial data is more authoritative, and will hold more weight with the jury, than online news reporting about the [L]eagues’ finances. And NASCAR will undoubtedly challenge the reliability of public reporting.” Doc. 36 at 12. Thus, Plaintiffs clearly fail to meet their burden that the discovery sought cannot be “obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.”
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion, Doc. 1, and close the case.
It is SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 30, 2025
New York, New York
EDGARDO RAMOS, U.S.D.J.