219 KENWOOD HOLDINGS, LLC, Aрpellant-Defendant, v. PROPERTIES 2006, LLC, Appellee-Plaintiff.
No. 45A03-1401-MI-49.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
Oct. 24, 2014.
20 N.E.3d 342
Patrick A. Schuster, Patrick A. Schuster & Associates, David E. Braatz, Crown Point, IN, Attorneys for Aрpellee.
OPINION
BAKER, Judge.
219 Kenwood Holdings, LLC, (Kenwood) appeals the judgment of the trial court finding that Properties 2006, LLC, (Properties 2006) substantially complied with the requirements of
FACTS
Kenwood was the owner of record of property located at 219 Kenwood Avenue in Hammond (the Property) on April 25, 2013. On that date, the Proрerty was sold in a tax sale to Unexpected Holdings, LLC, as a result of Kenwood‘s delinquency in its payment of taxes. Unexpected
On June 21, 2013, Properties 2006 sent Kenwood notice of its purchase and its intent to petition for а tax deed as required by
On September 25, 2013, Kenwood filed a Verified Objection to Petition for Tax Deed in the trial court, arguing that the first notice sent by Properties 2006 did not meet the requirements of
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
In determining whether the trial court was correct in finding that Properties 2006 substantially complied with
Our Suрreme Court has noted that “[t]he first and often the only step in resolving an issue of statutory interpretation is the language of the statute.” Shell Oil Co. v. Meyer, 705 N.E.2d 962, 972 (Ind.1998). “The goal of statutory construction is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the legislature.” N.D.F. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ind.2002). The language of the statute is the best evidence of legislative intent, and all words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Erkins v. State, 13 N.E.3d 400, 407 (Ind.2014). Consequently, “[i]f the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is not subject to judicial interpretation.” Hill v. State, 15 N.E.3d 589, 591 (Ind.Ct.App.2014).
Our Supreme Court has exрlained the statutory framework for a tax sale as follows:
A purchaser of Indiana real property that is sold for delinquent taxes initially receives a certificate of sale. A [] redemption period ensues. If the owners fail to redeem the property during that [period], a purchaser who has complied with the statutory requirements is entitled to a tax deed. The property owner ... must [ ] be given two notices.
The first notice announces the fact of the sale, the date the redemption period will expire, and the date on or after which a tax deed petition will be filed. The second notice announces that the purchaser has petitioned for a tax deed.
Tax Certificate Invs., Inc. v. Smethers, 714 N.E.2d 131, 133 (Ind.1999) (citations omitted).
Here, Kenwood does not take issue with the second notice. Instead, Kenwood argues that the first notice did not meеt the statutory requirements outlined in
The notice that this section requires shall contain at least the following:
(1) A statement that a petition for a tax deed will be filed оn or after a specified date.
(2) The date on or after which the petitioner intends to petition for a tax deed to be issued....
The statute goes on to list a total of fifteen elements that must be included in the notice sent by the purchaser to the property owner.
The notice sent by Properties 2006 to Kenwood inсluded the following statement: “A petition for a tax deed will be filed on or after August 24, 2013.” Appellant‘s Br. p. 5. Kenwood argues that, while this statement complies with subdivision (1), it fails to comply with subdivision (2). Appellant‘s Br. p. 7.
In this case, the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. Subdivision (2) provides that the petitioner must notify the owner of record оf “[t]he date on or after which the petitioner intends to petition for a tax deed to be issued.”
However, Kenwood‘s interpretation is only possible if the words “to petition” are omitted from the statute. Through this omission, Kenwood turns
“[t]he date on or after which the petitioner intends to petition for a tax deed to be issued,”
“the date on or after which the petitionеr intends [...] for a tax deed to be issued[.]”
Appellant‘s Br. p. 7.
When the statute is read in its original form, it is clear that subdivision (2) does not require the petitioner to predict when the court will actuаlly issue the tax deed. Instead, the statute requires the petitioner to inform the owner of record of “[t]he date on or after which the petitioner intends to petition for a tax deed to be issued.”
Kenwood also appears to argue that the requirements of subdivisions (1) and (2) cannot be sаtisfied by one statement alone. Under this rationale, Properties 2006‘s statement—“A petition for a tax deed will be filed on or after August 24, 2013.“—is insufficient to satisfy both subdivisions as is, but becomes sufficient if broken into—“A petition for a tax deed will be filed. This petition will be filed on August 24, 2013.”
We find Kenwood‘s interpretation untenable. Subsection (e) does not impose a requirement that each element be con-
We also note that the purpose of the statute was achieved in this case. Kenwood was given notice that Properties 2006 intended to petition for а tax deed and that Kenwood had a right of redemption. Kenwood then attempted to secure a loan from several financial institutions but was ultimately unsuccessful. The notice given provided Kenwood with an opportunity to obtain a loan in order to redeem its property. Kenwood‘s failure to redeem the Proрerty was not the result of any discrepancy in the notice, but rather, the result of its failure to obtain a loan. Under these circumstances, we find no error.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
KIRSCH, J., and ROBB, J., concur.