Case Information
*-644 Order: *-618 For the reasons stated above, the Plaintiff's duplicate motions #44 and #45 are Denied. *-591 Dated January 7, 2026. *-563 Electronically signed pursuant to V REF 9{d). *-523 A. *-519 Co, *-474 Kerry A. McDonald-Cady, Superior Court Judge *-459 Vermont Superior Court *-452 Filed 01/07/26 *-446 Windsor nit *1 7ermont Superior Court Filed 01/07/26 Windsor Unit
VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Windsor Unit Case No. 23-CV-05356
12 The Green
Woodstock VT 05091
802-457-2121
www.vermontjudiciary.org 215 Summer Street, LLC v. Melissa Thibodeau et al
ENTRY REGARDING MOTION Motion for Relief From Judgment; Motion Under VRCP 60(b)(1);
Title:
Motion for Relief From Judgment Under VRCP 60(b)(1)
(Motion: 44; 45)
Filer: Megan R. C. Calla, Esq.
Filed Date: December 09, 2025; December 20, 2025
Decision on V.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) Motions
The Plaintiff, 215 Summer Street, LLC, through its attorney, Megan Calla, Esq., filed
duplicate motions seeking relief from a final judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) of the Vermont
Rules of Civil Procedure (V RRCP) The Plaintiff seeks relief from judgment in favor of the
Defendants, Melissa Thibodeau, Debra Tilton and JJoshua Thibodeau, on the no-cause
termination of lease claim to seemingly be able to re-open the litigation and bench trial on that
single count.
The Defendants did not file a written response with the Court. The Court has exercised
its discretion to issue a decision solely on the Plaintiffs pleadings. The issue raised by Plaintiff
is legal in nature, not a factual dispute, and therefore, a hearing is unnecessary. V.R.C.P. 7(b)(5)
and (6).
First, the Court finds that Plaintiff's motion filed on December 20, 2025, is timely under
the rule as it is not more than one year after the judgment issued by this Court on January 2,
2025. Second, the Plaintiffs claim of trial judge error of law is a mistake within the meaning of
federal civil procedure allowing relief from final judgment on grounds of mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect, even if the error is not an obvious legal mistake. Kemp v. United
States, 596 U.S. 528, 534, 142 S.Ct. 1856, 213 L.Ed.2d 90 (2022); see also Neathawk v.
Langlois, 2024 WL 166966, at *3 (Vt. Jan. 12, 2024) (unpub. mem.) (citing Kemp for
proposition that "under equivalent federal rule ... "Rule 60(b)(1) covers all mistakes of law made
by ajudge'"). As the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure are based on the Federal Rules, the
Court finds that an allegation of judicial error of law falls within the ambit of Rule 60(b)(1), see
Reporter's Note, V.R.C.P. 60 ("This rule is substantially identical to Federal Rule 60."), though
should not be intended as a substitute to a timely appeal, Bigelow v. Bigelow, 168 Vt. 618, 721
A.2d 98 (1998). See also Adamson v. Dodge, 174 Vt. 311,327,816A.2d455 (2002) ("Interests
of finality require that relief from a previous judgment should be granted only in extraordinary
circumstances."). The rule "does not protect a party from tactical decisions which in retrospect
may seem ill advised,” Okemo Mountain, Inc. v. Okemo Trailside Condominiums, Inc. , 139 Vt.
433, 436, 431 A.2d 457 (1981) (citation omitted), and it is not an otherwise “open invitation to
reconsider matters concluded at trial,” John A. Russell Corp. v. Bohlig , 170 Vt. 12, 24, 739 A.2d
1212 (1999) (quotation omitted). The Court is, therefore, implored to adhere to the principles of
“certainty and finality of judgments so that litigation can reach an end.” Richwagen v.
Richwagen , 153 Vt. 1, 4, 568 A.2d 419 (1989).
In this case, the Plaintiff sought ejectment against the Defendants based upon two notices
she provided: 1) for no cause effective on December 31, 2023; and 2) for alleged violations of
the written lease agreement for failing to comply with a material term prohibiting the tenant from
destroying, defacing, damaging or removing the property or from making alterations or
improvements without the landlord’s consent. The Plaintiff filed the ejectment complaint on
December 22, 2023. In its oral findings and conclusions from January 2, 2025, the Court held
that because the complaint was filed before the termination date for no cause on December 31 st ,
it could not support a claim of ejectment. The trial court looked to 9 V.S.A. § 4467(k) for
support, which states, “[A] notice to terminate a tenancy shall be insufficient to support a
judgment of eviction unless the proceeding is commenced not later than 60 days from the
termination date set forth in the notice.” The trial court found that Plaintiff’s no cause action
filed 9 days before the tenancy termination date for no cause was too soon. Therefore, the trial
court found that Plaintiff was not entitled to judgment of eviction if the tenancy had not yet been
terminated as of the date the complaint was filed. The trial court looked to Andrus v. Dunbar as
further support requiring a prior and effective notice of termination by the landlord. 2005 VT 48,
178 Vt. 554. The Court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that as the no cause eviction count was
identified as anticipatory, it was properly filed even if nine days early.
The Court finds that the trial court did not commit a mistake that requires relief from the
judgment on the Plaintiff’s no cause eviction count. “Punctilious compliance with all statutory
eviction procedures, including notice provision” is required in residential leases. In re Soon
Kwon, 2011 VT 26, ¶ 14, 189 Vt. 598, 19 A.3d 139. When considering the long-standing
Vermont case law of strict compliance with notice requirements under the Residential Rental
Agreements Act, it distinguishes these residential eviction cases that are highly regulated by
statute from other types of litigation such as divorce that permit anticipatory claims. Moreover,
Vermont law is clear that ejectment is a remedy available to the landlord “after the determination
of the lease” and “proceed[s] upon the supposition that the lease is at an end.” Sabourin v. Woish ,
116 Vt. 385, 387, 78 A.2d 333 (1950). It is thus resolutely “only when the lessee holds without
right after the determination of the lease that a plaintiff can resort to the remedy.” Id . (emphasis
added). See also In re Parker , 2001 WL 34050702, at *2 (Bankr. D. Vt. Apr. 24, 2001) (noting
that under Vermont law, a landlord seeking to evict a residential tenant must, before
commencing the process, “wait for the termination date in the notice to pass”).
To the extent that the Vermont Supreme Court has not spoken explicitly to the propriety
of anticipatory evictions, it appears plausible, based on its previous observations in a closely
adjacent context, that Vermont law treats a termination notice as a procedural requirement that
establishes a future termination date rather than as an instrument that immediately ends the lease
upon delivery. And so, for instance, a three-justice panel has before observed that
[t]he trial court … properly ruled that the claims based on the termination notices
of January 3 and January 17 had not properly accrued, as the lawsuit was filed
prior to the stated termination dates. The statute provides that “[i]f the tenant
remains in possession after termination of the rental agreement … the landlord
may bring an action for possession.” 9 V.S.A. § 4468 [emphasis deleted]. The
lawsuit filed on January 11 was therefore premature as to those notices with later
termination dates. See Avdich v. Kleinert , 69 Ill.2d 1, 12 Ill.Dec. 700, 370 N.E.2d
504, 508 (Ill. 1977) (plaintiff landlord was not entitled to possession until after
expiration of stated termination date and therefore could not maintain action to
recover possession prior to that time); Hous. Auth. of the City of Newark v.
Caldwell , 247 N.J.Super. 595, 589 A.2d 1088, 1089 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div.
1991) (filing complaint for possession prior to expiration of required termination
period means cause of action has not accrued, and court lacks jurisdiction to
dispossess tenant).
Northgate Hous. Ltd. v. Kirkland , 2002 WL 34422174, at *3 (Vt. Nov. 2002) (unpub. mem.).
See also Boyer v. Niquette , 2014 WL 3714703, at *2 (Vt. Jan. 7, 2014) (unpub. mem.)
(Robinson, J., dissenting) (observing that “letter initiating the termination of a tenancy is not
tantamount to a complete and effective termination of that tenancy”); Bean v. Bickford , 2009 WL
8019257 (Vt. Super. Ct. May 22, 2009) (Bent, J.) (“The common law requires that before a
tenancy is terminated, there must be an act of termination. Until that point in time, a landlord is
not entitled to possession as against a tenant in otherwise lawful possession.”).
Additionally, the Plaintiff was able to amend her complaint pursuant to V.R.C.P. 15(a)
but failed to do so. The Plaintiff could have added the no cause eviction count after the date of
termination on December 31, 2023, which is permitted under 9 V.S.A. § 4467(i). Again, the
Plaintiff’s election not to amend the complaint to add the no cause eviction when it became ripe
is not a basis to seek relief from judgment now under V.R.C.P. 60(b)(1). See e.g., Penland v.
Warren , 2018 VT 70, ¶ 7, 208 Vt. 15 (“[R]ule [60] does not protect a party from tactical
decisions which in retrospect may seem ill advised, and it is not an open invitation to reconsider
matters concluded at trial.”).
Also salient to the Court, the Plaintiff has since filed a new ejectment case against the
same Defendants at the same property with new notices provided in Docket 25-CV-01630. In
this new docket, the Court issued a rent escrow order on November 24, 2025, and has set a
hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against Defendant Joshua Thibodeau. The
Court is not persuaded by the Plaintiff’s argument that the trial court’s ruling that amending the
complaint under V.R.C.P. 15(a) to cure her unripe no cause eviction count contradicts the
principles of judicial efficiency embodied within V.R.C.P. 1. The Residential Rental
Agreements Act statutory requirements to ensure that tenants are provided with proper notice
before being evicted fall squarely within a tenant’s due process rights to notice that V.R.C.P. 1
was not intended usurp.