20 Fair empl.prac.cas. 588, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,283 J. D. Monk v. Roadway Express, Inc., Robert E. Piper, Jr., Movants-Appellants20 Fair empl.prac.cas. 588, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,283 J. D. Monk v. Roadway Express, Inc., Robert E. Piper, Jr., Movants-Appellants
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Hill
In this case we examine the propriety of assessing attorneys’ fees under
On June 3,1975, J. D. Monk, Percy Green, and Robert McPherson, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, filed suit against Roadway Express, Inc. (Roadway) and Local Union No. 194 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters for racial discrimination. The plaintiffs were represented by Robert C. Piper, Jr., Frank E. Brown, Jr., and Bobby Stromile, the appellants in the instant case.
On September 5, 1975, the plaintiffs commenced discovery by propounding interrogatories to Roadway. Roadway’s motion for enlargement of time within which to answer interrogatories was filed and granted on November 14, 1975. On January 5, 1976, Roadway answered the plaintiffs’ interrogatories and simultaneously propounded interrogatories to the plaintiffs. Roadway filed a motion on April 13, 1976, for an order compelling the plaintiffs to answer their interrogatories. A hearing on the motion was scheduled for 10:00 a. m. on April 22, 1976, but the plaintiffs’ attorneys failed to appear, requiring the hearing to be rescheduled for 3:00 p. m. on the same day. Following the hearing, the magistrate ordered the plaintiffs to answer the interrogatories on or before May 24, 1976.
At the same time that it had filed a motion to compel, Roadway had noticed depositions of each of the plaintiffs to be taken on May 6 and 7, 1976. The depositions of Monk and Green were taken, but McPherson could not be located by his attorney and his deposition was not taken.
The plaintiffs’ lack of cooperation in the defendants’ pretrial discovery efforts led Roadway to file two motions to dismiss. On May 18, 1976, Roadway moved to dismiss McPherson’s complaint for failure to give his deposition, and on June 14, 1976, Roadway moved to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiffs, with prejudice, for failure to answer interrogatories. On June 16, 1976, the district court ordered the plaintiffs to show cause why their complaint should not be dismissed, with prejudice, and why they should not be taxed with all of the defendants’ reasonable expenses, costs, and attorneys’ fees. Pursuant to a hearing on the
On October 5, 1976, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the imposition of sanctions and/or the taxation of costs and attorneys’ fees against the plaintiffs and their counsel. On January 6, 1977, the district court ordered certain costs, attorneys’ fees, and expenses taxed against the plaintiffs’ attorneys on the grounds that their conduct was deliberate and vexatious in that they failed to diligently pursue the plaintiffs’ interests and abide by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court found that the forced dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims was caused by the total and deliberate failure of their counsel to properly prosecute them, as evidenced by their failure to answer Roadway’s interrogatories as ordered; their failure to produce McPherson for his deposition as previously agreed; their failure to advise their clients of their denomination as class representatives and the possible consequences of class representation; and their failure to file briefs twice requested by the court concerning this case’s relation to a class action certification entered in the Western District of Texas. A motion for a rehearing on the motion to assess attorneys’ fees and costs against the plaintiffs’ attorneys was filed and denied. The plaintiffs’ attorneys, Piper, Brown, and Stromile, appeal from the judgment against them in the amount of $17,372.53 for the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Roadway in defending the law suit.
The appellants contend first that the district court erroneously assessed attorneys’ fees against them under
Looking first to the propriety of entering any award at all against the appellants under
The general American rule is that attorneys’ fees are not ordinarily recoverable as costs.
E. g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375, 391, 90 S.Ct. 616, 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1969).
The Second Circuit indicated clearly in
Browning Debenture Holders’ Committee v. DASA Corp.,
560 F.2d 1078, 1087-89 (2d Cir. 1977), that, where an attorney has been vexatious in increasing costs through improper motions, actions, or delays, he may be assessed, under
On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit, in
United States v. Ross,
535 F.2d 346, 350-51 (6th Cir. 1976), concluded that the “costs” provided by
We agree with the Sixth Circuit in its observations that
Our construction of
We note that the district court’s reliance on
In conclusion, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for determination of a proper award consistent with this opinion. We point out in closing that
VACATED and REMANDED.
Notes
.
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatlously may be required by the court to satisfy personally such excess costs.
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.
(k) In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney‘s fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
. We acknowledge that a panel of this circuit affirmed the assessment of jury expenses under