83 Op. Att'y Gen. 192 | Md. Att'y Gen. | 1998
Dear Ms. Owens:
You have requested our opinion about public access to records reflecting individual bonuses or performance awards paid to merit system employees and appointed officials of Anne Arundel County. In a recent opinion, the County Attorney concluded that the Maryland Public Information Act prohibited disclosure of this information. We respectfully disagree. In our opinion, the public is entitled to inspect records that reflect the earnings of government officers and employees, whether those earnings consist solely of a regular salary or are augmented by a bonus or performance award.
One piece of information, however, is outside these prohibitions on disclosure: the "salary" of a public employee. This information, the General Assembly has determined, must be available to the public. The General Assembly has pursued this objective through two provisions. The first states that the term "`[p]ublic record' includes a document that lists the salary of an employee of a unit or instrumentality of the State government or a political subdivision." SG, § 10-611(f)(2).1 Moreover, when the General Assembly added the provision on personal financial information in 1982, it provided that the new exemption "does not apply to the salary of a public employee." SG, § 10-617(f)(1). See Chapter 431, Laws of Maryland 1982.2
Therefore, as the County Attorney recognized in his opinion, the determinative point is whether the bonuses and performance awards in question are best viewed as part of "the salary of a public employee." If so, the custodian must make the information available on request. See Moberly v. Herboldsheimer,
The County Attorney's opinion cites authority (none involving public access to information) for the proposition that "[t]he law make[s] a distinction between the terms `salary' and `bonus.'" We agree that, in various contexts, courts have often held a bonus to be distinct from a salary. In general, a bonus implies a one-time lump payment, whereas a salary is ordinarily understood to mean the periodic payment of a specific sum, as specified in the employment contract. See, e.g., Blick v. Mercantile Trust Dep. Co.,
Yet, the term "salary" is not always given so restrictive a scope as to exclude lump-sum payments like bonuses or performance awards. The most basic meaning of the term, after all, is quite broad: "compensation for services rendered." The Chancellor'sCase, 1 Bland 595, 630 (1825). See also, e.g., Savannah Bank Trust Co. v. Mason,
This broader meaning may be applied to the term "salary" when doing so serves the objective underlying the language. For example, in Rock v. Burris,
In our opinion, the General Assembly enacted the "salary" provisions of the PIA to ensure that members of the public could find out how much public employees earned. The term "salary" should be construed to help achieve this objective. Giving "salary" too narrow a construction would allow governments to secretly augment the earnings of public employees through bonuses and performance awards, contrary to the General Assembly's goal of holding a government publicly accountable for its compensation decisions. Under the PIA, to borrow a phrase from an Ohio court, "the public has an absolute right to ascertain the earnings of its servants." State ex rel. Jones v. Myers,
Very truly yours,
J. Joseph Curran, Jr. Attorney General
Jack Schwartz Assistant Attorney General
_________________________ Robert N. McDonald Chief Counsel Opinions Advice
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