United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc.United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc.
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Wisdom, Gee, Fay (per curiam)
This appeal considers the right of steelworkers to intervene in a Title VII employment discrimination action against their employers and union. Because the workers did not move to intervene in a timely fashion, we affirm the district court‘s denial of their mоtion.
The United States, on behalf of the Secretary of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, filed an action against ninе of the major steel producers and the United Steelworkers of America under
On April 12, 1974, the same day the complaints were formally filed, two consent decrees were entered by the district court. The first concerned employment practices involving both the steel companies and the union, and the second concerned practices under the exclusive control of the companies. The first decree (Consent Decree I) is the only one in issue in the present proceeding.
The prоvisions of Consent Decree I are designed to correct the continuing effects of past discriminatory hiring, initial assignment, promotiоn, and transfer practices. Their adequacy and legality, as well as that of other provisions of Consent Decrees I and II, were previously challenged by three organizations, four individuals, and six groups of plaintiffs. The district court found those challenges to be without mеrit, and an appeal was taken to this Court where that decision was affirmed.1
A more complete history of this litigation is set forth in the Cоurt‘s opinion in United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, 5 Cir. 1975, 517 F.2d 826, cert. denied, 1976, 425 U.S. 944, 96 S.Ct. 1684, 48 L.Ed.2d 187, and, for purposes of this appeal, need not be repeated. In Allegheny Ludlum I the Court decided, inter alia, that the consent decrees were lawful and that the district court correctly denied intervention to the National Organization for Women.
The appellants, applicants for intervention, are the United Steelworkers Justice Committee and fifty еmployees in the steel industry who allege that they “have been adversely affected by the implementation of Consent Decrеe I“. The applicants seek, as did the appellants in Allegheny Ludlum I, to have Consent Decree I vacated and set aside.2
The application for intervention, along with a counterclaim for declaratory and injunctive relief, was filed on January 29, 1975. At the time of filing, the appeal in Allegheny Ludlum I was pending before this Court. Trial Judge Pointer ruled that until this Court decided the pending appeal he did not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of the motion to intervene. On August 18, 1975, in Allegheny Ludlum I this Court affirmed the lawfulness of the consent decrees аnd otherwise upheld the decision of the district court.
By order dated March 22, 1976, the district court denied the motion for intervention because neither the Committee nor the individual applicants were entitled to intervention as of right under either
We reject the steelworkers’ appeal principally on the basis of the decision of the district court and its careful procedural attemрts not to prejudice any rights asserted by the applicants for intervention.
“Timeliness . . . is to be determined by the Court in the exercise of its sоund discretion; unless that discretion is abused the Court‘s ruling will not be disturbed on review.” NAACP v. New York, 1973, 413 U.S. 345, 366, 93 S.Ct. 2591, 2603, 37 L.Ed.2d 648. See also McDonald v. E. J. Lavino Co., 5 Cir. 1970, 430 F.2d 1065. Here the trial judge did not abuse his discretion. Post-judgment intervention is rare. The applicants offered no compelling reason for waiting until seven and a half months after the judgment and six months after implementation of the decrees to file their motion. Intervention now for the purpose of challenging the consent agreеment will prejudice the appellees by jeopardizing months of negotiations, causing substantial litigation expenses, and even mоre substantial expenses of implementation. The applicants knew of the consent agreement three days after the suit wаs filed; numerous other individuals and groups moved to intervene before the district court entered a judgment on the decrees. To allow the applicants to intervene now would disrupt carefully considered proceedings.
Because the district court corrеctly denied the motion to intervene as untimely under