1495 Jaeger L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision
970 N.E.2d 949
Ohio
2012
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*1 222 Universities, and Land-Grant Universities, of Public and Association

American Education. Higher Affairs Administrators NASPA-Student Community Legal Aid Reedy; Henry; Hollie and Kristen Laura Osseck Zindle; Northeast Ohio Janice, Paul E. and Services, Inc., and Christina M. Service, Callen, Legal Rights curiae Ohio B. for amici Legal Services James Inc., Services, Association, Community Legal Aid Boards Ohio School Services. Legal Northeast Ohio County Cuyahoga Jaeger Appellant, L.L.C.,

1495 v. Appellees. al., et Board of Revision Cty. Cuyahoga as 1495 L.L.C. [Cite Revision, 222, 2012-Ohio-2680.] 2012.) (No. 23, 2012 Decided June May 2011-1529 Submitted Per Curiam. by the challenges the denial (“Jaeger”) 1495 L.L.C. appeal, this (“BTA”) through Jaeger sought of a motion Appeals of Tax

Board subsequent On stipulated forward a adopted order that dispositive issued February 2008. On for stipulated value that had been require that would for an additional order Jaeger filed its motion through forward value be carried jurisdic- that it had no grounds motion on the denied 30-day that it lost when The BTA reasoned tion. court, to this expired. order

appealing its carry-forward law requires that the case argument renews by failing BTA erred and contends that the subsequent value to characterizes its jurisdiction. Jaeger also complaint” “continuing exercise its defect” that to correct the “technical seeking motion as BTA’s order. was absent from the language Because we agree with the BTA’s conclusion that it lacked affirm the decision of BTA.

Facts 9, 2009, Jaeger On October a filed notice of to the BTA from a {¶ 4} (“BOR”) decision of Cuyahoga County 30, Board of Revision September dated rejected BOR had Jaeger’s complaint 2008 and ordered no change originally determined for property. 11, 2011, January On the'BTA issued an order a adopting property value

to which 17, had stipulated on December 2010. After the South Euelid-Lyndhurst City School District Board of Education notified the BTA that the wrong school district was named on the original the BTA issued new 1, order on February 2011. The new order named the correct board of education and once again adopted 17, the December 2010 stipulated The BTA’s orders made no mention of carrying forward the stipulated value. On filed a Jaeger “Motion to Carry Forward Stipulated Taxable Value to Subsequent Years” with the BTA. That motion noted that the previous BTA order “did not specify the tax value was to carry [for 2008] forward to subsequent years, albeit not to it forward is an unintended result when nothing occurred to trigger new valuation.” Invoking R.C. 5715.19(D), the motion asked the BTA to issue “order instructing that the Cuyahoga County Auditor shall be directed to correct the tax records” on the grounds that the “originally-stipulated value [for must be 2008] carried forward each according to law until which time performs the auditor a new valuation for the property pursuant to statutory event, duties or when an such as sale, property’s triggers need to change the valuation.” August the BTA issued its order denying Jaeger’s motion. The BTA held that it jurisdiction lacked to consider Jaeger’s motion because the motion was not filed within the 30-day appeal period following the issuance of the order adopting the stipulation on February Jaeger appealed.

Analysis We confront an appeal from an {¶ order of the BTA in 8} which the BTA found that it lacked to grant the requested relief. Jaeger argues that the 5715.19(D) continuing-complaint provision of R.C. conferred on the disagree. but we Because the BTA lacked we affirm. 5715.19(D) A. required contends that the BTA to carryover stipulated order a years value to later Jaeger predicates both the of the BTA and its substantive argument on R.C. and on the law applies First, case it. 5715.19(D)’s recoupment for taxes and “Liability carryover mandate: cites R.C. succeeding year until and each [i.e., current tax] for such charges * * * determination, upon be based shall finally determined complaint is added.) (Emphasis valuation, as determined.” or assessment 2008 be value for that the requires mandate carryover that this asserts case tax-year-2008 because the carried forward in the same sexennial those are and also because until was County. in Cuyahoga reappraisal year 2012 is a period i.e.,— for its Second, again Jaeger cites R.C. by has not been determined when a provides provision, determination,” i.e., 90 for such prescribed the time of revision “within board shall 5715.19(C), proceedings and the connected then the days, see until such any ensuing year board as a valid “continued *3 from a decision upon any appeal or finally determined the board complaint is to file fresh board,” complainant need for the thereby obviating the of the that the to maintain provision relies on this year. Jaeger for the later BTA the value for to decide year permitted to the appeal of the 2008 2011, had not 2008-tax-year complaint that the given years and was still those finally determined yet been and the applying case law Finally, Jaeger cites Manor, Cty. v. Lorain Bd. In Ltd. provision. Oberlin continuing-complaint of (1994), BTA acted Revision, 1, we held that the 629 N.E.2d 1361 69 Ohio St.3d that the value it determined when it failed to order unreasonably unlawfully remaining be carried forward to the of an interim should for the first Bd. Cuyahoga Cty. relied on v. Manor years period. two Oberlin Wolf (1984), in that “the Revision, 205, 50 which we stated 11 St.3d 465 N.E.2d Ohio until it is carry-over complaint becomes original complaint [for 1979] determined,” by failing recognize that the BTA erred with the result along before the that “tax 1980 and 1981 were issue years separate the BTA for owner had asked Although property 1979.” Id. at 207. (and lower) that R.C. theory valuations for 1980 and 1981 on the circumstances, we held that under the created forward the value determined 1979 carry required so, the BTA had done we period. of the interim Because to the other two Id. at 208. affirmed. Manor, that it was Jaeger argues the basis of and Oberlin Wolf BTA not to determine and forward and unlawful for the

unreasonable AERC Saw and 2011.1 But see 2008 to initiated a new triennium. Cuyahoga was an 2009 County, update year

225 Revision, 2010-Ohio- Bd. Cty. Inc. v. Franklin Village, Mill 5715.19(D) must be of R.C. (carry-forward provision 936 N.E.2d valuations); accord property duties to amend statutory auditor’s harmonized with forward (BTA value be carried to order that the duty at 2 had a Manor Oberlin in the last changed was that the of record there was no evidence where triennium). of the two it held because argument, substantive not reach The to do so.

that it lacked modify jurisdiction to correctly it lacked concluded that B. The BTA 30-day appeal period expiration after its decision its decision modify to vacate or BTA loses if appeal an without the period expires 30-day appeal Manor, is not present- and Oberlin Unlike the situation Wolf from the BTA’s through the issue of the BTA’s duties ing Instead, 2011.2 February issued on in this case was the order expiration after the jurisdiction long BTA to exercise Jaeger asked the from decision. appeal period “has principles generally, Consistent with administrative-law expiration of an or the its decisions until the actual institution

control over 89 N.E.2d Ayres, for an Natl. Tube Co. v. Ohio St. appeal.” of the time Chester, (1949), MB L.L.C. syllabus; one of the see also West paragraph 430, 2010-Ohio-3781, 934 N.E.2d Cty. Butler doctrine, modify or vacate its the BTA loses 18. Under this *4 pursuant to a court R.C. timely appeal if there is a from decision decision having without an been filed. expires appeal or if the appeal period 5717.04 BTA until the had no not file its motion Because did further action that case.3 jurisdiction to take substantive that the “con- Jaeger contends Against straightforward reasoning, this BTA jurisdiction on the of conferred complaint” provision R.C. tinuing principles administrative-law action in of the usual spite to take further Manor, original days entry appeal of In Oberlin on reveals that within 30 the record dispositional appeal order and the taxpayer of from both the the filed notice motion. BTA’s denial of a reconsideration Chester, 430, 2010-Ohio- from our decision in MB West derives no benefit neither of the in that case had been notified the of education 934 N.E.2d 928. Because board decision, jurisdiction BTA have we held that the pendency BTA nor of the BTA’s vacate, though after the the motion was filed motion to even to entertain the board of education’s Chester, in MB West 30-day there is no issue ordinary expiration appeal period. the Unlike statutory notice here. impose closure on an administrative proceeding. We now address that conten- tion. BTA

A decision becomes unappealable, After final continuing-complaint provision the operates at the level, not the

board-of-revision noted, As provides when the board of revision fails a complaint 90-day decide within the prescribed by time frame 5715.19(C), “the any proceedings relation thereto shall be continued by the board as a any [of valid ensuing year revision] until such complaint is determined the board or upon any appeal from a decision of the board.” The statute makes clear that under those circumstances original “the complaint shall continue in effect filing.” without further plain language The of the statute establishes that continuing-complaint jurisdiction essence, at the applies boards of revision—in its provision allows the auditor’s valuation for a year to be challenged before the board of revision without the of a complaint. new Jaeger argues that the provision not only extends the of the boards of revision with to the original tax year’s complaint, but supersedes also the usual rule that the BTA’s jurisdiction in a case ends with the expiration for appealing from its decision. We disagree. sure, To be the continuing-complaint provision does imply extension the BTA’s own years, to later only but during pendency of the

original BTA appeal. cited, Cases like those previously Wolf, Oberlin Manor and establish that once the board of revision’s disposition of the complaint for the (and original year is at must) the BTA can in some cases exercise over the subsequent years during case itself is still pending. But the case law also establishes that after case has terminat-

ed, taxpayer may invoke the continuing-complaint provision at the board of final, revision after the dispositive issued original order for the itself year. That precisely is what happened with respect 2005 in ABRC, 44, 2010-Ohio-4468, 936 N.E.2d 472. taxpayer’s for tax was resolved on the BTA in and the BTA adopted a stipulated by value auditor, for tax who had reassessed the 2005 based a sexennial on *5 reappraisal, changed the 2005 newly value from the appraised value to the value stipulated for tax year 2002—an act that increased the assigned value for 2005. Because the March 2006 deadline for challenging the valuation for tax year passed, 2005 had the taxpayer demanded that the BOR review the auditor’s carry-forward part as of the continuation court, held that the board at this so, the case arrived and when

BOR continu- under the challenge AERC’s jurisdiction to entertain revision did have ¶ AERC, 10-14. ing-complaint provision. the parallels in AERC The situation 21}

{¶ case for finally decided the fully BTA has in case: the present situation the subsequent years.4 addressed specifically and has not original the (absent other AERC, would some in this case in the board of revision Just as circumstance) challenge for to entertain obliged countervailing Moreover, continuing complaint and 2011 as part (like in limits, taxpayer in this case the jurisdictional usual subject to the AERC) the board of revision ruling by an adverse right would have the case, but as brand-new part to the BTA—not as of the former appeal. in situation is for the doubt the best practice No that to seek a BTA order addresses the

complainant, appropriate, whenever setting in the value for the carry-forward the relates scope Cuyahoga Cty. Mun. School Dist. Bd. original year. See Cleveland of Edn. ¶ 2005-Ohio-2285, 306, 24 N.E.2d covered “specify that boards of revision and the (recommending orders”). action, in AERC demonstrates that by their But the absence of such means of continuing complaint presenting furnishes the issue to the boards revision themselves. asking of its motion as to cure a Finally, Jaeger’s characterization in BTA’s failure to unavailing. Jaeger legal

“technical defect” is asserts error decision, authority legal in its but it cites no such address the later jurisdictional limitations. exempt error constitutes a defect that is from the usual foregoing continuing-complaint provision discussion shows the usual limits expand jurisdiction beyond prescribed does not the BTA’s jurisdictional principles. statutes and administrative-law

Conclusion correctly jurisdiction modify held that it had no Because the decision, BTA. we affirm the decision

Decision affirmed. O’Connor, C.J., Lundberg Stratton, O’Donnell, Lanzinger, Pfeifer, JJ., concur. and McGee Cupp, Brown, sure, AERC, adopting stipulated value did recite that

4. To be the BTA’s order AERC, law,” “in as we stated in this statement did should be earned forward accordance with but AERC, applied any specific year. fn. 2. not constitute a mandate that the value be *6 J., concurring. Pfeifer, to a county stipulated new valuation for

and Jaeger years. Although desires to value to later forward, stipulation carrying makes no reference to to Jaeger ought opportunity have the to its case for so. I with the court that present doing agree late, that the BTA Jaeger’s request modify its decision came too but I write separately to make clear that all is not lost. out, As the court’s decision points pendency 2008-tax-year way all the into 2011 means that had a “continuing complaint”

that allows it to challenge the auditor’s assessments at the board of revision for any without a fresh for of those years. See Revision, Village, AERC Saw Mill Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. ¶ 2010-Ohio-4468, 472, 12, citing 936 N.E.2d Columbus Bd. Edn. v. Franklin (1999). Cty. Bd. 720 N.E.2d 517 Edn., Bd. rejected Columbus the BTA’s conclusion that its decision on the earlier had terminated the proceedings to subsequent years subject that were complaint. the continuation of the at Id. Therefore, it did not although years, address the later the BTA’s decision present case does not preclude proceedings on the continuing complaint Moreover, the BOR. because there is no need to file a fresh complaint for the years, the usual deadline of March 31 does not ensuing apply. 5715.19(A)(1); AERC, see 7. Finally, when the BOR issues its decision for one of years, may the later that decision appealed to the BTA pursuant 5717.01. my law, Based on understanding an opportunity

pursue its claim for the later Accordingly, I concur in the majority opinion. Co., L.P.A.,

Dyson, Schmidlin, & Foulds Raymond J. Robert Schmidlin J. Foulds, Roberts, and Kevin P. for appellant.

Brindza, Seed, L.L.P., McIntyre Seed, Hoehnen, & H. David and Jennifer A. appellee Euclid-Lyndhurst South City School District Board of Education.

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