11 Fair empl.prac.cas. 636, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,420 Louis Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches11 Fair empl.prac.cas. 636, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,420 Louis Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Koelsch
OPINION
Before KOELSCH and SNEED, Circuit Judgés, and FIRTH, * District Judge. PER CURIAM:Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the district court dismissing their action on the ground that their complaint failed to state, and could not be amended to state, a claim. We affirm.
The suit is one for damages. Plaintiffs are citizens or legally admitted
Plaintiffs assert two separate bases for their claim: (1) the Immigration and Nationality Act,
1.
2.
“The constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting§ 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full effect to the congressional purpose — -by requiring, as an element of the cause of action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory motivation stressed by the sponsors of the limiting amendment. See the remarks of Representatives Willard and Shellabarger, quoted supra, at 100. The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action. The conspiracy, in other words, must aim at adeprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all.” (Footnotes omitted.) 403 U.S. at 102, 91 S.Ct. at 1798.
The upshot of that position is that the statutory action is restricted to injuries inflicted upon the victim because of his status as a member of an identifiable class; the statutory “purpose to deprive of equal rights” requirement is inferred from the racial or other class 2 motivation underlying the tortious conduct. See Arnold v. Tiffany, 487 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1973), at 218 n.1; Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 3, 98 n.21 (1971).
Applying those principles, we think plaintiffs’ allegations fail to state a claim. In substance they embrace two distinct discriminatory deprivations. The first is the plaintiffs’ inability to secure employment because of plaintiffs’ disparate treatment vis a vis the “illegals”; the second is the inequality of protection afforded Maricopa County farm workers, legal and illegal, as distinguished from other American workers, as the indirect result of the dilution of working standards occasioned by the hiring of “illegals.”
As to the first, assuming that the legality of residence status creates a class cognizable under the
Griffin
gloss on
The alleged discriminatory motivation against citizens and those legally present will not suffice. That discrimination does not aim at creating a disparity in rights between the favored and disfavored class; the alleged animus against legal workers is contradicted by plaintiffs’ own allegations that defendants deprive both legal and illegal farm workers of statutory protections in terms applicable to all employees. As
Griffin
narrowed the cases in which a deprivation of equal rights is actionable to those where the injury is class motivated, it seems to us a necessary corollary that the class animus alleged be consistent with the deprivation of rights alleged. Here it is not. Instead, the equality of legal rights denied plaintiffs and “illegals” is equality with- all remaining workers who are not victimized by the alleged conspiracy. Of itself, the creation of a class of victims by tortious conduct does not bring a claim within
Here, it would appear that the conspiracy was universally directed towards any worker in, or who might come into, the local work force. As we read
Griffin
and the statute’s legislative history,
Affirmed.
Notes
. As originally introduced, the bill which became
. The Court left open the question in Griffin whether the statute reached class-based deprivations founded on a non-racial class animus — in Griffin the Court found the necessary congressional power in the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment and pretermitted the question of whether the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment afforded Congress the power to redress deprivations which cannot be broadly defined as the badges and incidents of slavery, and whether Congress exercised the power. We need not resolve the question here, as in any event no claim is stated.
. There is an as yet unresolved possibility that
. While concluding that Congress has not authorized a private civil claim in the circumstances here alleged, we would suggest that such legislation might well provide a worthwhile aid in curbing and discouraging illegal alien immigration.