10 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 531, 9 Empl. Prac.
Dec. P 10,062
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GRIFFIN WHEEL COMPANY, and International Molders, and Allied
Workers Union, Local No. 75, AFL-CIO, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 74--1546.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
April 10, 1975.
William A. Carey, Gen. Counsel, William L. Robinson, Associate Gen. Counsel, Linda Colvard Dorian, Charles L. Reischel, Attys., EEOC, Washington, D.C., Roger J. Martinson, Acting Reg. Atty., Alfоnso McGhee, Associate Regional Atty., Ellis L. Bert. Asst. Reg. Atty., William Franklin Jordan, Atty., EEOC, Atlanta Regional Litigation Center, Atlanta, Ga., Beatrice Rosenberg, Joseph T. Eddins, Attys., EEOC, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellant.
William F. Gardner, John C. Falkenberry, William E. Mitch, Birmingham, Ala., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before GODBOLD and MORGAN, Circuit Judges, and BOOTLE, District Judge.
BOOTLE, District Judge:
In 1970 Curtis Pack and Jimmy Youngblood filed charges with the EEOC alleging discrimination. The EEOC filed the complaint instituting this action in May 1973; the complaint sought an injunction and also asked the court 'to make whole those persons adversely affected by the practices and policies alleged herein' including an award of back pay. (The union was joined as a defendant because its presence might have been necessary in framing a remedy.) The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the action was barred by the Alabama statute of limitations and that the EEOC was not authorized to file suit after the expiration of the 180 day period provided by the 1972 amendment to Title VII. We reverse.
I. 180 DAY LIMITATION UNDER TITLE VII
Subsequent to the date on which the district court granted summary judgment, this Circuit held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act1 does not impose a 180 day limitation on the power of the EEOC to bring suit. EEOC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
II. STATE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Pack filed his charge with the EEOC asserting:
I believe the Company discriminated against me because of my race (Negro) by giving me a warning notice for an offense in which they have not givе (sic) such notices to white employees and for intending to lay me off for the same offense.
This charge was later amended to read:
'I believe that the Company discriminated against me because of my racе by giving me a warning notice for an offense that Caucasian employees commit and are not given warning notices.' Youngblood's charge was, 'I believe the Company discharged me because of my race (Negro).' The EEOC's investigation of these charges convinced it that a broad pattern of racial discrimination as charged in the complaint existed at Griffin Wheel.2
The district court ruled that the record did not establish sufficient undisputed facts which would entitle the defendants to summary judgment on either of the two additional grounds asserted by them (viz., that the issues presented in the complaint went beyond the permissible extension of the express matters embraced in the charges filed with the EEOC3 and that res judicata barred the suit).
Our question narrows to whethеr the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the ground that the action was barred by the Alabama statute of limitations.4
The major case in this Circuit dealing with the limitation periods to be applied to actions brought under Title VII is United States v. Georgia Power Co.,
Title VII is silent as to limitation periоds. Section 706(g) does specify that '(b)ack pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission.' But this is not a prescriрtion as to when suits may be filed. Clearly, Congress simply meant to provide a maximum period during which an employer might be liable for back pay, but it did not thereby intend to modify applicаble state statutes of limitations on the ability to bring suit.
Georgia Power dictates the answer to our question. There we said (
Where the government is suing to enforce rights belonging to it, state stаtutes of limitation are not applicable. See e.g., United States v. Thompson,
Rather than the contention of either of the parties, we follow the general rule expressed in Beard v. Stephens, a decision involving an action for damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1343:
Congress has created many federal rights without prescribing a period for enforcement. In such cases the federal courts borrow the limitations period prescribed by the state where the court sits. The applicable period of limitations is that which the state itself would enforce had an аction seeking similar relief been brought in a court of that state. (
To accomplish this goal, '(w)e must look . . . first to federal law to determine the nature of the claim and then to stаte court interpretations of the state's 'statutory catalogue' to see where the claim fits into the state scheme.' Id.
In the suit before us is the EEOC 'suing to enforce rights belonging to (thе sovereign)' or is it employing the suit as a 'legal conduit for the recovery of sums due the individual citizens rather than the treasury'? We find that it is doing both. Insofar as the complaint seeks injunctive relief, the EEOC is seeking to enjoin practices contrary to public policy as prescribed in the United States Constitution and in enactments of Congress, EEOC v. Duff Brothers, Inc.,
Insofar as the complaint seeks reсovery of back pay it is private and not public in nature and is subject to the Alabama statute of limitations. This means that the action must have been commenced within one year after the occurrence of the injury complained of. Upon remand, the district court must give further consideration to whether this action was timely commenced within the purview of the state statute of limitations. Its memorandum opinion erroneously treated the filing of the last charge (on March 16, 1971) as 'the last actionable act.'6 Georgia Power teaches that employment discrimination may as readily be a continuing course of conduct as a single event (
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Notes
Section 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e--5(f)
The EEOC's amended complaint alleges that Griffin Wheel violated Title VII in
(a) Discriminating against Blacks in hiring, discharges, and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment.
(b) Maintaining a disciplinary system for violations of company policy which discriminates against Blacks on the basis of race. Blacks are given written warnings for violations of company policy whereas Caucasians are given verbal warnings. This system results in the greater frequency of disciplinary actions, including layoff and discharge, against Blacks.
(c) Maintaining locker, shower and restroom facilities segregated on the basis of race.
(d) Failing and refusing to take apprоpriate affirmative action to eliminate its discriminatory employment practices and policies and to correct the effects of present and past disсrimination against Blacks.
See Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc.,
'The following must be commenced within one year; . . . Actions for any injury to the person or rights of another, not arising from contract, and not herein specifiсally enumerated.' Ala.Code tit. 7, § 26
As Georgia Power indicates, the doctrine of laches would remain applicable.
While the filing of the charge is a jurisdictional prerequisitе to bringing suit under Title VII, it does not fix the date on which the cause of action accrues (unless perchance the charge be filed on the same day on which the injury occurs)