358 P.3d 506
Wyo.2015Background
- Parents divorced in 2009; decree incorporated a stipulation: counseling/extracurricular costs to be split 50/50, uncovered medical costs split 75% (father)/25% (mother).
- Daughter received residential treatment at Wyoming Behavioral Institute in 2010; parties disputed later whether residential treatment is "counseling" (50/50) or "medical" (75/25).
- In April 2011 daughter began a ~16‑month stay at New Haven Residential Treatment Center; New Haven enrollment/tuition agreements signed by both parents made them jointly and severally liable and New Haven billed each parent 50% monthly.
- Parents each paid roughly $106,224.50 (half) of the $212,449 total New Haven cost while the court question remained pending; later the Wyoming Supreme Court and district court held residential treatment is a medical expense (75/25).
- Mother sought reimbursement from Father for amounts she paid in excess of her 25% share; district court held no written or implied modification of the divorce decree and rejected promissory estoppel, ordering Father to reimburse $53,112.25. Father appealed; Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Samiec's Argument | Hopkins' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did a signed New Haven agreement modify the divorce decree to require 50/50 sharing? | New Haven enrollment/financial agreements signed by both parents constituted a written modification to require equal sharing. | New Haven contracts bound sponsors to New Haven only and did not alter parental obligations under the divorce decree. | No — New Haven agreements were only promises to New Haven, not a written modification of the divorce decree. |
| Was there an implied‑in‑fact modification of the decree to 50/50 by conduct or oral agreement? | Parent conduct and the billing/ payments established mutual assent to a 50/50 modification. | No mutual assent; billing discussion at intake was only about New Haven's billing practice while the court's pending determination made modification premature. | No — trial court’s finding of no implied‑in‑fact contract was not clearly erroneous. |
| Does promissory estoppel bind Mother to pay 50%? | Mother’s signing and payments were a clear, definite promise inducing Father to rely and act. | Mother’s promise was to New Haven, not Father; Father relied on assumption while a judicial determination was pending, so reliance was unreasonable. | No — promissory estoppel not proven: no clear definite promise to Father and reliance was not reasonable. |
| Was contempt or reimbursement appropriate given the above? | Father argued factual disputes precluded contempt; sought to avoid reimbursement. | Mother sought contempt and reimbursement for amounts over her 25% share. | District court held evidentiary hearing and ordered reimbursement by Father; Supreme Court affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Samiec v. Fermelia, 308 P.3d 844 (Wyo. 2013) (prior appellate ruling that residential treatment is a medical expense)
- Big-D Signature Corp. v. Sterrett Props., LLC, 288 P.3d 72 (Wyo. 2012) (explains when an integrated written contract may be orally or conductually modified)
- Symons v. Heaton, 316 P.3d 1171 (Wyo. 2014) (elements and application of promissory estoppel in contract modification context)
- Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 75 P.3d 640 (Wyo. 2003) (framework for implied‑in‑fact contracts and reliance on outward manifestations)
- Moore v. Wolititch, 341 P.3d 421 (Wyo. 2015) (standards of appellate review for district court factual findings)