338 F. Supp. 3d 875
E.D. Ill.2018Background
- In Sept. 2016 American Airlines rolled out Twin Hill–manufactured uniforms worldwide; within days–weeks many employees reported rashes, respiratory problems, vertigo and other ailments.
- American allowed some employees to revert to old uniforms and later permitted non–Twin Hill garments; by Sept. 2017 over 1.4 million Twin Hill items had been distributed to ~65,000 employees and thousands had reported symptoms.
- Plaintiffs (11 named employees) sued American and Twin Hill asserting battery, IIED, negligence, strict products liability, and a medical‑monitoring claim; they seek individual damages and class injunctive relief (recall, stop supplying Twin Hill uniforms, medical monitoring fund).
- American moved to dismiss arguing state workers’ compensation exclusivity bars plaintiffs’ tort claims against the employer (intentional‑harm exception inapplicable). Twin Hill moved to dismiss and to strike class allegations, arguing lack of causal and defect allegations and manageability problems for a nationwide class.
- The court granted American’s motion (claims against employer preempted) but denied Twin Hill’s motions, holding plaintiffs plausibly stated a products‑liability/design defect claim against the manufacturer and that class allegations were not facially infirm.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs may sue American in tort despite workers’ compensation exclusivity | American knew uniforms were unsafe or substantially certain to injure employees, so intentional‑tort exception applies | Workers’ comp exclusivity bars tort claims unless employer specifically intended or was substantially certain to injure a particular employee | Dismissed claims against American: plaintiffs did not plausibly allege specific intent or substantial certainty that any named plaintiff (or small identifiable group) would be harmed |
| Standard for "substantial certainty" and whether statistical knowledge suffices | Substantial certainty can be satisfied by statistical certainty that some portion of workforce would be harmed given scale of distribution | Statistical or collective knowledge is insufficient—intent requires knowledge directed at a particular victim or small, identifiable group | Court adopts the view that substantial‑certainty must be focused on identifiable victim(s); statistics about collective harm do not convert negligence into intentional tort |
| Viability of products‑liability/design defect claims against Twin Hill (causation, defect) | Plaintiffs allege widespread, temporally linked symptoms and testing showing hazardous chemicals in garments; plausible defect and causation at pleading stage | Testing has not identified any single chemical at levels sufficient to show causation; plaintiffs lack garment‑level specificity | Denied Twin Hill’s motion to dismiss: complaint plausibly alleges design defect and a non‑speculative causal link sufficient to survive Rule 12(b)(6) and reach discovery |
| Whether class allegations should be stricken at pleading stage | Nationwide class manageable; common questions (e.g., whether Twin Hill garments can cause harm) exist and discovery will resolve choice‑of‑law issues | Variations in state law and individualized issues (exposure, health histories) make class treatment unmanageable; injunctive relief requires ongoing harm | Denied motion to strike: it is premature to resolve choice‑of‑law and manageability at pleading stage; subclasses and classwide proof may address variations; ongoing exposure/proximity allegations suffice to plead continuing harm for injunctive relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (standards for plausibility under Rule 8)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standards and plausibility)
- Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (choice‑of‑law in diversity cases)
- Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1985) (substantial‑certainty required for intentional‑tort exception; knowledge must be as to the injury)
- Lucenti v. Laviero, 327 Conn. 764 (Conn. 2018) (narrow application of substantial‑certainty; comment e consistent with requiring identifiable victims)
- Walston v. Boeing Co., 181 Wash. 2d 391 (Wash. 2014) (rejecting collective/statistical knowledge as sufficing for intent)
- Conway v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc., 116 Nev. 870 (Nev. 2000) (intentional‑harm exception requires specific intent to injure)
- Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v. Lee, 543 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. App. 2018) (employer must be able to predict who will be injured; collective certainty insufficient)