Zuniga v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co.
20-CV-77
| D.C. | Mar 3, 2022Background
- Appellants sued for unpaid wages and recovered wages by offers of judgment; they then timely moved and the Superior Court awarded $41,573.43 in attorneys’ fees and costs on February 12, 2019.
- The February 12 order awarded fees but did not expressly name which defendants were liable; defendants did not immediately pay the award.
- Appellants sought to enforce the fee award; the clerk refused a writ of attachment because the order lacked express identification of liable defendants.
- With defendants’ consent, the court entered a nunc pro tunc order on May 13, 2019, clarifying that Whiting-Turner and Commercial Interiors were jointly and severally liable; defendants then paid the award in full.
- Appellants sought (1) interest on the unpaid fee award for the period it remained unpaid and (2) additional fees/costs incurred to enforce the award. The trial court denied interest and held the supplemental fee motion untimely under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 54(d)(2)(B).
- On appeal the court held interest should have accrued from February 12 to May 13 and remanded to calculate it; it affirmed denial of the supplemental fee request as untimely but left open recovery of fees incurred to obtain relief (e.g., interest) if a future judgment entitles appellants to them.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether D.C. Code § 28-3302(c) provides for interest on an award of attorneys’ fees | Fee awards are "judgments or decrees" and therefore accrue interest under § 28-3302(c) | § 28-3302(c) does not expressly require interest on fee awards; matrix adjustments already compensate for delay | Court: Fee awards are "judgments or decrees"; interest accrues under § 28-3302(c) (reverse denial) |
| When interest begins to run on a fee award clarified by a nunc pro tunc order | Interest should run from original award date (Feb. 12) because the May 13 order was nunc pro tunc | Interest should run from May 13 because that was the effective enforceable entry | Court: May 13 order was properly entered nunc pro tunc to Feb. 12; interest accrued from Feb. 12 to May 13 (reverse denial) |
| Whether appellants may recover additional fees/costs incurred to enforce the fee award under D.C. Code § 32-1308(b)(1) | § 32-1308(b)(1) authorizes fees for proceedings to enforce a judgment; appellants timely sought such fees or their filing was supplemental | Motion was untimely under Rule 54(d)(2)(B) because it was filed more than 14 days after the May 13 judgment | Court: Motion for post-May 13 enforcement fees was untimely under Rule 54(d)(2)(B) and denial affirmed; but fees incurred to obtain relief not provided by May 13 (e.g., interest) remain recoverable if and when a judgment entitles them (affirm in part; without prejudice in part) |
Key Cases Cited
- Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 487 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1973) (post-judgment interest applies to attorney-fee awards)
- Eaves v. County of Cape May, 239 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 2001) (federal rule: interest on fee awards mandatory)
- MidAmerica Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 962 F.2d 1470 (10th Cir. 1992) (attorneys’ fees treated like other money judgments for interest)
- Appeal of A.H., 590 A.2d 123 (D.C. 1991) (nunc pro tunc power to correct judgment record)
- District of Columbia v. Jackson, 878 A.2d 489 (D.C. 2005) (Rule 54(d)(2)(B) timeliness requirement for fee motions)
- Robinson v. City of Harvey, 617 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 2010) (strict enforcement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B) deadlines)
