Zullo v. Lombardo, 755 F.3d 1

Debtor David Lombardo filed Chapter 7 in Sept. 2010; Zullo held a pre-bankruptcy Massachusetts judgment against him for defective, unlicensed plumbing work.
Zullo sued in bankruptcy court in Dec. 2010 seeking a determination that the debt was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (willful and malicious injury).
After counsel changes and completed discovery, the case proceeded toward trial; 17 months after filing the adversary complaint Zullo’s new counsel sought summary judgment and orally requested leave to amend to add a claim under § 523(a)(2)(A) (fraud/false pretenses).
The bankruptcy court indicated the existing pleadings did not support a § 523(a)(6) theory, denied leave to amend, and granted summary judgment for Lombardo; the BAP affirmed.
The First Circuit reviewed whether denial of leave to amend was an abuse of discretion, focusing on undue delay and the movant’s failure to justify a 17‑month wait to seek amendment.
The court affirmed, holding that Zullo’s unexplained delay—especially given that the underlying facts were long-known and discovery was closed—justified denial under the amendment rules.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by denying Zullo leave to amend his adversary complaint after 17 months to add a § 523(a)(2)(A) claim	Zullo argued leave should be freely given under Rule 15 and that facts were settled so amendment would not prejudice Lombardo; delay was not a sufficient ground to deny	Lombardo argued the amendment request was unduly delayed (17 months), offered no valid reason for neglect, and came at the close of discovery just before trial, warranting denial	Affirmed: denial was within the court’s discretion because Zullo failed to justify the lengthy delay and waited until trial was imminent to seek amendment, imposing potential burdens on the court and opponent

Brandt v. Repco Printers & Lithographics, Inc. , 132 F.3d 104 (1st Cir.) (standard of review when BAP affirms bankruptcy court)
Noonan v. Rauh (In re Rauh), 119 F.3d 46 (1st Cir.) (abuse-of-discretion standard for amendment decisions)
Stepanischen v. Merchs. Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.) (burden to explain considerable delay before seeking amendment)
Acosta‑Mestre v. Hilton Int’l of P.R., Inc., 156 F.3d 49 (1st Cir.) (undue delay can alone justify denial of leave to amend)
Grant v. News Grp. Bos., Inc., 55 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.) (deference to trial court when adequate reason supports denial)
Invest Almaz v. Temple‑Inland Forest Prods. Corp., 243 F.3d 57 (1st Cir.) (assess what movant knew or should have known in evaluating delay)
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (U.S.) (Rule 15 factors including undue delay)