Zoldan v. Chaffee
25 N.E.3d 451
Ohio Ct. App.2014Background
- Mayor Michael Chaffee voted to approve wind turbines for the Village of Lordstown; the turbines were built and became operational in March 2011.
- Councilman Stanley Zoldan opposed the project; on April 5, 2011, Zoldan personally shut down a turbine (photographed) because he believed there had been no final electrical/building inspections.
- Village staff (Parks/Grounds superintendent, police chief, fire chief) had authority to cut power; Zoldan did not obtain their permission and admitted he acted without such authority.
- Chaffee learned of the shutdown, consulted the village solicitor, contacted police to report tampering with village property, and gave a voluntary statement; police/prosecutor later filed a criminal complaint against Zoldan, which was dismissed after payment of costs.
- Zoldan sued the Village and Chaffee for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, defamation, and IIED; the trial court dismissed defamation and IIED as time-barred, granted summary judgment to the Village on malicious prosecution/abuse of process but denied summary judgment as to Chaffee on immunity grounds.
- On appeal, the court reviewed whether Chaffee, as a political-subdivision employee, was entitled to immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744 and whether exceptions (manifestly outside scope; malicious/bad faith/wanton/reckless) precluded immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Zoldan) | Defendant's Argument (Chaffee) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Chaffee is entitled to statutory immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) | Chaffee acted maliciously/bad faith/wanton or reckless in initiating/pursuing criminal process; thus exception to immunity applies | Chaffee’s actions were within his official duties (as mayor), based on solicitor advice and concern over tampering with village property; no malice or bad faith | Reversed trial court: Chaffee entitled to immunity as a matter of law (no genuine issue of material fact) |
| Whether Chaffee’s conduct was manifestly outside the scope of employment | Zoldan argued filing/reporting criminal activity against a councilmember exceeded mayoral authority and was retaliatory | Chaffee argued reporting and seeking legal advice about tampering with village property were within mayoral responsibilities and objectively reasonable | Held: Conduct was within scope of employment; no factual basis to show it was manifestly outside scope |
| Whether Chaffee acted maliciously, in bad faith, wantonly or recklessly | Zoldan relied on speculation that the criminal complaint was retaliatory for his opposition to turbines | Chaffee pointed to contemporaneous consultations with solicitor and police and absence of evidence of improper motive | Held: Zoldan’s speculation insufficient under Civ.R. 56(E); no evidence of malice/bad faith/wanton/reckless conduct |
| Whether speculative assertions can defeat summary judgment on immunity | Zoldan maintained his deposition speculation created triable issues | Chaffee argued legal standard requires specific facts, not conjecture | Held: Speculation/conjecture insufficient; summary judgment appropriate for immunity question |
Key Cases Cited
- Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102 (1996) (standard of appellate de novo review for summary judgment)
- Hicks v. Leffler, 119 Ohio App.3d 424 (1997) (definition and proof requirements for malicious conduct)
- Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 71 Ohio St.3d 552 (1994) (bad faith requires more than negligence or bad judgment)
- Universal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567 (1936) (definition of wanton misconduct)
- Thompson v. McNeill, 53 Ohio St.3d 102 (1990) (definition of reckless conduct)
- Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380 (2012) (discussion of reckless conduct and its boundaries)