Zion v. County of Orange
874 F.3d 1072
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Connor Zion, who had recent seizures, attacked Deputy Juan Lopez with a kitchen knife; Deputy Michael Higgins arrived and witnessed the stabbing.
- Dashcam videos show Higgins fire nine shots at Zion from ~15 feet; Zion falls; Higgins fires nine more shots at Zion at about four feet while Zion is on the ground and appears wounded.
- After a pause, Higgins takes a running start and stomps on Zion’s head three times; Zion died at the scene.
- Zion’s mother sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging excessive force (Fourth Amendment), deprivation of familial relations (Fourteenth Amendment), municipal liability, and related state-law claims; district court granted summary judgment to defendants.
- Ninth Circuit reviewed video evidence, reversed in part, held issues of fact exist as to excessive force and denied qualified immunity for the post-downforce conduct; remanded some claims for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Higgins’s continued shooting after Zion fell was excessive force under the Fourth Amendment | Continued shooting and the subsequent stomps were unreasonable once Zion was on the ground and no longer an immediate threat | Shooting was justified because Zion was still moving and posed an ongoing threat; officers need not stop until the threat ends | Jury issue: a reasonable jury could find Zion was no longer an immediate threat; defendants not entitled to summary judgment on post-fall force; qualified immunity denied for force after threat ended |
| Whether Higgins is entitled to qualified immunity | Force after threat ended violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law | Officer actions were objectively reasonable given perceived threat | Qualified immunity does not apply to use of deadly force after suspect ceased posing immediate threat if jury so finds |
| Whether Higgins’s head-stomping violated the Fourteenth Amendment familial-relations/due process right | Head-stomping was gratuitous, done after a pause and served no legitimate law-enforcement purpose—shocks the conscience | Stomps were contemporaneous with stopping a dangerous suspect and part of controlling scene | Remandable: jury could find stomps were purposefully brutal and thus violated substantive due process; district court erred to grant summary judgment on that claim |
| Municipal liability and remaining state-law claims; disposition | Municipal claims should proceed; remaining state claims should be considered if constitutional claims survive | District court had granted summary judgment (plaintiff conceded Monell claims) | Affirmed dismissal of Monell claims (plaintiff conceded); other federal and state claims remanded for district court consideration |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective-reasonableness standard for police use of force)
- Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014) (officers may continue firing until threat ends)
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (clearly established prong of qualified immunity requires materially similar precedent)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force unreasonable against nonthreatening fleeing suspect)
- Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (continued force on prone suspect can be excessive)
- Davis v. City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2007) (punching a handcuffed prone suspect violated Fourth Amendment)
- A.D. v. California Highway Patrol, 712 F.3d 446 (9th Cir. 2013) (officer shot suspect who posed no immediate threat; due-process concerns)
- Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (conduct that "shocks the conscience" violates substantive due process)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (police on notice when conduct is clearly unlawful under existing precedent)