Zherka v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 68

Selim Zherka pleaded guilty in 2015 to a nonviolent financial felony (18 U.S.C. § 371), served 37 months, and completed supervised release in 2020; federal law 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) bars felons from possessing firearms.
Zherka sued the Attorney General in Sept. 2020 seeking a declaration that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to nonviolent felons and seeking an injunction restoring his right to possess a firearm at home.
The district court dismissed under the pre‑Bruen two‑step framework, concluding § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to nonviolent financial felons and rejecting any due‑process right to an individualized hearing.
The Supreme Court decided Bruen during the appeal; the Second Circuit declined remand and applied Bruen’s historical‑tradition test itself.
The court held that (1) felons remain among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, but (2) historical tradition and precedents support congressional authority to disarm felons categorically, and (3) Zherka has no due‑process right to an individualized dangerousness hearing prior to disarmament.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Zherka)	Defendant's Argument (Garland)	Held
Whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to a nonviolent financial felon	A nonviolent felon may not be categorically disarmed; § 922(g)(1) cannot be applied to him	Longstanding authority permits Congress to disarm felons; Heller treats felon bans as presumptively lawful	Held constitutional as applied: felons are among "the people," but history/tradition supports categorical disarmament under Bruen
Whether Zherka is among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment	He is an American entitled to Second Amendment protection despite felony conviction	Felons are outside scope or may be disarmed as a class	Held: felons are part of “the people,” but that protection can be limited by historically consistent regulations
Whether due process requires an individualized dangerousness hearing before disarmament	He is entitled to an individual assessment (citing § 925(c) as an example)	Statute operates on conviction status; Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe forecloses the requested process	Held: No procedural‑due‑process right; § 922(g)(1) depends on conviction, so individual hearing is not required
Whether the case should be remanded for district‑court Bruen analysis	Remand appropriate because Bruen repudiated the two‑step test	Court has full Bruen briefing and can decide; remand would waste resources	Held: Declined remand; appellate court conducted the Bruen analysis itself

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognized individual right to possess firearms for self‑defense in the home and described longstanding felon prohibitions as presumptively lawful)
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) (established text‑and‑history test for Second Amendment challenges)
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) (upheld firearms prohibition for persons found dangerous under domestic‑violence protective orders; explained application of historical‑analogy approach)
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporated the Second Amendment against the states)
Connecticut Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) (procedural due process does not require a hearing to establish facts that are irrelevant to the statutory scheme)
United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2013) (upheld § 922(g)(1) against a facial challenge)
Antonyuk v. James, 120 F.4th 941 (2d Cir. 2024) (post‑Bruen Second Circuit treatment of licensing/character standards)