Zaragoza v. State
407 P.3d 1122
Utah Ct. App.2017Background
- Jonathan Zaragoza was convicted by a jury in 2010 of aggravated assault (lesser included aggravated assault involving bodily injury), aggravated kidnapping, and domestic violence in the presence of a child based primarily on two out-of-court statements by his wife (Wife) and her in-court testimony. This court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal.
- Wife initially invoked the spousal testimonial privilege and would not testify, but had given two prior statements to police; the trial court admitted those statements under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine after finding Zaragoza had tampered with the witness (276 jail calls and other conduct).
- During the defense case, Wife agreed to testify for Zaragoza and denied being restrained or sustaining certain severe injuries; trial counsel called her as a defense witness.
- After direct appeal, Zaragoza filed a post-conviction petition raising (1) prosecutorial "testimony" about jail calls and other matters, (2) ineffective assistance claims against trial counsel (calling Wife, failing to investigate an alibi, not seeking lesser-included instructions), and (3) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (not raising trial counsel ineffectiveness thoroughly, not petitioning the Utah Supreme Court, not raising speedy-trial). He also asked for appointed counsel in post-conviction proceedings.
- The district court denied appointment of counsel, granted the State’s motion for summary judgment on all post-conviction claims, and Zaragoza appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Zaragoza's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court abused discretion by denying appointment of post-conviction counsel | District court should have appointed counsel to litigate post-conviction claims | Appointment is discretionary; court properly considered statutory factors and petitioner appeared capable | Affirmed — no abuse of discretion; court considered required factors and issues were not unusually complex |
| Whether summary judgment was improper as to claim that prosecutor improperly "testified" about jail calls, letters, prior bad acts, pending charges | Prosecutor improperly testified, prejudicing trial | Claim is barred as not raised at trial/appeal; prosecutor did not "testify" but argued and questioned witnesses within rules | Affirmed — claim precluded by statute and substantively fails (no improper testimony) |
| Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising trial counsel’s tactics (calling Wife; failing to investigate alibi; failing to request lesser-included instructions) | Appellate counsel should have argued trial counsel ineffective on these grounds | Trial counsel’s choices were reasonable tactics; alleged omissions would not likely have altered result; some issues could have been raised earlier and are barred | Affirmed — appellate counsel not ineffective: tactical choices reasonable; alibi evidence unlikely to change outcome; no rational basis for lesser-included instructions given the evidence of a bat (dangerous weapon) |
| Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for not seeking Utah Supreme Court review or raising speedy-trial | Appellate counsel should have sought certiorari and argued speedy-trial violation | No constitutional right to counsel on discretionary review; the delay (~1 year) was not presumptively prejudicial and some delay caused by defendant | Affirmed — no ineffective assistance: no right to counsel for discretionary review; speedy-trial claim not otherwise meritorious |
Key Cases Cited
- Ross v. State, 293 P.3d 345 (Utah 2012) (standard for appointment of post-conviction counsel; deference to district court)
- Litherland v. State, 12 P.3d 92 (Utah 2000) (no statutory or constitutional right to counsel for collateral attacks)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Lafferty v. State, 175 P.3d 530 (Utah 2007) (standards for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (factors for speedy-trial analysis)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (presumptively prejudicial delay threshold in speedy-trial claims)
- Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982) (no constitutional right to counsel for discretionary appeals)
- State v. Powell, 154 P.3d 788 (Utah 2007) (test for lesser included offense instruction)