Zani v. Rite Aid Headquarters Corp.
246 F. Supp. 3d 835
| S.D.N.Y. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Robert Zani received a single prerecorded automated call in Sept. 2014 from Rite Aid HQ notifying him (a prior-year flu-shot recipient at a Rite Aid pharmacy) of availability of flu vaccines, including high-dose vaccine for 65+.
- Zani had given his cell number to the local Rite Aid pharmacy when receiving prescriptions and signed notices of privacy practices; Rite Aid HQ maintained a customer profile and used vendors (designated business associates under HIPAA) to place the calls.
- Rite Aid’s campaign called only prior-year pharmacy patients and used a generic script similar to other Rite Aid advertising; Rite Aid’s internal materials sometimes described the calls as marketing.
- Plaintiff sued under the TCPA alleging negligent and willful violations for the automated call, seeking class certification; Rite Aid moved for summary judgment arguing the call fell within FCC’s “Health Care” exception and required only prior express consent.
- The district court found as a matter of law that (1) the calls were made by/on behalf of a covered entity or its business associate, (2) the calls conveyed a “health care message” under HIPAA/FCC rules, and (3) therefore the calls were exempt from the FCC’s heightened prior-express-written-consent telemarketing rule; summary judgment for Rite Aid granted and class motion denied as moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the prerecorded flu-shot call qualifies as a “health care message” under 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2) | The call was generic, promotional, aimed at marketing, and therefore is telemarketing/advertising, not a health-care message | The call informed prior-year patients about availability of a prescription vaccine and was sent by/on behalf of a covered entity/business associate—thus a health-care message | Court: Call conveyed a health-care message as a matter of law (prescription vaccine, sent to patients in existing treatment relationship about individual health need) |
| Whether the call was made by or on behalf of a HIPAA “covered entity” or “business associate” | Implied contest that HQ wasn’t the health-care provider and the call was corporate marketing | Rite Aid HQ is a business associate of branded pharmacies, had patient data, and placed calls on behalf of pharmacies | Court: Undisputed that Rite Aid HQ was a business associate and made calls on behalf of the pharmacies |
| Whether evidence of marketing purpose (advertising intent, generic script) makes the Health Care Rule inapplicable | Marketing purpose and generic messaging show the call is telemarketing and subject to prior‑express‑written‑consent | The Health Care Rule is an exception to the Telemarketing Rule; a message may be marketing yet still qualify if it is a health-care message | Court: Marketing purpose is immaterial; Health Care Rule is an exception to Telemarketing Rule, so health-care content controls |
| Standing (Article III injury) | Implicit: receipt of an unwanted call may be only a procedural violation; standing contested in reply by defendant | Defendant argued Spokeo requires concrete harm beyond a bare procedural violation | Court: Followed Second Circuit precedent (Leyse summary-order guidance) — actual receipt/listening to a prerecorded message suffices for concrete injury; plaintiff has standing |
Key Cases Cited
- Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31 (2d Cir.) (summary-judgment materiality standard)
- Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2005) (Article III jurisdictional considerations)
- Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (U.S. 1997) (deference to agency interpretation of its own regulation)
- Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (U.S. 2000) (limits on deference to agency interpretations)
- Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (U.S. 2001) (avoidance of superfluity in statutory/regulatory interpretation)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (U.S. 2016) (Article III standing requires concrete injury)
