Zander v. Morsette, 959 N.W.2d 838

Background

In June 2015 Jordan Morsette drove the wrong way on the Bismarck Expressway, causing a head-on collision that killed Taylor Goven and Abby Renschler and seriously injured Shayna Monson; Morsette’s BAC was 0.295%.
Morsette admitted liability for the crash; Plaintiffs sued for negligence and later moved to amend to add punitive damages under N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-11(1).
The district court allowed the punitive claim amendment, denied Morsette’s pretrial motion to exclude evidence of his intoxication for the compensatory phase, and bifurcated trial into compensatory and punitive phases.
The jury returned very large compensatory and punitive awards; the district court later reduced punitive awards per statutory caps but denied a new trial on compensatory damages.
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed: it held the admission of intoxication evidence and omission of a limiting jury instruction were prejudicial requiring a new compensatory trial, and it held the court abused its discretion in permitting the punitive-damages amendment because evidence did not show the required malice.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Relevance of defendant’s intoxication to compensatory damages after liability admitted	Intoxication is relevant to noneconomic damages because the manner of injury (drunk driving) uniquely increased plaintiffs’ pain, mental anguish, and behavioral changes	Once liability is admitted, intoxication is irrelevant and highly prejudicial to the compensatory damages inquiry	Evidence of intoxication was not relevant to wrongful-death plaintiffs’ compensatory damages; admitting it was an abuse of discretion and prejudicial — new trial on compensatory damages ordered
Failure to give instruction prohibiting punitive considerations in compensatory phase	Plaintiffs argued compensatory awards were proper given injuries and circumstances	Defendant requested a pattern instruction preventing the jury from using compensatory awards to punish; omission was prejudicial	Failure to give the instruction likely permitted punishment-based reasoning in compensatory awards and was prejudicial — supports new trial
Sufficiency of evidence to amend complaint to add punitive damages (malice threshold)	Plaintiffs relied on Morsette’s conviction/guilty plea and extreme intoxication to show malice/oppression justifying punitive claim	Defendant argued conduct showed recklessness/gross negligence but not actual malice (intent to harm) required by statute	Court abused its discretion in permitting the punitive-damages amendment; evidence did not meet the statutory preponderance threshold for malice
Excessiveness of verdict / passion or prejudice	Plaintiffs maintained awards reflected compensatory needs and statutory allowances for punitive damages	Defendant argued verdicts were excessive and tainted by passion/prejudice from inadmissible evidence and argument	Court found the compensatory awards were likely influenced by passion/prejudice and could not be deemed harmless — reversed and remanded for new compensatory trial

Key Cases Cited

Rentz v. BNSF Ry. Co., 952 N.W.2d 47 (N.D. 2020) (standard for abuse of discretion review)
Flynn v. Hurley Enterprises, Inc., 860 N.W.2d 450 (N.D. 2015) (district court has broad discretion on admissibility of evidence)
GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 209 So. 3d 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (when liability is admitted, evidence of intoxication is irrelevant and prejudicial)
Hammond v. Sys. Transp., Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 867 (C.D. Ill. 2013) (circumstances of death may be relevant to damages, but negligence preceding death is not compensable grief and may be excluded)
Girouard v. Skyline Steel, Inc., 158 P.3d 255 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (wrongful-death damages limited to injury "resulting from the death")
Bismarck Realty Co. v. Folden, 354 N.W.2d 636 (N.D. 1984) (punitive damages require more than negligent or willful conduct)
Stoner v. Nash Finch, Inc., 446 N.W.2d 747 (N.D. 1989) (definition and proof standards for actual malice)