Zaldivar v. Prickett
297 Ga. 589
| Ga. | 2015Background
- October 2009 collision: Daniel Prickett (plaintiff) sued Imelda Zaldivar (defendant) for injuries; each blames the other. Prickett was driving an Overhead Door Company truck provided for his employment.
- Zaldivar served apportionment notice under OCGA § 51-12-33 seeking to assign some fault to nonparty Overhead Door for negligent entrustment.
- Prickett moved for partial summary judgment arguing OCGA § 51-12-33 permits assigning fault to a nonparty only if the nonparty committed a tort that was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury, and negligent entrustment can never be a proximate cause of injury to the entrusted person (relying on Ridgeway).
- Trial court granted summary judgment for Prickett; Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision adopting Ridgeway’s view. Judge Branch dissented.
- Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari, ruled that (1) subsection (c) requires considering fault of nonparties only where they committed a tort that was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury, and (2) negligent entrustment can, in some circumstances, be a proximate cause of injury to the person entrusted; Ridgeway is disapproved to the extent it held otherwise. Court reversed the Court of Appeals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Prickett) | Defendant's Argument (Zaldivar) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of “fault” under OCGA § 51-12-33(c) — may fault be assigned to nonparties? | Fault may be attributed to a nonparty only if the nonparty committed a tort that was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. | Subsection (c) contemplates assigning fault to nonparties even if they lack tort liability to the plaintiff. | The statute requires considering fault of nonparties only when they committed a tort (breach of legal duty sounding in tort) that was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury; but such nonparties may be immune or otherwise not liable. |
| Effect of apportionment when nonparty has immunity or settled with plaintiff | Nonparty fault should not be considered if the nonparty could not be liable to the plaintiff. | Subsection (c) and (d) show nonparties (including those immune or settled) can be assigned fault; affirmative defenses or immunity do not erase fault. | A nonparty’s fault may be considered even if the nonparty has an immunity or the plaintiff settled (which typically extinguishes liability); defenses affect liability but not whether the nonparty’s tortious conduct can be deemed fault for apportionment. |
| Whether negligent entrustment can be a proximate cause of injury to the entrusted person | Relies on Ridgeway: negligent entrustment cannot be proximate cause of injury to the person entrusted (so Overhead Door’s fault cannot be assigned). | Negligent entrustment can be a proximate cause because entrustor’s knowledge of incompetence makes entrustee’s misconduct foreseeable. | Negligent entrustment can be a proximate cause of injury to the person entrusted; Ridgeway’s contrary suggestion is disapproved. |
| Interaction between comparative negligence and proximate cause in first‑party negligent entrustment | Plaintiff’s own negligence necessarily breaks causal chain, barring assignment of entrustor’s fault as matter of law. | Comparative negligence may bar recovery by plaintiff but does not negate that entrustor’s tortious conduct was a proximate cause; apportionment may still consider nonparty fault. | Comparative negligence is an affirmative defense that can reduce or bar recovery, but it does not automatically eliminate proximate causation or the ability to assign fault to a tortfeasor for apportionment purposes. |
Key Cases Cited
- Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 291 Ga. 359 (2012) (interpreting apportionment statute and noting statute addresses plaintiffs and tortfeasors, including nonparties)
- Ridgeway v. Whisman, 210 Ga. App. 169 (1993) (Court of Appeals decision suggesting negligent entrustment cannot be proximate cause of an entrusted person’s injury; disapproved to that extent)
- Barnett v. Farmer, 308 Ga. App. 358 (2011) (holding that interspousal immunity does not prevent assigning fault to an immune nonparty under apportionment statute)
- Ontario Sewing Machine Co. v. Smith, 275 Ga. 683 (2002) (explains when intervening acts break causal chain: unforeseeable, not triggered by defendant, and sufficient alone to cause injury)
- Pitts v. Ivester, 171 Ga. App. 312 (1984) (endorsing Restatement § 390 formulation of negligent entrustment and recognizing first‑party negligent entrustment claims)
- CGL Facility Mgmt. v. Wiley, 328 Ga. App. 727 (2014) (describing negligent entrustment elements: entrustor’s knowledge of incompetence/recklessness and concurrence with entrustee’s negligent conduct)