Zailey Hess v. Jamie Garcia
72 F.4th 753
| 7th Cir. | 2023Background
- Plaintiff Zailey Hess, a 17‑year‑old student on a class‑required police “ride along,” alleges Officer Jamie Garcia repeatedly made sexual comments and physically groped her during the ride‑along, at a gas station, and in a secluded location; Garcia also solicited another officer to have sex with Hess and sought out a prostitute to introduce Hess to prostitution.
- A classmate reported similar misconduct by Garcia; the students reported the incidents to a teacher. Chief John Doughty was the Hammond, Indiana, police chief at the time.
- Hess sued Garcia and Chief Doughty in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, invoking the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses and the Fourth Amendment.
- The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims against Chief Doughty but reversed dismissal as to Officer Garcia.
- The Seventh Circuit held that sexual assault by a government official acting under color of law can violate the Constitution and found Hess’s complaint plausibly alleged claims under Equal Protection, the Fourth Amendment (unreasonable seizure), and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process (bodily integrity).
- The court rejected requiring an on‑complaint comparator for Equal Protection claims alleging official sexual assault and declined to create a categorical line between “serious” and “less serious” official sexual assaults for constitutional purposes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equal Protection — sex discrimination | Hess: Garcia’s sexualized conduct targeted her because she is female; plausibly alleges discriminatory motive without naming a comparator | Garcia: Hess failed to identify a similarly situated comparator | Reversed as to Garcia: comparator not required at pleading stage and unnecessary where official sexual harassment/assault serves no legitimate governmental purpose |
| Fourth Amendment — seizure/unreasonableness | Hess: unwanted sexual touching and being driven to a secluded area constitute a seizure and were unreasonable | Garcia: conduct was innocuous/boorish, not a seizure, and not part of a criminal investigation | Reversed as to Garcia: allegations plausibly show seizures and unreasonable searches/seizures; Fourth Amendment applies outside criminal investigations |
| Substantive Due Process — bodily integrity | Hess: intentional sexual assault by a state actor violates the Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity; shocks the conscience | Garcia: conduct was not sufficiently severe to "shock the conscience" or implicate Due Process | Reversed as to Garcia: intentional sexual assault by an official acting under color of law shocks the conscience and violates substantive due process; court declines to carve out permissible categories of official sexual assault |
| Supervisor liability (Chief Doughty) | Hess: Doughty permitted ride‑alongs despite knowledge of prior inappropriate conduct; failed to prohibit female ride‑alongs | Doughty: allegations insufficient to show personal involvement, facilitation, or deliberate indifference | Affirmed dismissal with prejudice: complaint fails to plausibly allege Doughty’s personal role; respondeat superior is not a basis for §1983 liability |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: factual allegations must plausibly show liability)
- Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (Twombly pleading plausibility standard)
- Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007) (seizure occurs when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (when a specific constitutional provision applies, it governs over generalized substantive due process analysis)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (shocks‑the‑conscience test and relation between Fourth Amendment and substantive due process)
- Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989 (2021) (physical force by officers can constitute a seizure)
- Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing bodily integrity/substantive due process theory for official sexual abuse)
- Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2012) (plaintiff need not identify comparators in complaint)
- Alexander v. DeAngelo, 329 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 2003) (addresses bodily integrity and conscience‑shocking analysis)