Zackary Courtois v. D.s.h.s., State Of Washington
49280-6
| Wash. Ct. App. | Sep 12, 2017Background
- Courtois, a long‑time DDA beneficiary, was found ineligible for Developmental Disabilities Administration (DDA) benefits after turning 18; he had multiple historical diagnoses and a 2013 autism diagnosis from his treating pediatrician.
- He had a qualifying FSIQ (Feb 2013) and an adaptive skills score (Apr 2014); the adaptive ratings were provided by his mother and scored by a psychologist.
- The Department denied benefits, invoking the DDA "dual diagnosis" rules (requiring that qualifying scores not be attributable to unrelated conditions) and questioning whether the adaptive test was administered/scored by a qualified professional.
- An ALJ and the Department Board of Appeals affirmed the denial; Courtois appealed to superior court, which reversed on two grounds: (1) the Board misapplied the dual‑diagnosis WACs (error of law), and (2) lack of substantial evidence that the adaptive test was not administered/scored by a qualified professional.
- Courtois sought attorney fees under the EAJA (RCW 4.84.350); the superior court denied fees, finding the Department was "substantially justified." Courtois appealed that denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Courtois) | Defendant's Argument (Department) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Department was "substantially justified" under the EAJA given the superior court reversed the agency for error of law in applying dual‑diagnosis WACs | The superior court's reversal on plain‑language grounds means the Department lacked any reasonable legal basis, so EAJA fees should be awarded | The Department had a reasonable, good‑faith basis to apply the dual‑diagnosis rules given multiple diagnoses at testing times and the WACs' language could reasonably be read to apply | Court affirmed denial of EAJA fees: Department was substantially justified despite the error of law because its position was reasonable and taken in good faith |
| Whether the adaptive skills test finding was unsupported by substantial evidence (i.e., whether mother was a qualifying professional) and whether that precludes EAJA relief | Superior court found the Board’s finding lacked substantial evidence; Courtois contends that reversal on this ground means the Department was not substantially justified | Department contends its reliance on the ALJ/Board finding (mother not evidently a qualifying professional) was reasonable even if ultimately overturned | Court held that lack of substantial evidence does not compel EAJA relief; the Department acted on a reasonable factual basis and not in a manner shown to be arbitrary, willful, or capricious |
| Whether Courtois may recover EAJA fees for this appeal | Courtois seeks appellate EAJA fees if he prevails on appeal | Department opposes; EAJA fees require prevailing party status | Court denied appellate EAJA fees because Courtois did not prevail on the EAJA entitlement issue on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Raven v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 177 Wn.2d 804 (2013) (EAJA "substantially justified" requires a reasonable basis in law and fact; agency action may be justified even if ultimately unfounded)
- Silverstreak, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 159 Wn.2d 868 (2007) (EAJA substantial‑justification standard; examine strength of factual and legal basis)
- Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988) (federal standard that agency action need not be correct, only reasonable, to be "substantially justified")
- Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Lyons Enterprises, Inc., 186 Wn. App. 518 (2015) (affirmed on other grounds) (example where agency interpretation found substantially justified in complex statutory context)
- Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2005) (observing it is "decidedly unusual" to find substantial justification where agency decision was reversed for lack of substantial evidence)
- Costanich v. Washington State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 164 Wn.2d 925 (2008) (EAJA appellate fee availability up to statutory cap)