Zachary Baisden v. Credit Adjustments, Inc.
813 F.3d 338
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- Plaintiffs Zachary Baisden and Brenda Sissoko incurred unpaid medical bills for anesthesiology services; those accounts were referred by Consultant Anesthesiologists to debt collector Credit Adjustments, Inc., which placed automated prerecorded calls to plaintiffs’ cell phones.
- Neither plaintiff directly gave their numbers to Credit Adjustments or Consultant Anesthesiologists; the numbers were provided to Mount Carmel Hospital during admission and later shared downstream.
- Plaintiffs signed hospital Patient Consent and Authorization forms (2009 form for Sissoko and 2011 forms for both) that authorized Mount Carmel to use and release health information, including for billing and collection and to third parties and billing-service companies.
- Plaintiffs sued under the TCPA, alleging calls using an autodialer and prerecorded voice lacked prior express consent; Credit Adjustments conceded it made the calls and used the technology but argued plaintiffs’ admissions consents to Mount Carmel conveyed prior express consent.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Credit Adjustments based on FCC interpretations of “prior express consent”; the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether providing a cell number to a hospital (which passes it to an affiliated provider and then to a debt collector) can constitute "prior express consent" under the TCPA | Baisden/Sissoko: consent must be given directly to the creditor that incurred the debt (Consultant Anesthesiologists); their numbers were not provided to that creditor, so no consent | Credit Adjustments: FCC precedent allows consent to be obtained through intermediaries and by making a number available in the context of the transaction that gave rise to the debt | Court: Affirmed that consent can be conveyed via intermediary; providing number to hospital (with authorization to release for billing/collection) constituted prior express consent |
| Scope of "provided during the transaction that resulted in the debt owed" language from FCC | Plaintiffs: that phrase requires the number be provided during the initial transaction that created the debt | Credit Adjustments: FCC meaning is contextual—consent given "during the transaction" includes related transactions concerning the debt; not limited to an initial form | Court: Rejected narrow "initial transaction" interpretation; upheld broader FCC reading |
| Whether hospital authorizations here actually cover cell phone numbers as "health information" and permit disclosure for billing/collection | Plaintiffs: ordinary meaning of "health information" wouldn’t include a cell number; some authorization differences (2009 vs 2011) and time limits undermine consent | Credit Adjustments: contact information used for billing/payment is part of health/payment information; the forms expressly authorize release for billing and to billing agents | Court: Cell numbers are part of patient/health information related to payment; forms authorized release for billing/collection and conveyed consent |
| Effect of 1-year language in 2009 authorization and revocation of consent | Plaintiffs: 2009 form’s one-year validity bars later calls; consent can be revoked | Credit Adjustments: the 1-year clause applies to specified sensitive disclosures (drug/HIV), not the general billing authorization; no showing of revocation | Court: Interpreted clause as limited to sensitive categories; summary judgment for calls covered by the authorization stands |
Key Cases Cited
- Charvat v. EchoStar Satellite, 630 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2010) (recognizing FCC interpretive authority over the TCPA)
- Hill v. Homeward Residential, 799 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 2015) (context of number provision controls whether prior express consent exists)
- Imhoff Inv., L.L.C. v. Alfoccino, Inc., 792 F.3d 627 (6th Cir. 2015) (Hobbs Act limits appellate review of FCC rule validity)
- Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. v. Kurzon Strauss, LLP, 759 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2014) (summary judgment standard cited for review)
- Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, 768 F.3d 1110 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding hospital-provided number conveyed prior express consent for debt-collection calls)
- Murphy v. DCI Biologicals Orlando, 797 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2015) (example where context of provision of number supported consent)
- Nigro v. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, 769 F.3d 804 (2d Cir. 2014) (contrasting example where number given outside debt context did not supply consent)
- Savedoff v. Access Grp., Inc., 524 F.3d 754 (6th Cir. 2008) (contract interpretation principles; give ordinary meaning to words absent absurdity)
