z v. People, 2020 CO 53

Defendant Richard Manjarrez, a 45‑year‑old family friend and airline pilot, asked a teenage friend (then 16) to clean his house; her parents consented because they trusted him.
The victim cleaned his house three times; on the third visit (five days after her 17th birthday) Manjarrez kissed her, touched and digitally penetrated her, then drove her home.
After the assault the victim told her parents; Manjarrez apologized by text and was arrested.
He was charged with sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust; he conceded the contact but contested that he occupied a position of trust.
The court of appeals affirmed; the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether “special access” alone suffices to prove a position of trust or whether proof of a duty of supervision is required, and whether the evidence was sufficient here.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether “special access” alone is sufficient to establish a position of trust under § 18‑3‑401(3.5)	Roggow and statute allow proof of position of trust without an express charge; special access is evidence of an implied supervisory duty	Special access by itself is insufficient; prosecution must prove an actual duty or responsibility to supervise the child	Special access (derived from relationship or conduct) is evidence of an implied duty/responsibility for the child’s welfare during periods of access; an express charge is not required
Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove Manjarrez occupied a position of trust at the time of the assault	Family friendship, parents’ consent, Manjarrez’s conduct (picked up victim, fed her, was home while she cleaned, drove her home) created special access and implied supervisory responsibility	Relationship was peripheral; arrangement was a simple employment opportunity; victim initiated contact	Viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury could reasonably find Manjarrez had implied supervisory responsibility and thus occupied a position of trust; conviction affirmed

People v. Roggow, 318 P.3d 446 (Colo. 2013) (adults with "special access" to a child via relationship may occupy a position of trust; supervisory duty can be implied)
Pellman v. People, 252 P.3d 1122 (Colo. 2011) (legislature’s broad definition targets those who gain access to children through trust)
People v. Madril, 746 P.2d 1329 (Colo. 1987) (defendant who voluntarily permitted a child to be at his home assumed a position of trust)
People v. Duncan, 33 P.3d 1180 (Colo. App. 2001) (securing parental permission to take a child to the defendant’s home can create responsibility for the child en route and at the home)