931 F.3d 672
8th Cir.2019Background
- Detectives traced a homicide victim's cell phone to calls linked to a Bristol residence and to Lee Charles; Charles was arrested elsewhere and a warrant for the Bristol residence was obtained.
- The warrant application omitted that officers had heard the victim's phone ringing in nearby Winchester apartments.
- A KCPD SWAT team executed the warrant that evening after a brief drive-by; they knocked and announced but then breached the screen door, deployed a flash‑bang grenade into the living room as a woman holding keys indicated she would open the screen door.
- The flash‑bang caused a fire and traumatized two‑year‑old Z.J., who developed PTSD; Z.J. sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the SWAT officers, the detectives, and the Board.
- The district court denied defendants' summary‑judgment motions; on appeal the Eighth Circuit affirmed denial as to the SWAT officers (no qualified immunity), reversed as to the detectives (probable cause and qualified immunity), and dismissed the Board's appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether SWAT's use of a flash‑bang was excessive force / qualified immunity | Throwing a flash‑bang into a residence with unknown occupants (including a child) was objectively unreasonable and violated clearly established Fourth Amendment rights | Use was reasonable to secure entry and protect officers; at most a close call on established law | Use was unconstitutional; officers not entitled to qualified immunity because law clearly prohibited blind use of flash‑bangs where no basis to expect violence or where bystanders were not checked |
| Whether detectives omitted material facts from warrant affidavit (Franks claim) | Omitted that the phone was heard in Winchester apartments; omission was material and rendered probable cause lacking | Affidavit still supported probable cause given phone traces, calls to Bristol address and employer records linking Charles to Bristol | Omission not material to probable cause; warrant would have been supported even with omitted fact; detectives entitled to summary judgment on Franks claim |
| Whether detectives' decision to deploy a SWAT team violated the Fourth Amendment / qualified immunity | Detectives made an unreasonable decision (no investigation/surveillance) to use SWAT, causing the excessive entry | Even if decision was poor, detectives did not direct the flash‑bang and had no clear‑law notice that authorizing SWAT in these circumstances violated the Constitution | Court did not decide if decision was constitutionally unreasonable but held detectives entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established for that decision |
| Municipal liability of the Board (Monell) and reviewability of denial of summary judgment | Board deliberately indifferent to SWAT/flash‑bang practices; denial of summary judgment appropriate | Board appealed summary‑judgment denial | Eighth Circuit lacks appellate jurisdiction to review denial as to the municipal defendant (no qualified immunity); appeal as to Board dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity two‑step framework)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (objective immunity standard)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective‑reasonableness test for excessive force)
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (material falsehoods/omissions in warrant affidavits)
- Los Angeles Cty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609 (2007) (officers may take reasonable measures to secure premises during warrant execution)
- Milan v. Bolin, 795 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2015) (guidance on reasonableness of flash‑bang use)
- Boyd v. Benton Cty., 374 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2004) (throwing flash‑bang into room with bystanders unreasonable)
- Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2014) (use of diversionary devices must be justified by particular risk)
- Dukes v. Deaton, 852 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2017) (discussion whether flash‑bang cases established clearly established law)