Yvonne Trahan v. the Premcore Refining Group Inc. D/B/A Valero Port Arthur Refinery
09-17-00005-CV
| Tex. App. | Dec 13, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Yvonne Trahan worked at a refinery and sued Premcor Refining Group, Inc. (Premcor) for negligence after an injury; Premcor obtained summary judgment based on an exclusive-remedy defense.
- Trahan filed a motion to recuse Judge Walston, alleging a disqualifying relationship; the trial court denied the recusal motion and thereafter granted Premcor summary judgment.
- Trahan contends her recusal motion was timely under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(b)(1)(A) and (B), arguing she filed within days of learning the grounds.
- Premcor argues the motion was untimely because a hearing was already set and defends the summary judgment on the merits and on coverage under an ACE insurance policy.
- Central insurance dispute: whether Premcor was covered by a workers’ compensation policy (or listed as an alternate employer/additional insured) obtained by Valero/related entities, and whether Trahan was an employee of Premcor.
- Trahan’s reply brief advances five principal legal claims: (1) her recusal motion was timely; (2) denial of recusal is not harmless error here; (3) coverage turns on the policy language, not parties’ subjective intent; (4) the Alternate Employer Endorsement does not apply to Premcor; and (5) Trahan was not Premcor’s employee.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Trahan) | Defendant's Argument (Premcor) | Held (trial court) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of recusal motion | Motion was filed as soon as practicable under Rule 18a(b)(1)(A) and, alternatively, within the Rule 18a(b)(1)(B) safe harbor because Trahan lacked earlier knowledge | Motion untimely because a hearing had been set (April 22, 2016) making filing after the 10-day cutoff | Motion to recuse denied by trial court (found untimely / no recusal) |
| Effect of erroneous denial of recusal | Erroneous denial is not harmless where the same judge then granted summary judgment; reversal required when judge should have been recused | Any error is harmless if the judgment is correct on the merits; appellate review suffices | Court proceeded; summary judgment later granted to Premcor |
| Whether Premcor is covered by ACE policy | Coverage determined by policy language within the four corners; Premcor is not listed and thus not a party/insured; parties’ subjective intent irrelevant | Premcor and ACE intended and understood Premcor was covered; parties’ agreement resolves the issue | Trial court granted summary judgment for Premcor (coverage/dispositive ruling in Premcor’s favor) |
| Applicability of Alternate Employer Endorsement | Endorsement either excludes TX (“not applicable in TX”) or lists only “IF ANY” for alternate employer—Premcor is not scheduled; Trahan was not in special/temporary employment | Endorsement applies (Premcor claimed to be an alternate employer/additional insured) | Trial court rejected Trahan’s arguments and granted summary judgment to Premcor on relevant theories |
| Employment relationship (employee status) | Trahan denies being Premcor’s employee for purposes of the TWCA coverage question; control/borrowed-servant factors favor non-employment by Premcor | Premcor asserts control/right-to-control or alternative tests establish employer status | Trial court accepted Premcor’s position in granting summary judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Union Pacific Res. Co., 969 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1998) (distinguishes mandamus vs. appeal for recusal; erroneous denial of recusal does not void subsequent acts but supports appellate reversal when judge should have been recused)
- First Bank v. Brumitt, 519 S.W.3d 95 (Tex. 2017) (courts construe unambiguous contract language as written; extrinsic evidence cannot add terms)
- State Farm Lloyds v. Page, 315 S.W.3d 525 (Tex. 2010) (insurance-policy interpretation focuses on parties’ intent as expressed in the policy’s four corners)
- Gilbert Tex. Constr., L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 327 S.W.3d 118 (Tex. 2010) (parties’ intent is governed by the contract language, not unilateral assertions of intent)
- French v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 896 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1995) (instrument construction begins with the language used and applies canons of construction when meaning is disputed)
- Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sullivan, 334 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. 1960) (coverage procured for part of an employer’s workforce may extend to other employees in the same class under TWCA principles)